•  8
    Correction: Acquired Spinal Conditions in Evolutionary Perspective: Updating a Classic Hypothesis
    with Mark Collard, Kimberly A. Plomp, Keith M. Dobney, Morgane Evin, Ella Been, Kanna Gnanalingham, Milena Simic, and William Sellers
    Biological Theory 17 (3): 198-198. 2022.
  •  17
    Acquired Spinal Conditions in Evolutionary Perspective: Updating a Classic Hypothesis
    with Mark Collard, Kimberly A. Plomp, Keith M. Dobney, Morgane Evin, Ella Been, Kanna Gnanalingham, Milena Simic, and William Sellers
    Biological Theory 17 (3): 186-197. 2022.
    In 1923, Sir Arthur Keith proposed that many common back problems are due to the stresses caused by our evolutionarily novel form of locomotion, bipedalism. In this article, we introduce an updated version of Keith’s hypothesis with a focus on acquired spinal conditions. We begin by outlining the main ways in which the human spine differs from those of our closest living relatives, the great apes. We then review evidence suggesting there is a link between spinal and vertebral shape on the one ha…Read more
  •  18
    EE II 2 1220a39–b6
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 20 (1): 123-40. 2017.
    Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics has always proved to be fertile ground for at times needless textual emendation. I provide a translation and running commentary on Eudemian Ethics II 2 1220a39–b6 in accordance with the MSS text.
  •  15
    Chrysippus on Retribution and Rehabilitation
    Doispontos 10 (2): 109-34. 2013.
    The present article argues that Chrysippus' reply to the objection that Fate does away with that which is up to us (and therefore with justice in honor and punishments) consists in shifting the notion of that which is up to us from one in terms of ultimate origination to one in terms of self-sufficient causation—and thus in shifting the very notion of justice in honor and punishments from one in retributive terms to one in rehabilitative terms.
  •  8
    This text analyzes Diogenianus’ testimony (apud Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to an objection leveled against Stoic Fate-determinism. I argue that the objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony bears relation to the Idle Argument as reported by both Cicero and Origen but, unlike the Idle Argument, deals with the notions of “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς), “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν), and the issue of accountability.
  •  23
    In view of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s and Porphyry’s respective positions on the issue, I discuss whether logos apophantikos is to be defined, as DI 4 seems to imply, by its being true or false or rather, as DI 5 seems to imply, by its representing the ontological combination/separation of substrate and attribute through the logical combination/separation of subject and predicate.
  •  20
    A Note on τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς and τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν in Chrysippus
    Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 2 (3): 63-66. 2018.
    The present paper draws a contrast between the notions of τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς and τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to the effect that, according to Chrysippus, each has a different role to play and different requirements to meet, the former being especially tailored to suit the exigencies of praise and blame taken as exhortations, the latter those of desert and justice in praising and blaming as well as honoring and punishing.