•  35
    In the debate about the legal value of naked statistical evidence, Di Bello argues that (1) the likelihood ratio of such evidence is unknown, (2) the decision-theoretic considerations indicate that a conviction based on such evidence is unacceptable when expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints, and (3) the risk of mistaken conviction based on such evidence cannot be evaluated and is potentially too high. We argue that Di Bello’s argument for (1) works in a rather narr…Read more
  •  12
    Doppelgänger Changes the Game
    Episteme 1-26. forthcoming.
    Thirders sometimes feel compelled to give the same answer – a credence of 1/3 – to the original and the duplicating Sleeping Beauty problem, which leads to some unwanted consequences. I will argue that they do not have to feel compelled to give the same answer, because the original and the duplicating version of the Sleeping Beauty problem are different types of decision problems. If one accepts that it is rationally permissible to give different answers to different types of decision problems, …Read more
  •  12
    Práce si klade za cíl kriticky prozkoumat teorii J. S. Milla o rozlišení kvalitativní a kvantitativní charakteristice požitků (pleasure). Mill svoji teorii představil jako reakci na kritiku, že utilitární teorie vyhovuje jen zvířecí povaze lidské přirozenost a neuvažuje o vyšších schopnostech lidského ducha. Millova expozice teorie ale není v mnoha pasážích zcela jasná a průhledná. Práce se zaměřuje hlavně na prozkoumání problematického vztahu mezi kvantitativní stránkou a kvalitativní stránkou …Read more
  •  9
    How much are bold Bayesians favoured?
    Synthese 200 (4): 1-20. 2022.
    Rédei and Gyenis recently displayed strong constraints of Bayesian learning. However, they also presented a positive result for Bayesianism. Despite the limited significance of this positive result, I find it useful to discuss its two possible strengthenings to present new results and open new questions about the limits of Bayesianism. First, I will show that one cannot strengthen the positive result by restricting the evidence to so-called “certain evidence”. Secondly, strengthening the result …Read more
  •  6
    A scoring rule and global inaccuracy measure for contingent varying importance
    Philosophical Studies 180 (12): 3323-3352. 2023.
    Levinstein recently presented a challenge to accuracy-first epistemology. He claims that there is no strictly proper, truth-directed, additive, and differentiable scoring rule that recognises the contingency of varying importance, i.e., the fact that an agent might value the inaccuracy of her credences differently at different possible worlds. In my response, I will argue that accuracy-first epistemology can capture the contingency of varying importance while maintaining its commitment to additi…Read more