Pedro Francés

AI is a potentially very beneficial, but risky new technology. There is broad consensus that AI requires a formal normative framework to minimize risks affecting human rights, fairness, and autonomy, not to mention supposed existential and catastrophic risks derived from unaligned AGI. This framework could be entirely private or entirely public, but the reasonable option is a hybrid system: private governance procedures integrated in Corporate Responsibility policies, quality management systems and risk management systems at firm level; and public agencies in charge of monitoring high-risk systems during their lifecycle.This chapter links the main risks posed by AI with the need to resort to time-tested ethical principles as the ideological grounding of legislation and public policy. The governance systems of private companies based on ethical business policies represent the self-regulatory option for AI governance. It is argued, however, that self-regulation is not enough in this case. A public governance system for AI is required. The EU model of hybrid governance is described in detail as the more advanced model in this regard, including a reference to the main provisions and potential implication of the proposed, but still not in force, AI Act.Finally, the chapter mentions future challenges and lines of research regarding AI governance.

This chapter focuses on the moral legitimacy of corporations as a key element of a sustainable economy. In particular, the chapter explores the prospects of a liberal principle of corporate legitimacy. The liberal principle for corporate legitimacy draws upon Rawls’s liberal principle of political legitimacy as stated in Political Liberalism. The principle is justified by a hypothetical social-contract argument at the level of the firm. The main contention of the chapter is that, by means of a disciplined use of the method of the social contract, philosophical thought can contribute normative direction for necessary corporate change within the context of well-functioning, well-regulated and sustainable markets.

RESUMENEste trabajo tiene como objetivo responder a las críticas al liberalismo formuladas en un reciente trabajo de Carlos Kohn. Para mostrar esto expondré, en primer lugar, por qué pienso que Kohn generaliza ilegítimamente una concepción bastante estrecha de liberalismo, relacionada con la economía. En segundo lugar señalaré los límites de esa concepción, y cómo puede definirse otra más comprehensiva, en la que enmarcaré la mayor parte del liberalismo político contemporáneo y, un tanto audazmente, el contractualismo clásico de Hobbes. En tercer lugar, trateré de mostrar que, esta versión comprehensiva es una razonable descripción de la política, que no depende lógicamente de suposiciones dudosas sobre los presupuestos y requisitos de la economía de mercado y que, por ello, escapa indemne a la crítica de KohnPALABRAS CLAVELIBERALISMO-LIBERALISMO POLÍTICO-DEMOCRACIA LIBERAL-CAPITALISMOABSTRACTThe paper aims to revise the critiques to liberalism recently formulated by Carlos Kohn. i will explain, firstly, why I think Kohn wrongly generalizes a quite thin conception of liberalism, related to the economy. Secondly, I will suggest the limitations of that conception. Instead, another, more comprehensive notion can be formulated that can encompass both contemporary political liberalism and, even audaciously, Hobbes' cassical contractualism. Thirdly, I will argue that this comprehensive notion is a reasonable description of politics. it does not depend on doubtfull assumptions over the principles of market economy. hence, it escapes Kohn's critique.KEYWORDSLIBERALISM- POLITICAL LIBERALISM-LIBERAL DEMOCRACY-CAPITALISM

The Rawlsian veil of ignorance should induce agents to behave fairly in a distributive context. This work tried to re-propose, through a dictator game with giving and taking options, a sort of original position in which reasoning behind the veil should have constituted a moral cue for subjects involved in the distribution of a common output with unequal means of production. However, our experimental context would unwittingly recall more the Hobbesian state of nature than the Rawlsian original position, showing that the heuristic resource to the Rawlsian idea of a choice behind the veil is inefficacious in distributive contexts.

Lorenzo Sacconi and his coauthors have put forward the hypothesis that impartial agreements on distributive rules may generate a conditional preference for conformity. The observable effect of this preference would be compliance with fair distributive rules chosen behind a veil of ignorance, even in the absence of external coercion. This paper uses a Dictator Game with production and taking option to compare two ways in which the device of the veil of ignorance may be thought to generate a motivation for, and compliance with a fair distributive rule: individually-as a thought experiment that should work as a moral cue- and collectively-as an actual process of agreement among subjects. The main result is that actual agreement proves to be necessary for agents to be led towards a fair distributive principle and to generate a significant amount of compliance in absence of external authority. This conclusion vindicates the role of actual agreements in generating motivational power in correspondence with fair distributive rules.

The article “Diálogos de paz en Colombia: una Mirada desde la justicia del resarcimiento”[1] holds that the end-of-conflict agreement signed by the Colombian government and the FARC does not bring any general utility; specially because of the absolute impunity that Transitional Justice implies. The deal is dubbed “utilitarian”, meaning that the agreement was made in the personal interests of those who intervened in it -Government and guerrilla-. In contrast, this article will defend the general utility of the agreement and show that, although there are social costs, these were necessary to end the conflict. And they are more than offset in terms of general well-being by the outcome itself.------------------------[1] Article written by Ángel Emilio Muñoz Cardona and published by this journal in the vol. XXI/2 2017.

We advance the thesis that the method of experimental economics can make significant contributions to normative, as opposed to descriptive, business ethics. We contend that there are two basic ways in which experimental economics may make this contribution, and we exemplify these ways by pointing to experimental support of social contract theory as rational foundation for business ethics. These two ways are: (1) adding psychological realism; and (2) testing some quasi-empirical assumptions present in normative theory. In order to make good our methodological claim, we first describe the methodological rules of experimental economics, distinguishing this method from other behavioral business ethics approaches. We also contemplate the possible objection that empirical methods cannot bear on normative ethics because there is no way of bridging the gap between descriptive theory (how people behave) and normative theory (how people ought to behave).

Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy , and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction

Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy (Skyrms, Danielson), and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction

The appearance of the following pages might suggest an "intellectual biography". My purpose is not, though, to offer such a simple thing . Indeed, I would like to follow the evolution of Gauthier's thought not only to show how a thinker evolved from a particular view about a particular problem toward a quite original and suggestive formulation, but also to deepen our comprehension of moral contractarianism and its implications, by means of its contextualization. For this reason, I will focus not on Gauthier's philosophical production as a whole , but on the papers and works that mark the line toward moral contractarianism as it is found in Morals by Agreement . The trajectory we are about to go over is not, therefore, only a personal adventure , but the adventure of ideas. This will not be an easy journey. Our focus on the historical development of concepts will prevent us from giving a fully systematic account of every one of them. The unfamiliar reader may be disappointed as we use somewhat strange terms without completely explaining their meaning. We beg acquiescence with our method, hoping that, on the whole, the essential ideas will be understandable without a detailed discussion

Lorenzo Sacconi’s recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders’ conformist preferences – their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy (Skyrms, Danielson), and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction.