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Measures of Evidential SupportIn Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Evidence. forthcoming.
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Learning from experience and conditionalizationPhilosophical Studies 180 (9): 2797-2823. 2023.Bayesianism can be characterized as the following twofold position: (i) rational credences obey the probability calculus; (ii) rational learning, i.e., the updating of credences, is regulated by some form of conditionalization. While the formal aspect of various forms of conditionalization has been explored in detail, the philosophical application to learning from experience is still deeply problematic. Some philosophers have proposed to revise the epistemology of perception; others have provide…Read more
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No EndBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4): 737-749. 2015.Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to d…Read more
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No knowledge requiredEpisteme 16 (3): 303-321. 2018.Assertions are the centre of gravity in social epistemology. They are the vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are permitted to make an assertion. In this paper we argue and provide empirical evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account advocated by, e.g. Williamson (1996…Read more
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Learning Concepts: A Learning-Theoretic Solution to the Complex-First ParadoxPhilosophy of Science 87 (1): 135-151. 2020.Children acquire complex concepts like DOG earlier than simple concepts like BROWN, even though our best neuroscientific theories suggest that learning the former is harder than learning the latter and, thus, should take more time (Werning 2010). This is the Complex- First Paradox. We present a novel solution to the Complex-First Paradox. Our solution builds on a generalization of Xu and Tenenbaum’s (2007) Bayesian model of word learning. By focusing on a rational theory of concept learning, we …Read more
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On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoningSynthese 192 (12): 3877-3913. 2015.The paper investigates measures of explanatory power and how to define the inference schema “Inference to the Best Explanation”. It argues that these measures can also be used to quantify the systematic power of a hypothesis and the inference schema “Inference to the Best Systematization” is defined. It demonstrates that systematic power is a fruitful criterion for theory choice and IBS is truth-conducive. It also shows that even radical Bayesians must admit that systemic power is an integral co…Read more
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Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of ColorReview of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4): 721-741. 2017.The present paper investigates the first step of rational belief acquisition. It, thus, focuses on justificatory relations between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs, and between their contents, respectively. In particular, the paper aims at outlining how it is possible to reason from the content of perceptual experiences to the content of perceptual beliefs. The paper thereby approaches this aim by combining a formal epistemology perspective with an eye towards recent advances in phi…Read more
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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity ReduxPhilosophy of Science 80 (3): 378-397. 2013.Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews t…Read more
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Ruhr-Universität BochumRegular Faculty
Bochum, NRW, Germany
Areas of Specialization
2 more
Epistemology |
20th Century Philosophy |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Perception |