•  116
    Déjà vu may be illusory gist identification
    with Shen Pan
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.
    In déjà vu, a novel experience feels strangely familiar. Here we propose that this phenomenology is best seen as consisting in an illusory feeling of identification of the gist of the current scene or event, rather than in the intensity of the fluency-based, metacognitive feeling of familiarity.
  •  13
    Subpersonal Introspection
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9): 75-85. 2023.
    Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) set up a broad tent, intended to encompass all forms of directly-useable self-awareness. But they omit an entire dimension of possibilities by restricting themselves to person-level self-awareness. Their account needs to be enriched to allow at least for model-free meta-representational signals that are not consciously available, but whose appraisal issues in action-tendencies and/or states of person-level emotion.
  •  1
    The Innate Mind, 3 volumes, 2005-2007 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
  •  175
    No doing without time
    with Shen Pan
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42. 2019.
    Hoerl & McCormack claim that animals don't represent time. Because this makes a mystery of established findings in comparative psychology, there had better be some important payoff. The main one they mention is that it explains a clash of intuition about the reality of time's passage. But any theory that recognizes the representational requirements of agency can do likewise.
  •  12
    Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism of his Early Thought
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148): 328-331. 1987.
  •  8
    Investigating Wittgenstein
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151): 244-249. 1988.
  •  35
    Meaning and Mental Representation
    Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161): 527-530. 1990.
  •  20
    Tractarian Semantics.The Metaphysics of the Tractatus
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (164): 354. 1991.
  •  285
    The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology
    In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2011.
    The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that…Read more
  •  8
    Review of Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher: Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (review)
    with Jill Boucher and Jane Heal
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 305-308. 1999.
  •  215
    Evolution and the possibility of moral realism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 237-244. 2008.
    A commentary on Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality.
  •  19
    Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150): 131-134. 1988.
  •  38
    BAIER, KURT, The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality, reviewed by Sarah Stroud.. 577
    with Edwin B. Allaire, B. Allaire, John Charvet, Terry Pinkard, Gerald A. Cohen, Stephen Darwall, Herbert A. Davidson, William Demopoulos, and Fred Dretske
    Philosophical Review 106 (4): 589. 1997.
  •  23
    Attitude–Scenario–Emotion sentiments are superficial
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40. 2017.
  •  334
    The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 2005.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Co…Read more
  •  39
    The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (edited book)
    Oxford University Press on Demand. 2005.
    This is the first of three volumes on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. This book along with the following two volumes provide assess of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. This book is concerned with the fundamental architecture of the mind, addressing such question as: what capacities, processes, representati…Read more
  •  10
    The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?
  •  5
    This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?
  •  54
    Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale
    Cognition 158 (C): 165-176. 2017.
    Henry Wellman and colleagues have provided evidence of a robust developmental progression in theory-of-mind (or as we will say, “mindreading”) abilities, using verbal tasks. Understanding diverse desires is said to be easier than understanding diverse beliefs, which is easier than understanding that lack of perceptual access issues in ignorance, which is easier than understanding false belief, which is easier than understanding that people can hide their true emotions. These findings present a c…Read more
  •  64
    Introduction: Nativism past and present
    with Tom Simpson, Stephen Laurence, and Amp Amp
    In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press New York. 2005.
    Elaborates some of the background assumptions made by the chapters that follow and situates the theory that the author espouses within a wider context and range of alternatives. More specifically, it distinguishes between creature consciousness and state consciousness, and between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. And it defends representationalist accounts of consciousness against brute physicalist accounts. The chapter also introduces the remaining 11 chapters.
  •  24
    Introduction: nativism past and present
    In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press New York. 2005.
    Elaborates some of the background assumptions made by the chapters that follow and situates the theory that the author espouses within a wider context and range of alternatives. More specifically, it distinguishes between creature consciousness and state consciousness, and between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. And it defends representationalist accounts of consciousness against brute physicalist accounts. The chapter also introduces the remaining 11 chapters.
  •  56
    Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy
    with Aida Roige
    Mind and Language 34 (4): 540-550. 2019.
    The main thesis of Heyes' book is that all of the domain-specific learning mechanisms that make the human mind so different from the minds of other animals are culturally created and culturally acquired gadgets. The only innate differences are some motivational tweaks, enhanced capacities for associative learning, and enhanced executive function abilities. But Heyes' argument depends on contrasting cognitive gadgets with cognitive instincts, which are said to be innately specified. This ignores…Read more
  •  3
    The bodily senses
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
  •  482
    Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap?
    with Elizabeth Schechter
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 32-39. 2006.
  •  7
    The Innate Mind, Volume 3: Foundations and the Future (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability…Read more
  •  30
  •  21
    Pretend play: More imitative than imaginative
    Mind and Language 38 (2): 464-479. 2023.
    Pretense is generally thought to constitutively involve imagination. We argue that this is a mistake. Although pretense often involves imagination, it need not; nor is it a kind of imagination. The core nature of pretense is closer to imitation than it is to imagination, and likely shares some of its motivation with the former. Three main strands of argument are presented. One is from the best explanation of cross‐cultural data. Another is from task‐analysis of instances of pretend play. And the…Read more