•  83
    Duff on the Legitimacy of Punishment of Socially Deprived Offenders
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2): 247-254. 2012.
    Duff offered an argument for the conclusion that just or legitimate punishment of socially deprived offenders in our unjust society is impossible. One of the claims in his argument is that our courts have the standing to blame an offender only if our polity has the right to do so since our courts are acting as the representatives of, or to use the exact phrases by Duff, “in the name of”, or “on behalf of”, the whole polity. In this paper I will challenge that claim. I will argue that the courts …Read more
  •  73
    Temptations, Social Deprivation and Punishment
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (4): 775-785. 2010.
    Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth recently argued that there is generally a reason to punish a socially deprived offender less than his non-deprived counterpart (ie someone who is not socially deprived but is otherwise similar to the deprived offender in that he committed the same crime, caused the same harm, with the same degree of foresight, etc), because deprived offenders generally face stronger temptations to offend than their non-deprived counterparts. In reply, I will argue that we sh…Read more
  •  47
    Bennett’s Expressive Justification of Punishment
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4): 661-679. 2017.
    In this paper, I will critically assess the expressive justification of punishment recently offered by Christopher Bennett in The Apology Ritual and a number of papers. I will first draw a distinction between three conceptions of expression: communicative, motivational, and symbolic. After briefly demonstrating the difficulties of using the first two conceptions of expression to ground punishment and showing that Bennett does not ultimately rely on those two conceptions, I argue that Bennett’s a…Read more
  •  47
    Punishment and Bad Upbringing
    Criminal Justice Ethics 37 (2): 103-121. 2018.
    This article examines whether bad upbringing affects just or deserved punishment. There are two possible rationales for this claim. First,...
  •  24
    Book review (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3): 411-415. 2008.
  •  24
    Hoskins’s New Benefit-Fairness Theory of Punishment
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1): 49-61. 2019.
    The benefit-fairness theory of punishment, which is one of the most prominent retributive justifications of punishment, appeals to some benefits received by an offender in explaining why it is fair to impose punitive burdens on him. However, many see the two traditional versions of the theory, found in the works by writers such as Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, and George Sher, as being susceptible to fatal objections. In a recent paper, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and Punishment,” Zachary…Read more
  •  8
    Emergent medicine and the law
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2020.
    This book examines the relationship between law and scientific advancement, with a particular focus on the theory of evolution and medical innovation. Historically, the law has struggled to keep pace with modern medical advances. The authors demonstrate that the laws that govern human behaviour must evolve in response to such advances."--Provided by publisher.
  •  7
    Raz on the Methodology of Jurisprudence (review)
    Law and Philosophy 29 (2). 2010.
  •  3
    Book Review (review)
    Law and Philosophy 29 (2): 231-242. 2010.
  •  1
    Poverty, Distributive Justice, and Punishment
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 (1): 39-52. 2012.
    Should poverty be a mitigating factor, if it affects neither the strength of temptations to commit a crime an offender faced nor his mental capacity to refrain from committing the crime? I argue that it should, because of distributive justice. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I argue that we can improve distributive justice by mitigating poor offenders. Second, I argue that there are no strong objections against taking into account considerations of distributive justice in the se…Read more
  • This chapter is a commentary on T. M. Scanlon’s Lanson Lecture in Bioethics. It discusses whether the existence of disagreement affects the justifiability of “libertarian paternalism” and whether Scanlon’s “Value of Choice” account fits better with our considered judgments on allocation of health resources than luck egalitarianism.