Peter Goldie

Manchester
  • Manchester
    Department Of Philosophy
    Samuel Hall Chair In Philosophy
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1997
  •  5
    What is conceptual art? Is it really a kind of art in its own right? Is it clever – or too clever? Of all the different art forms it is perhaps conceptual art which at once fascinates and infuriates the most. In this much-needed book Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens demystify conceptual art using the sharp tools of philosophy. They explain how conceptual art is driven by ideas rather than the manipulation of paint and physical materials; how it challenges the very basis of what we can know…Read more
  •  159
    Philosophy and conceptual art (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    This volume is most probably the first collection of papers by analytic Anglo-American philosophers tackling these concerns head-on.
  •  21
    Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2002
    with Sven Arvidson, John Barresi, Tim Bayne, Pierre Bovet, Andrew Brook, Andy Clark, Lester Embree, William Friedman, and David Hunter
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95): 151-152. 2003.
  • Emotion, reason and virtue
    In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution and Rationality, Oxford University Press. 2004.
  •  79
    The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    The Aesthetic Mind breaks new ground in bringing together empirical sciences and philosophy to enhance our understanding of aesthetics and the experience of art.
  •  246
    Conceptual Art, Social Psychology, And Deception
    Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 1 (1): 32-41. 2004.
    Some works of conceptual art require deception for their appreciation—deception of the viewer of the work. Some experiments in social psychology equally require deception— deception of the participants in the experiment. There are a number of close parallels between the two kinds of deception. And yet, in spite of these parallels, the art world, artists, and philosophers of art, do not seem to be troubled about the deception involved, whereas deception is a constant source of worry for social ps…Read more
  • Die Rezeption von Evolutionstheorien im 19. Jahrhundert
    with Eve-Marie Engels and Michael T. Ghiselin
    Journal of the History of Biology 32 (1): 225-229. 1999.
  •  67
    Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories: Book Reviews (review)
    British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3): 335-338. 2011.
  •  42
    Loss of Affect in Intellectual Activity
    Emotion Review 4 (2): 122-126. 2012.
    In this article I will consider how loss of affect in our intellectual lives, through depression for example, can be as debilitating as loss of affect elsewhere in our lives. This will involve showing that there are such things as intellectual emotions, that their role in intellectual activity is not merely as an aid to the intellect, and that loss of affect changes not only one’s motivations, but also one’s overall evaluative take on the world
  •  118
    Virtues of Art
    Philosophy Compass 5 (10): 830-839. 2010.
    The idea that there is an important place in philosophical aesthetics for virtues of art is not new, but it is now undergoing a serious re‐examination. Why might this be? What are the principles behind virtue aesthetics? Are there any good arguments for the theory? (I will take virtue aesthetics to be the theory that there is a central place for virtues of art.) What problems does virtue aesthetics face? And what might the implications be of virtue aesthetics both in philosophy and in related di…Read more
  •  202
    Virtues of art and human well-being
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1): 179-195. 2008.
    What is the point of art, and why does it matter to us human beings? The answer that I will give in this paper, following on from an earlier paper on the same subject, is that art matters because our being actively engaged with art, either in its production or in its appreciation, is part of what it is to live well. The focus in the paper will be on the dispositions—the virtues of art production and of art appreciation—that are necessary for this kind of active engagement with art. To begin with…Read more
  •  129
    Empathy with One's Past
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 193-207. 2011.
    This paper presents two ideas in connection with the notion of empathic access to one's past, where this notion is understood as consisting of memories of one's past from the inside, plus a fundamental sympathy for those remembered states. The first idea is that having empathic access is a necessary condition for one's personal identity and survival. I give reasons to reject this view, one such reason being that it in effect blocks off the possibility of profound personal progress through radica…Read more
  •  196
    The mess inside: narrative, emotion, and the mind
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Narrative thinking -- Narrative thinking about one's past -- Grief : a case study -- Narrative thinking about one's future -- Self-forgiveness : a case study -- The narrative sense of self -- Narrative, truth, life, and fiction.
  •  358
    I argue that it is possible, in the right circumstances, to see what the kind thing is to do: in the right circumstances, we can, literally, see deontic facts, as well as facts about others’ emotional states, and evaluative facts. In arguing for this, I will deploy a notion of non‐inferential perceptual belief or judgement according to which the belief or judgement is arrived at non‐inferentially in the phenomenological sense and yet is inferential in the epistemic sense. The ability to arrive a…Read more
  •  142
    Anti-empathy
    In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 302. 2011.
  •  35
    Whimsicality in the Films of Eric Rohmer
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1): 306-322. 2010.
  •  61
    Love’s complications
    The Philosophers' Magazine 29 (29): 58-61. 2005.
  •  16
    Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals
    Brookfield: Ashgate. 2002.
    'Understanding Emotions' presents eight original essays on the emotions from leading contemporary philosophers in North America and the U.K - Simon Blackburn, Bill Brewer, Peter Goldie, Dan Hutto, Adam Morton, Michael Stocker, Barry Smith, and Finn Spicer. Goldie and Spicer's introductory chapter sets out the key themes of the ensuing chapters - surveying contemporary philosophical thinking about the emotions, and raising challenges to a number of prejudices that are sometimes brought to the top…Read more
  •  143
    How we think of others' emotions
    Mind and Language 14 (4): 394-423. 1999.
    As part of the debate between theory‐theorists and simulation‐theorists in the philosophy of mind, there is the question of how we think about the emotions of other people. It is the aim of this paper to distinguish and clarify some of the ways in which we do this. In particular five notions are discussed: understanding and explaining others’ emotions, emotional contagion, empathy, in‐his‐shoes imagining, and sympathy. I argue that understanding and explanation cannot be achieved by any of the o…Read more
  •  332
    The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration
    Oxford University Press. 2000.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to …Read more
  •  14
    Breithaupt’s central claim is that “empathy can be regarded as a mechanism for strengthening a decision” . My concern is that it is not clear what is meant by “strengthen.” Does empathy merely give more motivational “oomph” to a decision already made, or does it strengthen a decision in the normative sense—does it give more reason for the decision?