Peter Hylton

The difference between Carnap and Quine over analyticity is usually thought to turn on a disagreement as to whether there is a notion of meaning, or rules of language, which enable us to define that idea. This paper argues that the more important disagreement is epistemological. Quine came to accept a notion of analyticity. That leaves him in a position somewhat like Putnam's in ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’: that there is a notion of analyticity, but that it is of no philosophical importance. But their reasons for thinking analyticity unimportant are quite different: for Putnam it is because all analytic truths are trivial; for Quine, the notion of analyticity itself is unimportant. I contrast Putnam's position with that of Carnap, and also contrast Carnap and Quine. Analyticity only has the force that it has for Carnap because he accepts the Principle of Tolerance, the idea that changes within a language and changes of language are subject to justification in different senses. Quine rejects that idea. That is why he does not take analyticity to be philosophically important or useful.

Quine was one of the foremost philosophers of the Twentieth century. In this outstanding overview of Quine's philosophy, Peter Hylton shows why Quine is so important and how his philosophical naturalism has been so influential within analytic philosophy. Beginning with an overview of Quine's philosophical background in logic and mathematics and the role of Rudolf Carnap's influence on Quine's thought, he goes on to discuss Quine's famous analytic-synthetic distinction and his arguments concerning the nature of the a priori. He also discusses Quine's philosophy of language and epistemology, his celebrated theory of the indeterminacy of translation and his broader views of ontology and modality. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in Quine, twentieth century philosophy and the philosophy of language.

The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The prize-winning Russell scholar Peter Hylton presents here some of his most celebrated essays from the last two decades, all of which strive to recapture and articulate Russell's monumental vision. Relating his work to that of other philosophers, particularly Frege and Wittgenstein, and featuring a previously unpublished essay and a helpful new introduction, the volume will be essential for anyone engaged with the history of twentieth-century ideas.

Deals with the initial phase of the reaction, by Moore and Russell, against Idealism. In opposition to that view, they developed an extreme form of realism, which the author calls ‘Platonic Atomism’. The idea of a ‘proposition’ is fundamental for this view. Truth is undefinable, and facts are merely those propositions that happen to be true. Among the most important works here are Moore's ‘Nature of Judgement’ and Russell's 1901 book on Leibniz; the same metaphysical view underlies Moore's Principia Ethica.

Here the concern is with the logic underlying Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica and with the relation of that logic to Russell's underlying metaphysics. The author emphasizes the fact that work is, strictly speaking, a theory of propositional functions, not of classes; sentences containing symbols for classes are defined by means of propositional functions. It is terms of the latter sort of entity that Russell's Paradox must be solved; the theory of types is, strictly speaking, a theory of the stratification of propositional functions.

Michael Glanzberg: Quine on Reference and Quantification: This essay reviews Quine's main theses about the nature of reference and quantification, their origins, and their limitations. It presents Quine's view that reference is a derivative semantic notion, along with his proposal to eliminate proper names, and his speculation about how our ability to refer might develop. Turning to quantification, it shows the close connections between quantifiers and regimentation in Quine's work, and discusses his rejection of second‐order logic and quantification into modal contexts, along with the important connection Quine sees between quantification and ontological commitment.