Peter Johnson

In this paper, I examine Oakeshott's account of civility by drawing on the porcupine metaphor that Oakeshott borrows from Schopenhauer. I explain why Oakeshott thinks that civility is best understood as a moral practice, one which has a special significance for politics. I outline the conceptual differences between civility understood as a small virtue and as an attribute of the civil condition. Three major difficulties in Oakeshott's treatment are raised. The first concerns his view that 'civil' is an adverbial qualifier; the second concerns the relation between civility in its moral and its political senses, and the third is about the relation between civility and justice. While recognizing what is distinctive about Oakeshott's account, I indicate reservations about his discussion through a series of comparisons with Schopenhauer, and I conclude that, on their own terms, neither philosopher is able to solve the problem the porcupines set for them

Although it is widely acknowledged that Foucault’s accounts of the concept of heterotopia remain briefly sketched and somewhat confusing, the notion has provoked many interpretations and applications across a range of disciplines. In particular, it has been coupled with different stages or processes of modernity and persistently linked to forms of resistance. This article re-examines Foucault’s concept through a close textual analysis. It contrasts heterotopia with Lefebvre’s conceptualization of heterotopy and wider formulations of utopia. Drawing on Foucault’s study of the spaces of literature of Borges, and particularly Blanchot, the article argues that heterotopia refers to varied spatial and temporal disruptions that imaginatively interrogate and undermine certain formulations of utopia. It concludes by outlining how heterotopia contests the space in which we live

Why should modern philosophers read the works of R. G. Collingwood? His ideas are often thought difficult to locate in the main lines of development taken by twentieth-century philosophy. Some have read Collingwood as anticipating the later Wittgenstein, others have concentrated exclusively on the internal coherence of his thought. This work aims to introduce Collingwood to contemporary students of philosophy through direct engagement with his arguments. It is a conversation with Collingwood that takes as its subject matter the topics that interested him 'philosophy and method, philosophy of mind, language and logic, the historical imagination, art and expression, action, metaphysics and life' and which still preoccupy us today. --the first introductory book on this major modern philosopher --includes critical investigation of his thought --there is no similar work available.

The argument of this article is that the Albert Memorial acted as a catalyst for some of Collingwood's most well known ideas in the philosophy of history and aesthetics. It was not, however, the exclusive source of those ideas, and indeed they had philosophical expression elsewhere. One may view his contemplations, then, as work in progress. For example, the logic of question and answer promoted by the Memorial was also prompted by Collingwood's reading of Bacon and Descartes. This was a reflection of his determination to depart from the realism of his philosophical teachers. Similarly, the Memorial directs Collingwood's thought forward. The Memorial acts as a facilitator of his thought on history, which in the course of its formulation undergoes many transformations. The logic of question and answer also finds a place in Collingwood's early thinking about art, but even here it is in the process of constant transition. Collingwood's reaction to the Memorial helps us to conclude that there is nothing ironic about the fact that Collingwood loathed the structure that was also the instigator of one of his most influential philosophical doctrines