•  14
    Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism (edited book)
    with John Turri
    Oxford University Press UK. 2014.
    Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old,…Read more
  •  2
    Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?
    In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.
    This chapter contains section titled: Consideration of (T1) Consideration of (T2)
  • Reply to Professor Odegard
    Philosophical Books 23 (4): 198-203. 1982.
  • Infinitism
    In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, Continuum. 2012.
  •  69
    Infinitism
    with John Turri
    Oxford Bibliographies. 2015.
    Infinitism, along with foundationalism and coherentism, is a logically possible solution to the epistemic regress problem. But unlike the other two views, infinitism has only been developed and defended as a plausible solution since the late 1990’s. Infinitists grant that although there is an ending point of any actual chain of cited reasons for a belief, no belief (including the last one cited) is fully justified until a reason for it is provided. In addition to differing with foundationalism a…Read more
  •  25
  •  56
    “Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are aptly formed only if they …Read more
  •  22
    Keith Lehrer: Profiles (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3): 409-419. 1983.
  •  174
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 919. 1998.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his accoun…Read more
  •  12
    What price coherence?
    with Alonso Church
    Analysis 54 (3): 129. 1994.
  • Recent Publications
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3): 421. 1983.
  •  148
  •  1
    Infinitism
    In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 245-256. 2011.
  •  20
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons …Read more
  •  1
    Certainty
    In Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. 1998.
  •  406
    Skepticism and Closure
    Philosophical Topics 23 (1): 213-236. 1995.
  •  9
    El contextualismo y la verdadera naturaleza del escepticismo académico
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 127-140. 2000.
  •  289
    Why Not Infinitism?
    Epistemology 5 199-208. 2000.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Furthe…Read more
  •  1
  •  26
  •  133
    The Virtues of Inconsistency
    The Monist 68 (1): 105-135. 1985.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets