•  187
    Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering
    with Philipp Balzer and Klaus Peter Rippe
    Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 13 (1): 7-27. 2000.
    The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clari…Read more
  •  86
    Value pluralism: Some problems (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (1): 71-78. 1999.
  •  70
    Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1): 155-161. 2014.
    According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and t…Read more
  •  70
    The so-called resource curse raises moral issues. Who, if anyone, is morally responsible for it? This article argues that this question amounts to: who is blameworthy for the violations of people's property rights? The international oil companies are blameworthy for the violations of property rights only in the case of complicity, not in the normal purchase case. Yet the international community has to take action against massive violations of property rights. The article discusses different meas…Read more
  •  53
    Achtung vor Personen
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (4). 2007.
    Es geht in diesem Aufsatz um die Frage, was es heißt, eine andere Person zu achten. Im Zentrum steht dabei die moralische Achtung, nicht die Achtung im Sinne der Wertschätzung einer anderen Person. Ein wohlfahrts- und ein autonomietheoretisches Verständnis moralischer Achtung werden dargestellt und zurückgewiesen. Es wird für ein Verständnis moralischer Achtung argumentiert, wonach eine Person genau dann geachtet wird, wenn ihr authentischer Wille ernst genommen wird. Die Achtung schulden wir da…Read more
  •  49
    Wieso moralische Achtung wichtig ist
    Analyse & Kritik 31 (2): 351-361. 2009.
    Bittner argues in his paper that the idea of a general duty to respect persons is of much less importance than some moral philosophers think. If respect plays a role in our lives it is mainly appriciation respect persons have to merit. Respecting persons as such is, Bittner thinks, not just irrelevant, but also incompatibel with personal relations. Against this it is argued that respect for persons should be seen as the basic moral duty we have towards persons. And in addition, it is argued, tha…Read more
  •  46
    Normative Handlungsgründe
    Analyse & Kritik 21 (1): 25-40. 1999.
    It is a widely held view in moral philosophy that reasons for action are based on desires. This view should be rejected. Reasons for action are never provided by desires. Desires provide us with motives, whereas reasons for action are based on valuable facts which obtain independently of our desires. The recognition of these reasons does not necessarily motivate us. Motives depend on desires, for instance the motive for moral actions on the desire to do the morally right thing
  •  35
    ZusammenfassungEs wurde für die These argumentiert, dass der Begriff der Würde in der Medizinethik nutzlos sei und in den Fällen, in denen er verständlich verwendet wird, nichts anderes meint als den Respekt vor der Autonomie von Personen. In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass diese These falsch ist. Es wird ein Begriff von Würde vorgestellt, der sich nicht auf den Begriff des Respekts vor der Autonomie von Personen reduzieren lässt. Anhand der Diskussion um ein Sterben in Würde soll auch …Read more
  •  32
    Demanding something
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1): 63-77. 2014.
  •  31
    Sind alle Werte vergleichbar?
    Analyse & Kritik 16 (2): 153-165. 1994.
    Are the values of different options and goods, as cost-benefit analysis assumes, commensurable? Not always. The incommensurability of certain options is based on the fact that preferences are sometimes not rankable, even if the agent is fully informed about the options in question. In addition, even if all values were commensurable they could not be compared in monetary terms. If this is the case, cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as a decision procedure
  •  30
    The paper deals with the question of whether poverty as such violates the dignity of persons. It is argued that it does. This is, it is argued, not due to a lack of basic goods, nor to the fact that poverty prevents persons from enjoying the rights they have, particularly the right to bodily integrity. Poverty does violate dignity, so it is argued, insofar as poor people are dependent on others in a degrading way
  •  24
    Was bedeutet es, die Autonomie anderer zu respektieren?
    Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosphie 102 (2): 174-185. 2016.
  •  23
    Why Be Moral: A Meaningful Question?
    In Robert Louden & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), Why Be Moral?, De Gruyter. pp. 31-42. 2015.
  •  22
    The Volenti Maxim
    The Journal of Ethics 24 (1): 79-89. 2020.
    This paper discusses the volenti non fit injuria maxim. The volenti maxim states that a person is not wronged by that to which she consents, provided her consent is valid. I will argue, however, that the volenti maxim does not apply to all instances of valid consent. In some cases the consenter is wronged even if his consent is valid. Valid consent can only release others from consent-sensitive duties, not from consent-insensitive duties. If the consentee flouts a consent-insensitive duty the co…Read more
  •  22
    Selbstbestimmter Wille und das Recht auf assistierten Suizid
    Ethik in der Medizin 29 (2): 97-107. 2017.
    ZusammenfassungIm Blick auf ein Recht auf assistierten Suizid ist nicht nur umstritten, ob es ein solches Recht gibt, es ist auch umstritten, worauf ein solches Recht denn ein Recht wäre. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht deutlich zu machen, dass das, worum es in dieser Diskussion um den selbstbestimmten Suizid geht, die Frage ist, was Entscheidungen von Menschen achtungswürdig macht. Der Artikel plädiert für eine Idee von Achtungswürdigkeit, für welche die selbstbestimmte Ausübung von Rechten üb…Read more
  •  22
    How permissive consent works
    Ratio 33 (2): 117-124. 2020.
    Ratio, EarlyView.
  •  20
    Achtung vor der Würde von Personen
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 169-173. 2009.
  •  20
    Analytic ethics in German philosophy
    with Anna Kusser and Klaus-Peter Rippe
    Cogito 8 (3): 264-267. 1994.
  •  19
    Democracy and Environmental Decision-Making
    with K. P. Rippe
    Environmental Values 8 (1): 75-88. 1999.
    It has been argued that environmental decision-making can be improved be introducing citizen panels. The authors argue that citizen panels and other models of citizen participation should only be used as a consulting forum in exceptional cases at the local level, not as a real decision-making procedure. But many problems in the field of environmental policy need nonlocal, at least regional or national, regulation due to the fact that they are of national impor-tance. The authors argue that there…Read more
  •  17
    Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives
    with Mark S. Peacock and Michael Schefczyk
    Analyse & Kritik 27 (1): 188-196. 2005.
    In this paper we examine Fehr’s notions of “altruism”, “strong reciprocity” and “altruistic punishment” and query his ascription of altruism. We suggest that, pace Fehr, altruism cannot be defined behaviourally because the definition of altruism must refer to the motives of actors. We also advert to certain inconsistencies in Fehr’s usage of his terms and we question his explanation of altruism in terms of ‘social preferences’.