The idea that sociology has the status of a strict science—that is, that sociology, like mathematics, has at its disposal a well-founded, deductive system of propositions—is nowadays rejected even more by its pragmatic advocates than by its skeptical practitioners; it is refuted both by the arbitrary manipulation of sociology’s internally constitutive, theoretical interconnections at the hands of practical interests and technocratic utility, and by the resultant increasing relativization of its …
Read moreThe idea that sociology has the status of a strict science—that is, that sociology, like mathematics, has at its disposal a well-founded, deductive system of propositions—is nowadays rejected even more by its pragmatic advocates than by its skeptical practitioners; it is refuted both by the arbitrary manipulation of sociology’s internally constitutive, theoretical interconnections at the hands of practical interests and technocratic utility, and by the resultant increasing relativization of its findings. However, as we shall see, the arbitrariness of the treatment of sociology does not correspond with any arbitrariness in its object. On the contrary, with all empirical relativity a structural constancy persists in the agency constructing, comparing, and evaluating the experience of the everyday world, as well as scientific experience. This was precisely Kant’s discovery, that the conditions making possible our primary experience of objects must be, at the same time, the constitutive structure of the objects themselves, and also the framework for the scientifically systematic treatment of them, because otherwise there could be no knowledge in the sense of the structural identification of object, experience, and reflection. This Kantian principle guarantees, then, that sociology is indeed possible as a strict science; that is, it is completely possible as an integral, deductive aspect of theory, as long as we reconstruct, by means of axioms and postulates, the constitution of the object of theory out of the structure of our direct interpersonal experience. In this vein, Rene König, a pioneer in modern German social science, states
