•  545
    The Problem of the Many
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 411-468. 1980.
  •  490
    Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism
    Oxford University Press. 1975.
    In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case.
  •  290
  •  279
    Why there are no people
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1): 177-222. 1979.
  •  256
    Identity, Consciousness, and Value
    Oxford University Press. 1990.
    The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Pe…Read more
  •  256
    I do not exist
    In Graham F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity, Cornell University Press. 1979.
  •  208
    Empty ideas
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 31-41. 2012.
  •  191
    By contributing a few hundred dollars to a charity like UNICEF, a prosperous person can ensure that fewer poor children die, and that more will live reasonably long, worthwhile lives. Even when knowing this, however, most people send nothing, and almost all of the rest send little. What is the moral status of this behavior? To such common cases of letting die, our untutored response is that, while it is not very good, neither is the conduct wrong. What is the source of this lenient assessment? I…Read more
  •  187
    The causal theory of reference
    Philosophical Studies 43 (1). 1983.
  •  155
    The Survival of the Sentient
    Philosophical Perspectives 14 325-348. 2000.
    In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is with the bodies of these beings. And, …Read more
  •  154
    The mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1). 1998.
    For some fifty years now, nearly all work in mainstream analytic philosophy has made no serious attempt to understand the _nature of_ _physical reality,_ even though most analytic philosophers take this to be all of reality, or nearly all. While we've worried much about the nature of our own experiences and thoughts and languages, we've worried little about the nature of the vast physical world that, as we ourselves believe, has them all as only a small part
  •  137
    Skepticism and nihilism
    Noûs 14 (4): 517-545. 1980.
  •  122
    Experience and factual knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 64 (5): 152-173. 1967.
  •  98
    Reply to Stephen Mumford (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 484-490. 2010.
  •  97
    Free will and scientifiphicalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 1-25. 2002.
    It’s been agreed for decades that not only does Determinism pose a big problem for our choosing from available alternatives, but its denial seems to pose a bit of a problem, too. It’s argued here that only Determinism, and not its denial, means no real choice for us.But, what explains the appeal of the thought that, where things aren’t fully determined, to that extent they’re just a matter of chance? It's the dominance of metaphysical suppositions that, together, comprise Scientiphicalism: Wholl…Read more
  •  91
    All the Power in the World
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    This bold and original work of philosophy presents an exciting new picture of concrete reality. Peter Unger provocatively breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Russell. Wiping the slate clean, Unger works, from the ground up, to formulate a new metaphysic capable of accommodating our distinctly human perspective. He proposes a world with inherently powerful particulars of two basic sorts: one …Read more
  •  91
    Philosophical Papers: Volume Two
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    While well-known for his book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's articles have been less widely accessible. These two volumes of Unger's Philosophical Papers include articles spanning more than 35 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics. Unger's work has advanced the full spectrum of topics at the heart of philosophy, including …Read more
  •  85
    Philosophical Relativity
    Oxford University Press. 1984.
    In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an opposite …Read more
  •  73
    Précis of all the power in the world (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 455-456. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  70
    Precis of Identity, Consciousness and Value
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 133-137. 1992.
    This book presents, explains and defend an account of our identity, overtime that is both (a) psychologically aimed and (b) physically based. Not advanced as analytic, or as conceptually true, the account is meant to hold "only relative to the general correctness of our contemporary view of the world". Even so, it is explained why influential contemporary thinkers--Lewis, Nozick, Padfit, Shoemaker and others--have "vastly" underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival through …Read more
  •  69
    The Cone model of knowledge
    Philosophical Topics 14 (1): 125-178. 1986.
  •  67
    Precis of Living High and Letting DieLiving High and Letting Die (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 173. 1999.
  •  60
    There Are No Ordinary Things
    In Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Vagueness, Ashgate. pp. 3. 2002.
  •  59
    Two types of scepticism
    Philosophical Studies 25 (2). 1974.