Peter Zachar

In recent decades, Christian democracy has had a major impact on Hungarian politics. Both the first freely elected Hungarian Prime Minister, József Antall, and the current Prime Minister have favored the term Christian Democrat and have placed themselves in the heritage of this intellectual movement. This study tries to analyze the similarities and differences between the approaches of the two Hungarian politicians and explore their roots in the era between the two world wars. The study focuses on the differences between the Christian democratic movement after 1945 and the thoughts of political Catholicism in the so called Horthy-era.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diagnostic Criteria, Psychological Tests, and Ratings Scales: Extending the HistoryPeter Zachar, PhD (bio)Le moigne narrates a history of the development of psychiatric ratings scales as hybrids between psychological tests and diagnostic categories. In his telling, psychological tests seek to quantify population-based traits on which every person has a position and which tend to be conceptualized as being stable. Personality traits are often conceptualized as dispositions. Diagnostic categories represent not trait-like properties of populations but episodic states consisting of clusters of symptoms experienced by individuals with disorders. Ratings, scales, he notes, are hybrids between the two. They are used to quantify psychiatric symptom clusters so that change over time can be measured. Le Moigne argues that these distinctions were initially suggested during the development of measures that could assess outcomes in psychopharmacological treatment studies.With respect to depression, Le Moigne writes that in the 1970s and 1980s something akin to depressive personality was reconceptualized as a temperament. A key move, somewhat reflective of Kraepelin’s notion of a depressive temperament, was to view a dysthymic temperament as both a predisposing factor and an attenuated form of depression. Thus, an episodic state commandeered the predisposing–dispositional role that was assigned to stable personality traits.This conceptual shift allowed test-like ratings scales to be seen as useful for quantifying not just stable traits, but salient features of episodic states that are potentially subject to change in response to interventions. To put it another way, in the development of a psychological test, one goal is to have high test-retest reliability (i.e., stability of measurement). With rating scales used to measure change, one wants the scores to not be as stable; ideally the scores on the later assessments will be lower. According to Le Moigne, when dysthymia was subsequently placed on axis I of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-III (as a syndrome) and segregated from personality disorders which were placed on axis II, personality traits were evicted from the conceptualization of depressive disorders.One perennial feature of psychiatry and psychology is that even if an older idea is superseded [End Page 253] in the view of some thinkers, it can still attract adherents. Indeed, interest in understanding a relationship between personality and attenuated states did not fully disappear. For example, based on research in genetics, the schizophrenia spectrum concept included not only schizophrenia, but also milder conditions such that were conceptualized as personality disorders; that is, schizotypal personality disorder and paranoid personality disorder (Kety, Rosenthal, Wender, & Schulsinger, 1971).During the development of the DSM-IV, some people wanted to add depressive personality disorder to the manual (Phillips, Hirschfeld, Shea, & Gunderson, 1995). It seems to have become a territorial dispute between mood disorder specialists and personality disorder specialists The mood disorders specialists challenged the personality disorder specialists to differentiate depressive personality disorder from early onset, chronic dysthymia. They were able to do so by using criteria such as critical, blaming, and derogatory toward self. After the mood disorders work group proposed incorporating some of those criteria into a revised criteria set for dysthymia, the two sets overlapped. The result was the old criteria for dysthymia were printed in DSM-IV and criteria for depressive personality disorder and the revised criteria for dysthymia were both placed in the appendix.In the DSM-5, Axis II was eliminated and personality disorders were placed alongside all the syndromic symptom clusters at the same level. Even so, interest in attenuated presentations as personality-related lingered still. During the development of the DSM-5 there was some thought to using diagnostic spectra as a meta-structure for organizing the manual (Andrews et al., 2009). One idea was to move some personality disorders into a best fitting spectrum, akin to attenuated forms. This did occur with schizotypal personality disorder which is both in the DSM-5 chapter on schizophrenia and in the chapter on personality disorder. In the schizophrenia chapter it is positioned as the earliest emerging disorder on the spectrum. There was also some interest in grouping avoidant personality disorder with the anxiety disorders, but the evidence supporting such a change was not available.These issues may...

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

A professor of philosophy at Western University in Ontario, with joint appointments in Philosophy and the School of Health Studies, Louis Charland unexpectedly passed away on May 9, 2021. In addition to Western, he taught at the Universities of Toronto, McGill, and Concordia. He had visiting appointments at Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotion in Perth, and the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. Beyond his teaching and research, he also undertook consulting work for several hospitals and governmental and social service agencies.Louis was the son of a diplomat and was raised as a citizen of the world, with Paris...

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 3-14, January 2022. Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 3-14, January 2022. Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.

It is important for a field to occasionally take stock of where it is, which Annemarie Köhne has done with her exploration of different frames of thought on psychopathology currently in play. As an advocate for thinking of psychiatric constructs as practical kinds that are often calibrated to serve different, even competing purposes, I am in agreement with her concerns about relying on a one-size-fits-all model. Between her and I there are slight differences of emphasis with respect to essentialism and the role and scope of symptom-based descriptive psychopathology. In what follows I explicate these differences.Köhne competently elucidates how a categorical, disease-based model of disorder...

There is a large amount of scientific work on emotion in psychology, neuroscience, biology, physiology, and psychiatry, which assumes that it is possible to study emotions and other affective states, objectively. Emotion science of this sort is concerned primarily with 'facts' and not 'values', with 'description' not 'prescription'. The assumption behind this vision of emotion science is that it is possible to distinguish factual from evaluative aspects of affectivity and emotion, and study one without the other. But what really is the basis for distinguishing fact and value in emotion and affectivity? And can the distinction withstand careful scientific and philosophical scrutiny? The essays in this collection all suggest that the problems behind this vision of emotion science may be more complex than is commonly supposed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Vice, Mental Disorder, and the Role of Underlying Pathological ProcessesNancy Nyquist Potter (bio) and Peter Zachar (bio)Keywordsresponsibility, virtue theory, cultural norms, psychopathologyThe issues discussed by John Sadler are among the most complicated in the philosophy of psychiatry, if for no other reason than that they highlight an area where disciplinary fault lines between clinical psychiatry/ psychology and philosophy seem most evident. We spent a year writing an article on the relationship between the assessment of personality disorders and moral evaluations, and these fault lines became manifest not only between ourselves, but also when discussing our ideas with members of the various disciplines.Many practicing psychiatrists acknowledge that moral attributions (such as manipulativity) might be made about people with certain disorders (such as borderline personality disorder), but also find the argument that psychiatric diagnoses are moral rather than medical conditions to be a ludicrous bit of antipsychiatry in the Szaszian tradition. Philosophers, on the other hand, are less involved with these diagnostic categories in their day-to-day work and are more willing to be skeptical. Whether they are doing philosophy of psychiatry, moral theory, or sociopolitical philosophy, they are interested in digging a little bit deeper and are not impressed by arguments to the effect that—it’s obvious that these are really disorders. Being “obvious” is not a persuasive philosophical argument.The metaphysical task of determining what belongs in the category of criminality compared with other ways of sorting behavior has parallels in moral philosophy: Why is fraud, or theft, criminalized whereas (most) lying is not? Why is one set of moral norms enforceable, whereas a second set is aspirational? Does the difference involve property, where infractions of property are thought to be more serious wrongs than lying, which is “only” psychological rather than material? Are the “most serious” wrongs the ones we mark as crimes? Why is sodomy still criminalized in some areas but betraying one’s lifelong love is viewed as morally reprehensible but not criminal? Both actions are private, and only one seems to do harm—unfaithfulness—yet that is the one that is not criminalized. The point here is that, regardless of domain, our classification systems need to be justifiable, yet justification is most often mystifying. [End Page 27]The same is true for classifying mental disorders. The class of mental disorders appears to be a somewhat inconsistent collection of heterogeneous conditions and does not form a natural kind (Zachar 2000). At the most, the class of mental disorders names a family of loosely related conditions and the reasons for inclusion can shift from disorder to disorder.If the class of mental disorders does not specify an internally coherent kind akin to gold, deciding on the scope of psychiatric practice becomes an important problem. As Sadler asks, for what reasons do we classify pedophilia with schizophrenia—both as disorders—but omit sadism? This is an important question of disciplinary scope.This question of scope is itself ethically charged because, on the one hand, bringing a condition under the purview of psychiatry offers the possibility for treatment, and at least establishes the goal of improving the lives of people with specific kinds of problems. Making lives better is one of the humanistic justifications for science itself; clearly it is a raison d’être of psychiatry. On the other hand, medicalization sets up the conditions for a certain kind of social control. Hospitalization, educational services, day treatment, and disability payments are all contingent upon psychiatric diagnostic practices. These programs and the institutions that manage them are both socially available and socially prescribed. The diagnosed behaviors can now be considered to be entities, and explanations of them can be developed. New technologies for altering them will also be introduced. Such practices have been associated with dehumanization (Phillips 2009).Two important questions also need to be distinguished. The first is a question for moral philosophy—What degree of responsibility do people with putative mental disorders have for their behaviors? For example, should people with psychotic disorders or personality disorders be held responsible for crimes they commit? If so, under what conditions? Should responsibility for certain behavior be mitigated? If so, under what conditions? Moral philosophy...

Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology draws research from psychiatry, philosophy, and psychology to explore the variety of explanatory approaches for understanding the nature of psychiatric disorders both in practice and research. The fields of psychiatry and clinical psychology incorporates many useful explanatory approaches and this book integrates this range of perspectives and makes suggestions about how to advance etiologic theories, classification, and treatment. The editors have brought together leading thinkers who have been widely published and are well-respected in their area of expertise, including several developers of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and authors of the US National Institute of Mental Health's Research Domain Criteria Project. Each main chapter has a commentary provided by one of the other authors and an introduction written by one of the editors to create an accessible, interdisciplinary dialog.

The Contrast Between the nomothetic versus the idiographic was popularized in psychology by Gordon Allport (1937). In the early 1930s, Allport made his name by advocating for a quantitative, trait-based approach to the study of personality in contrast with the prevailing case study approach. In doing so, he was following the trend toward greater reliance on measurement in psychology as a whole. Allport, however, had grave doubts about the sufficiency of quantitative measurement for developing an understanding of individual psychological functioning. The nomothetic versus the idiographic was meant to give voice to these doubts.1 For Allport, the nomothetic referred to the study of populations with the aim ..

We are thankful for the opportunity to reflect more on the difficult problem of the relationship between moral evaluations and the construct of personality disorders in response to the commentaries by Mike Martin and Louis Charland. We begin by emphasizing to readers that this important problem is complicated by the different perspectives of the various disciplines involved, especially, philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology. Incredulity, anger, and dismay are among the reactions we encountered in discussions of these issues, especially with some mental health professionals. Strong reactions on either side of a disciplinary divide occasionally present barriers to a dispassionate discussion of the topic. ..

When i was in graduate school, I inadvertently walked in on a fellow student taking his comprehensive exams. He was extremely frustrated because two of the questions asked about conceptual issues in personality and personality disorders. This student was not expecting such questions and considered them to be unfair. I knew other students in that same program who would have considered it a gift to get such “interesting” questions. Those clinical and counseling psychologists with theoretical–philosophical interests are often attracted to the topics of personality and personality disorders. It has, therefore, puzzled me why these same topics are largely ignored by those philosophers who study the conceptual issues of ..

This article critically examines Louis Charland’s claim that personality disorders are moral rather than medical kinds by exploring the relationship between personality disorders and virtue ethics. We propose that the conceptual resources of virtue theory can inform psychiatry’s thinking about personality disorders, but also that virtue theory as understood by Aristotle cannot be reduced to the narrow domain of ‘the moral’ in the modern sense of the term. Some overlap between the moral domain’s notion of character-based ethics and the medical domain’s notion of character-based disorders is unavoidable. We also apply a modified version of John Sadler’s “moral wrongfulness test” to borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. With respect to both diagnoses, we argue that they involve negative moral evaluations, but may also have indispensable nonmoral features and, therefore, classify legitimate psychiatric disorders.

In this brief commentary, I would like to discuss two reservations I have about the article by Bergner and Bunford. Before doing so let me make some preliminary remarks.Their hypothesis that the concept of disability unites the various mental disorder constructs that have been proposed over the centuries and across cultures is reasonable and accords well with common sense. The concept of disability does a lot of good work in helping us to understand mental disorders.With respect to the authors’ contrast between the disability conception versus the behavioral conception of mental disorder, the notion that counting behaviors alone justifies diagnosing a psychiatric disorder is worth critiquing. Claiming that everyone...

This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, "What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind?" It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared anti-anthropomorphism from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicting the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)