•  50
    For a very long time now, philosophers have been inclined to distinguish two kinds of reasoning. There is theoretical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what is true, and there is practical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what to do. Figuring out what to do is something we do all the time, but it’s not so easy to say just what this activity is. On its face, it seems to have something to do with selecting a course of action. But sometimes we select a course of action without fi…Read more
  • Essays on Anscombe's Intention (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Review 40 1-4. 2013.
    Review of Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland, eds., Essays on Anscombe's Intention
  •  60
    A Metaphysics for Freedom (review)
    Philosophical Review 126 (4): 558-561. 2017.
  •  589
    Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2): 308-327. 2020.
    Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Non-cognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls Non-Inferential Weak Cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders.
  •  131
    Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony
    with Judith Baker
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2): 178-199. 2018.
    Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reduction…Read more
  •  36
    Kantian Morals and Humean Motives
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 109-126. 2004.
    The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
  • The Irrelevance of Desire: An Essay on the Rationality of Action
    Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1992.
    I begin by outlining a general theory of reasons, on which a purported reason R is a reason to F just in case it makes sense to F on the basis of R. The dissertation is then devoted to specifying the conditions under which it makes sense to act on some given basis. There are two main questions. ;The first is how an action must be related to an end for it to make sense to do the action toward that end. One prevalent view is that the action should be sufficient for the end. Another is that the act…Read more
  •  66
    Practical Steps and Reasons for Action
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1). 1997.
    There is an idea, going back to Aristotle, that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief. Not surprisingly, the idea has almost always led to some form of inferentialism about reasons for action. In this paper I argue that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief, but that this requires abandoning inferentialism about reasons for action. This result will be thought paradoxical. It is generally assumed that if there is to be a us…Read more
  •  121
    Velleman's autonomism
    Ethics 111 (3). 2001.
    People sometimes think they have reasons for action. On a certain naive view, what makes them true is a connection between the action and the agent’s good life. In a recent article, David Velleman argues for replacing this view with a more Kantian line, on which reasons are reasons in virtue of their connection with autonomy. The aim in what follows is to defend the naive view. I shall first raise some problems for Velleman's proposal and then fend off the objection that serves as his rationale …Read more
  •  18
    The Action as Conclusion
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4): 481-505. 2001.
    On the question of the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning, few have been willing to follow Aristotle's lead. He said the conclusion was an action. These days, the conclusion is usually described either as a proposition about what one ought to do, or as a psychological state or event, such as a decision to do something, an intention to do something, or a belief about what one ought to do. Why favor these options over the action-as-conclusion view? By far the most oft-repeated answer is …Read more
  •  87
    What goes without saying in metaethics
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 357-379. 2000.
    Reflection on the nature of practical thought has led some philosophers to hold that some beliefs have a necessary influence on the will. Reflection on the nature of motivational explanation has led other philosophers to say that no belief can motivate without the assistance of a background desire. An assumption common to both groups of philosophers is that these views cannot be combined. Agreement on this assumption is so deep that it is taken as going without saying. The only option entertaine…Read more
  •  99
    Kantian morals and Humean motives
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1). 2004.
    The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
  •  97
    The Action as Conclusion
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4): 481-505. 2001.
    On the question of the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning, few have been willing to follow Aristotle's lead. He said the conclusion was an action. These days, the conclusion is usually described either as a proposition about what one ought to do, or as a psychological state or event, such as a decision to do something, an intention to do something, or a belief about what one ought to do. Why favor these options over the action-as-conclusion view? By far the most oft-repeated answer is …Read more
  •  79
    Aspects, Guises, Species and Knowing Something to be Good
    In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, Oxford University Press. pp. 234. 2010.
    Argues i) that part of what it is to understand what is being asked, when we ask whether something is good, is being able to distinguish stopping points in a series of "Why?" questions, and ii) that this ability explains how we can reason from observable facts to conclusions about value.
  •  9
    What Goes without Saying in Metaethics
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 357-379. 2000.
    Reflection on the nature of practical thought has led some philosophers to hold that some beliefs have a necessary influence on the will. Reflection on the nature of motivational explanation has led other philosophers to say that no belief can motivate without the assistance of a background desire. An assumption common to both groups of philosophers is that these views cannot be combined. Agreement on this assumption is so deep that it is taken as going without saying. The only option entertaine…Read more
  •  2
    Mackie's motivational argument
    In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
  •  72
    The meaning of 'good' and the possibility of value
    Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2). 2002.
    Moore held that to call something good is to ascribe a property to it. But he denied that the property could be expressed in non-evaluative terms. Can one accept this view of the meaning of good without falling into skepticism about whether anything can be, or be known to be, good? I suggest a way of doing this. The strategy combines the idea that good is semantically entangled, as opposed to semantically isolated, with the idea that rational agents have a generic disposition to follow reasons.
  •  58
    How reason can be practical: A reply to Hume
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1): 213-230. 2007.
    Opponents of Humean skepticism about practical reason do not normally exploit his idea that beliefs can only serve the aims we have. Many have used that idea to argue in favour of Humean skepticism. Others have denied that it supports Humean skepticism. I argue that we need to use this idea. It is only by embracing the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation that we can truly see where Hume went wrong.