Philip J. Kain

Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence—in a world filled with meaningless suffering. He also believed in eternal recurrence—that our lives will repeat infinitely and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough that eternal recurrence simply be accepted—Nietzsche demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror of existence—a paradox that is completely overlooked by commentators (who thus fail to adequately understand Nietzsche). All of this demands careful explanation.

Within Rousseau scholarship there is serious disagreement concerning the correct way to understand Rousseau's social and political thought. For many, Rousseau does not allow for individual liberty, and also, for many, he is a muddled, confused, and inconsistent thinker. I would like to argue that Rousseau does allow for individual liberty and that his major social and political doctrines are much more consistent than is usually thought to be the case. In my view, Rousseau is a very careful thinker, but his thought is difficult to understand and it is often misunderstood.

The article focuses on philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's commitment to a virtue ethic and his belief in the horror of existence. It talks about the Nietzsche view on the need to construct a meaning for suffering in order to obscure the meaninglessness of existence. The philosophical implications that follow from the horror of existence and the need for virtue to be compatible with happiness are discussed. The article also explores the need for power to create and maintain illusions related to virtue ethic and existence

FOR HEGEL, ALIENATION ("ENTAUSSERUNG") IS NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH ESTRANGEMENT ("ENTFREMDUNG"). ALIENATION CAN LEAD TO ESTRANGEMENT; IT CAN WORK TO OVERCOME ESTRANGEMENT; OR IT CAN SIMPLY BE POSITIVE AND DESIRABLE ON ITS OWN. WHILE ESTRANGEMENT IS NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE, ULTIMATELY IT IS NEGATIVE AND IS TO BE OVERCOME; ONLY POSITIVE ALIENATION WILL THEN REMAIN. FOR THE YOUNG MARX, ALIENATION NEVER OVERCOMES ESTRANGEMENT, AND ALIENATION IS NEVER POSITIVE. ALIENATION ALWAYS LEADS TO ESTRANGEMENT AND BOTH ARE TO BE OVERCOME COMPLETELY. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT BECOMES POSSIBLE TO STUDY THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH THESE CONCEPTS OPERATE

Marx has been criticized by feminists for many reasons, much of it based upon a misunderstanding of Marx. Many feminists take Marx's view to be that the family, gendered division of labor, and male domination are determined by either purely economic factors of natural biological factors. I try to show that Marx holds neither of these views. I also try to show that reproduction and the oppression of women that arises from men's control of private property, which are often claimed to be matters of peripheral interest to Marx, are, in fact, conceptually most central and important for him

I would like to offer an interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, of the relationship of master morality to slave morality, and of Nietzsche's philosophy of history that is different from the interpretation that is normally offered by Nietzsche scholars. Contrary to Nehamas, Deleuze, Danto, and many others, I wish to argue that Nietzsche does not simply embrace master morality and spurn slave morality.1 I also wish to reject the view, considered simply obvious by most scholars, that the iibermensch develops out of, or on the model of, the master, not the slave.2 And to make the case for all of this, I want to explore the relationship between Hegel's master-slave dialectic and the conflict Nietzsche sees between master morality and slave morality. That Nietzsche does not intend us to recall the famous master-slave dialectic of Hegel's Phenomenology as we read the Genealogy of Morals, I find difficult to believe. Yet very few commentators ever notice, let alone explore, this connection.

The question has been raised whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to be like a categorical imperative. The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical imperative is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus thinks the determinism “implicit in the doctine of the eternal recurrence of the same renders any imperative impotent…. How can one will what must happen in any case?” At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny the determinism involved in eternal recurrence. This article explores the extent to which it can be claimed that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without downplaying Nietzsche's dterminism.

On what might be called a Marxist reading, Hegel’s analysis of civil society accurately recognizes a necessary tendency toward a polarization of classes and the pauperization of the proletariat, a problem for which Hegel, however, has no solution. Indeed, Marxists think there can be no solution short of eliminating civil society. It is not at all clear that this standard reading is correct. The present paper tries to show how it is plausible to understand Hegel as proposing a solution, one that is similar to that of social democrats, and one that could actually work.

Some argue that for Nietzsche there are truths and that knowledge of them is possible and desirable. Others think that Nietzsche rejects the possibility of truth and that this gives rise to problems of self-contradiction. I argue that there is truth for Nietzsche. The truth is that existence is horrible. Truth exists. We can know this truth. But it would likely mean our annihilation. Thus, truth must be avoided -- which is different from, despite the fact that it will often appear the same as, claiming that truth simply does not exist. We have through long evolution learned to avoid truth.

This article examines Hegel's treatment of self-consciousness in light of the contemporary problem of the other. It argues that Hegel tries to subvert the Kantian opposition between theoretical and practical reason and tries to establish a form of idealism that can avoid solipsism. All of this requires that Hegel get beyond the Kantian concept of the object - or the other. Hegel attempts to establish an other that is not marginalized, dominated, or negated. What he gives us is a valuable alternative to post modernism, which attempts instead to deconstruct or dissolve the other. Key Words: mastery • objectification • recognition • self-consciousness • solipsism.

This article examines Hegel's treatment of Antigone and of women in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I differ from many other scholars in arguing that Antigone ought to be understood as like the Hegelian slave—both were dominated and oppressed, but, through that very domination and oppression, they subverted the master and ultimately made as significant a contribution to culture as he did. Antigone represents a form of individualism which, unlike liberal individualism, is compatible with the Sittlichkeit that Hegel wants to achieve for the modern world. Despite the fact that many of Hegel's views on women are not acceptable, he nevertheless has some things to say that can be of value for feminists. Certainly, his views are not as objectionable as the ones he seems to hold in the Philosophy of Right, and the latter should not be projected back into the Phenomenology.

In his very influential book, History and Class Consciousness, Lukács argued that Engels illegitimately extended Marx's dialectical method beyond the social realm to the realm of nature and in doing so replaced Marx's dialectical theory of knowledge (in which subject and object are reciprocally trans formed) with a contemplative reflection theory (in which subject and object "persist in their old, rigid opposition").1 Since then, and very much in the same spirit, many others have located the difference between Marx and Engels not in their treatments of historical materialism or method but in Engels' acceptance of a dialectic of nature and a theory of reflection.2 I shall try to argue precisely the opposite, namely, that their differences are to be located in the former, far more than in the latter, areas.

MARX'S VIEWS ON MORALITY DO NOT REMAIN THE SAME THROUGHOUT ALL PERIODS OF HIS THOUGHT. THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES HIS VIEWS ONLY IN THE PERIOD OF 1845-1857. IT TRIES TO SHOW THAT ESPECIALLY IN THE "GERMAN IDEALOGY" MARX DEVELOPS A DOCTRINE OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM ACCORDING TO WHICH MATERIAL CONDITIONS DETERMINE CONSCIOUSNESS IN SUCH A STRICT WAY THAT MORAL OBLIGATION INDEPENDENT OF THOSE CONDITIONS IS IMPOSSIBLE. MORALITY, FOR MARX, IS IDEOLOGICAL ILLUSION DESTINED TO DISAPPEAR IN COMMUNIST SOCIETY.

Schweickart and I both discuss market socialism. Neither of us accepts the traditional Marxist view that market economies necessarily produce contradictions that drive them toward collapse. Both of us think the socialist experiments of the twentieth century show that markets cannot successfully be eliminated. Thus, for market socialism, we keep a market and we work to prevent it from producing contradictions, alienation, and collapse. One question that arises here concerns the role of labor unions. Should they play a major role in market socialism, or are there respects in which they would obstruct it? There is another important issue that Schweickart should discuss. Market socialism, given its commitment to a market, must face the issue of market generated alienation or fetishism. Can market socialism avoid such problems? And if so how?

Machiavelli's advice to the prince is to avoid self-interest and to work for the good of the state. This is not to say, however, that Machiavelli does not counsel evil. To achieve the good, one must do evil. It is necessary. But it is still evil. Machiavelli is not a utilitarian or a moral consequentialist in ethics. If an action has certain desirable consequences, it may be politically necessary to perform that action. But that does not make the action moral. If it is evil, it remains evil. Yet it is necessary to do it to achieve the good.

This book traces the development of Marx's ethics as they underwent various shifts and changes during different periods of his thought. In his early writings, his ethics were based on a concept of essence much like Aristotle's, which Marx tried to link to a principle of universalization similar to Kant's "categorical imperative." In the period 1845-46, Marx abandoned this view, holding morality to be incompatible with his historical materialism. In the later work he was less of a determinist. Though he no longer wished to reject morality, he did want to transcend a morality of burdensome obligation and constraint in order to realize a community built upon spontaneous bonds of solidarity.

Nietzsche’s concept of the self grows out of Kant—and then attempts to subvert Kant. Nietzsche agrees that a unified subject is a necessary presupposition for ordered experience to be possible. But instead of a Kantian unified self, Nietzsche develops a conception of the self of the sort that we have come to call postmodern. He posits a composite bundle of drives that become unified only through organization. This subject is unified, it is just that its unity is forged, constructed, brought about by domination. But if the self is a bundle of struggling and shifting drives, how could it remain unified over time? Nietzsche’s concept of the self requires his doctrine of eternal recurrence, which promises that I will remain the same, exactly and precisely the same, without the slightest change, not merely throughout this life, but for an eternity of lives.

While many philosophers have found Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics to be interesting in certain respects, overall most tend to find it rather shallow and to think that Hegel either misunderstands Kant's thought or has a rather crude understanding of it. For example, in examining the last two sections of Chapter V of the Phenomenology - 'Reason as Lawgiver' and 'Reason as Testing Laws' (where we get an extended critique of the categorical imperative)- Lauer finds Hegel's treatment to be truncated and inadequate.1 The only trouble, though, is that like most other readers of the Phenomenology, Lauer does not recognize that Hegel had been examining and criticizing Kantian ethics throughout a much greater part of-indeed, more than half of-Chapter V. Once we do understand this, I think we must concede that Hegel's treatment is hardly truncated and that it cannot be described as shallow or inadequate. I will try to show that Hegel demonstrates a rather sophisticated understanding of, and gives a serious and thorough critique of, Kantian practical reason.

To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and the role that love and marriage play in it, we must understand his concept of recognition. It is a mistake, however, to think as some do that mutual recognition between equals is sufficient for Sittlichkeit. Rather, for Hegel, the more significant and powerful the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Ultimately recognition must come from spirit (Geist). Understanding this will allow us to see, despite Hegel, that he can capture, better than other theorists, many of the central concerns of contemporary same-sex marriage proponents and help provide them a philosophical underpinning.

THE FIRST STAGE OF COMMUNISM, FOR MARX, IS A MODIFIED EXCHANGE ECONOMY. THUS IT SHOULD BE MARKED BY ALIENATION OR FETISHISM. BUT MARX DENIES THIS IN CHAPTER 1 OF VOLUME I OF "CAPITAL". THE REASON BEING THAT THE WORKERS WOULD BE IN CONTROL OF THEIR EXCHANGE RATHER THAN CONTROLLED BY IT. IN EARLIER WRITINGS, THIS CONTROL SEEMED TO REQUIRE A POWERFUL STATE APPARATUS, AND THUS POLITICAL ESTRANGEMENT. IN SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF HIS LATER WRITINGS, MARX ARGUES THAT SUCH A STATE APPARATUS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. THIS CONFLICT IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT MARX EMPLOYS TWO DIFFERENT MODELS FOR THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM.

Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence: a world filled with meaningless suffering_suffering for no reason at all. He also believed in eternal recurrence, the view that that our lives will repeat infinitely, and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough for Nietzsche that eternal recurrence simply be accepted_he demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror of existence. In this groundbreaking study, Philip Kain develops an insightful account of Nietzsche's strange and paradoxical view that a life of pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again.