Universite Catholique de Lyon

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Accept: theism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept another alternative
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Skip
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Reject all
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Skip
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: epistemic
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible