•  11
    Toy models, dispositions, and the power to explain
    Synthese 201 (5): 1-17. 2023.
    Two recent contributions have discussed, and disagreed, over whether so-called toy models that attempt to represent dispositions have the power to explain. In this paper, I argue that neither of these positions is completely correct. Toy models may accurately represent, satisfy the veridicality condition, yet fail to provide how-actually explanations. This is because some dispositions remain unmanifested. Instead, the models provide how-possibly explanations; they _possibly_ explain.
  •  162
    Some how-possibly explanations have epistemic value because they are epistemically possible; we cannot rule out their truth. One paradoxical implication of that proposal is that epistemic value may be obtained from mere ignorance. For the less we know, then the more is epistemically possible. This chapter examines a particular class of problematic epistemically possible how-possibly explanations, viz. *epistemically opaque* how-possibly explanations. Those are how-possibly explanations justified…Read more
  •  238
    From Explanation to Recommendation: Ethical Standards for Algorithmic Recourse
    Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES’22). forthcoming.
    People are increasingly subject to algorithmic decisions, and it is generally agreed that end-users should be provided an explanation or rationale for these decisions. There are different purposes that explanations can have, such as increasing user trust in the system or allowing users to contest the decision. One specific purpose that is gaining more traction is algorithmic recourse. We first pro- pose that recourse should be viewed as a recommendation problem, not an explanation problem. Then,…Read more
  •  20
    Representing Non-actual Targets?
    Philosophy of Science 89 (5): 918-927. 2022.
    Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non-actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets.
  •  14
    Hamilton's rule: A non-causal explanation?
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C): 109-118. 2022.
  •  32
    Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
    Synthese 199 (3-4): 10039-10057. 2021.
    Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate…Read more
  •  57
    Understanding with Models
    Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 12 (1): 133-136. 2019.
    PhD thesis summary
  •  95
    Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2): 18. 2019.
    One can find in the literature two sets of views concerning the relationship between understanding and explanation: that one understands only if 1) one has knowledge of causes and 2) that knowledge is provided by an explanation. Taken together, these tenets characterize what I call the narrow knowledge account of understanding. While the first tenet has recently come under severe attack, the second has been more resistant to change. I argue that we have good reasons to reject it on the basis of …Read more
  •  136
    How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations?
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73 1-12. 2019.
    One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. Some suggest they provide so-called ‘how-possibly explanations’. However, this raises an important question about the nature of how-possibly explanations, namely what distinguishes them from ‘normal’, or how-actually, explanations? I provide an account of how-possibly explanations that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I argue that the modal notions of actuality and possib…Read more
  •  100
    Non-causal understanding with economic models: the case of general equilibrium
    Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (3): 297-317. 2017.
    How can we use models to understand real phenomena if models misrepresent the very phenomena we seek to understand? Some accounts suggest that models may afford understanding by providing causal knowledge about phenomena via how-possibly explanations. However, general equilibrium models, for example, pose a challenge to this solution since their contribution appears to be purely mathematical results. Despite this, practitioners widely acknowledge that it improves our understanding of the world. …Read more
  •  12
    Cet article reconstruit la théorie hayékienne de l’évolution culturelle tout en en montrant certaines limites et implications. Ce travail consiste ainsi en un effort de reconstruction et de synthèse. Pour ce faire, nous situerons en premier lieu la pensée hayékienne sur la toile de fond d’une réfexion sur les ordres spontanés et sur l’évolutionnisme. Nous effectuerons ensuite une distinction fondamentale entre règles de conduite et ordre d’actions du groupe. Nous analyserons fnalement les règles…Read more
  •  3
    Quel tarif pour la formation universitaire ?
    Revue Phares 10 91-102. 2010.
    La problématique sous-jacente au débat concernant la tarifcation de la formation universitaire3, souvent pas suffsamment explicite, n’est pas de savoir quel est le coût de la formation universitaire, mais plutôt par qui et comment le coût doit être assumé. Cette communication se proposera de répondre à cette question en faisant appel à deux principes normatifs principaux, soit l’effcacité et l’équité. Nous donnerons une défnition de l’effcacité et verrons en quoi celle-ci commande une interventi…Read more
  •  9
    N. Emrah Aydinonat offre une caractérisation des explications par la main invisible. Celles-ci seraient des explications partielles potentielles et seraient en mesure de nous indiquer des capacités à l’œuvre dans le monde et élargiraient notre horizon intellectuel en conceptualisant des possibilités jusqu’alors inédites. Je montre que Nancy Cartwright offre un argument permettant de douter de cette première possibilité. La science économique n’ayant que peu de principes sûrs à sa disposition et …Read more