•  249
    Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would comm…Read more
  •  153
    On Reflection
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 510-512. 2014.
    Review of Kornblith, "On Reflection".
  •  70
    I Know. Modal Epistemology and Scepticism
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257): 640-644. 2014.
    Review of Freitag, "I know".
  •  30
    Predicative Names
    Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 9 (18): 95-108. 2018.
    This paper argues that proper names may have literal non-referential truth-conditional values, thereby undermining the notion of semantic reference.
  •  35
    Kripke's Critique of Descriptivism Revisited
    Princípios 17 (27): 167-201. 2010.
    This paper has two purposes: the first is to critically examine Kripke’s well-known arguments against Descriptivism and suggest that they are not as decisive as many have thought; the second is to argue that proper names do encode descriptive information of various kinds, that such information may be truth-conditionally significant, and hence that a name’s truth-conditional contribution is not limited to its referent.
  • Truth and Meaning in the Port-Royal Logic
    Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 96 127-140. 2014.
  •  289
    Are proper names rigid designators?
    Axiomathes 20 (2-3): 333-346. 2010.
    A widely accepted thesis in the philosophy of language is that natural language proper names are rigid designators, and that they are so de jure, or as a matter of the “semantic rules of the language.” This paper questions this claim, arguing that rigidity cannot be plausibly construed as a property of name types and that the alternative, rigidity construed as a property of tokens, means that they cannot be considered rigid de jure; rigidity in this case must be viewed as a pragmatic and not a s…Read more
  • On Aquinas on Evil
    Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 97 7-22. 2015.
  •  109
    What does Kripke mean by "a priori"?
    Diametros 28 1-7. 2011.
    This paper argues that Kripke's claim that there are contingent a priori truths would be vitiated by a seemingly unorthodox understanding of the term "a priori"
  •  2
    Troubles with Direct Reference
    Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 93 33-51. 2012.
    The Direct Reference view of proper names remains popular today, even though it is dogged by three longstanding problems: Frege’s puzzle of identity statements, Frege’s second puzzle concerning substitution in non-extensional contexts, and the problem of empty names. This paper criticizes the recent attempts by Braun and Soames to rescue Direct Reference from these traditional objections.
  •  15
    ¿Descripciones definidas referenciales?
    Princípios 18 (29): 285-298. 2011.
    This paper questions the claim that definite descriptions have a referential semantics. Two possible definitions of “referential meaning” are discussed, and it is argued that definite descriptions are not referential according to either one. Devitt’s (2004, 2007) recent account of descriptions’ referential meaning is also briefly examined, and some problems with it are pointed out. It is suggested (though not shown) that the troubles with specifying exactly in what sense definite descriptions…Read more
  • Are Quantifier Phrases Always Quantificational? The Case of 'Every F'
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2): 143-172. 2013.
    This paper argues that English quantifier phrases of the form ‘every F’ admit of a literal referential interpretation, contrary to the standard semantic account of this expression, according to which it denotes a set and a second-order relation. Various arguments are offered in favor of the referential interpretation, and two likely objections to it are forestalled.
  •  47
    Interrogando a Musonio Rufo sobre el bien y el placer
    Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 5 (9): 33-39. 2014.
    Se examina un argumento de Musonio Rufo sobre la relación entre el placer y el bien moral. In Spanish.
  • Reevaluando la tesis Kripke-Putnam
    Argumentos (9): 270-294. 2013.
    This paper challenges the Kripke-Putnam thesis about natural kind terms, according to which natural kind terms are referential and rigid. I argue that natural kind terms are semantically underdetermined expressions, and are therefore intrinsically neither referential nor rigid. After reviewing Kripke’s and Putnam’s original arguments, I look at examples of natural kind terms discussed by them and others in the literature, aiming to show that they are indeed semantically underdetermined. I conc…Read more