• Content, Mental Representation and Intentionality
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1): 153-174. 2019.
    Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in at least two respects: first, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism…Read more
  •  8
    Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here.…Read more
  •  17
    Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition, this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism. Extended and distr…Read more
  •  13
    Who's on first? Living situations and lived experience
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 27. 2011.
    This paper is a discussion of Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol's article 'The validity of first-person descriptions as authenticity and coherence' . In section I, I present what I take as being the main points they defend in that article, and put them in relation with the global purpose of the special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which their article is included. In section II, I start discussing the paper by comparing the conception of description they defend with a const…Read more
  •  39
    A problem for representationalist versions of extended cognition
    Philosophical Psychology (2): 1-19. 2013.
    In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it…Read more
  •  36
    Quel Arrière-plan pour l’esprit?
    Dialogue 45 (3): 419-444. 2006.
    J’analyse dans cet article la notion d’Arrière-plan teile qu’elle a été développée par John Searle en philosophie de I’esprit depuis une vingtaine d’années. Cette notion désigne, largement, I’ensemble des capacités mentales non-représentationnelles au moyen desquelles les représentations mentales peuvent avoir un contenu sémantique déterminé et être appliquées. Je tente de montrer que, bienqu’originale et pertinente, cette notion, telle qu’elle est caractérisée par Searle, est tout à fait insuff…Read more
  •  4
    The Many Faces of Experience
    Constructivist Foundations 11 (2): 395-397. 2016.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: The priority Kordeš gives to empirical phenomenology in the empirical assessment and grounding of constructivism stems from a restrictive conception of experience that has been questioned by other proponents of what he calls the “phenomenological attitude.”
  •  14
    This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the q…Read more
  •  50
    This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that…Read more
  •  44
    Boundless thought. The case of conceptual mental episodes
    Manuscrito 35 (2): 269-309. 2012.
    I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they hav…Read more
  •  2
    Relocating mental phenomena: the philosophy of the spirit of Dewey
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (245): 273-292. 2008.
  •  20
    Interaction et transaction
    Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 6 203-213. 2010.
  •  4
    Présentation
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 260 (2): 153-154. 2012.
  •  8
    Délocaliser les phénomènes mentaux: la philosophie de l'esprit de Dewey
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 245 (3): 273-292. 2008.
  •  56
    Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition , this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism . Extended and dis…Read more
  •  2
    Interaction et transaction: quelques enjeux pragmatistes pour une conception relationnelle de l’organisme
    Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 6 203-213. 2010.
  •  321
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, b…Read more
  •  74
    The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3): 1-24. 2014.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in…Read more
  •  13
    Mental Explicitness
    Abstracta 3 (1): 2-22. 2006.
    This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the q…Read more