• Russell-Arg Philosophers
    Routledge. 1999.
    First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
  •  97
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
  •  68
    Paderewski Variations
    Dialectica 64 (4): 483-502. 2010.
    How successful are Fregean theories compared with guise-theoretic Millian theories in dealing with a range of problematic propositional attitude ascriptions? The range considered is roughly that of Paderewski puzzles and their relatives. I argue that these fall into two categories: in one category, the Fregean theory looks to be under pressure from guise-theoretic rivals, though I argue that Fregeans can, to advantage, borrow some guise-theoretic machinery. Concerning the other category, which i…Read more
  • Departing from Frege. Essays in the Philosophy of Language
    Erkenntnis 62 (1): 137-144. 2005.
  •  26
    Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation
    Philosophical Issues 10 (1): 191-200. 2000.
  • Reference without Referents
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2): 428-428. 2005.
  •  29
    Of Course there are Fictional Characters
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4): 615-630. 2012.
  •  5
    Facts and Free Logic
    ProtoSociology 23 122-130. 2006.
  •  2
    First Published in 1979. Paperback 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informal company. This is an overview of Russell's philosophy, focussing in particular on his earlier work. Carter headings: Meaning; Names; Descriptions; The Perfect Language; Knowledge; Ontology; Mathematics
  •  92
    Review: Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4). 1995.
    Review of Williamson: Vagueness.
  •  44
    Cambridge University Press. 2009.
    A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Many paradoxes raise serious philosophical problems, and they are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. The expanded and revised third edition of this intriguing book considers a range of knotty paradoxes including Zeno's paradoxical claim that the runner can never overtake the tortoise, a new chapter on paradoxes about morals, paradoxes a…Read more
  •  1
    Thought and Ontology (edited book)
    Franco Angeli. 1997.
  •  6
    Names, Fictional Names, And ‘Really’: R.M. Sainsbury
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (1): 243-269. 1999.
  •  261
    I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of Concepts
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 101-124. 2011.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the…Read more
  •  16
    Logika filozoficzna
    Roczniki Filozoficzne 55 (2): 155-222. 2007.
  •  83
    Empty Names
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 57-66. 2000.
    This paper explores the idea that a name should be associated with a reference condition, rather than with a referent, just as a sentence should be associated with a truth condition, rather than with a truth value. The suggestion, to be coherent, needs to be set in a freelogical framework (following Burge). A prominent advantage of the proposal is that it gives a straight-forward semantics for empty names. A problem discussed in this paper is that of reconciling the rigidity of names with seemin…Read more
  •  6
    No Title available: Reviews
    Philosophy 88 (3): 475-478. 2013.
  •  88
    Is there higher-order vagueness?
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163): 167-182. 1991.
  •  2
    Critical Notice
    Mind 94 (373). 1985.
  •  6
    Logical Forms explains both the detailed problems involved in finding logical forms and also the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical logic. In this revised edition, exercises are integrated throughout the book. The result is a genuinely interactive introduction which engages the reader in developing the argument. Each chapter concludes with updated notes to guide further reading.
  •  54
    This text argues that we must depart considerably from Frege's own views if we are to work towards an adequate conception of natural language.
  •  59
    Moral dilemmas
    Think 8 (22): 57-63. 2009.
    Could it be that one morally ought to do something morally bad? Some people think the answer is obviously ‘No’. Indeed, these theorists may say, it is contradictory to suppose that one morally ought to do something morally bad. Others hold that it is not a contradiction but a sad fact of life that one may be morally required to do something morally bad. This latter position is the one I'll be supporting. If it's the right view, it really matters in practical affairs. For example, almost everyone…Read more