Raef Zreik

This article engages the analogy of Palestine/Israel to apartheid South Africa, and probes the political imaginary that contours this discussion while explicating the circumstances of its emergence. Accordingly, it contends that apartheid is not merely a system of institutionalized separation; rather, it organizes the facts and reality of separation(s) within a frame and against a background unity that effectively allows it to be perceived as such. To that end, the article explores four key factors that created background unity in apartheid South Africa: labor relations; political theology; role of language; and geo-political unit(y), and scrutinizes their political and experiential ramifications in Palestine/Israel.

The case of Israel generally, and specifically regarding the justifications put forth for the Law of Return by a wide range of liberal scholars, accents the main problems and weaknesses of liberal legality. Part one of the paper rethinks aspects of liberal legality and its artificial nature in light of debates surrounding the Law of Return. Debating both the case of Israel and the insistence of many Israeli scholars on justifying the Law using liberal terms, this part reveals certain aspects of liberalism that usually remain hidden. Part III comments on Israel and evaluates the Law of Return while comparing it to similar laws, arguing that even after revisiting liberal legality, the Law of Return scores badly according to the criteria of liberal legality. Thus, the first analysis places Israel within a paradigm, revealing that Israel may not be so exceptional. For those who view liberalism as a pure, ideal theory this paper points to the dark side of liberalism, and thereby suggests that Israel might not be the only “pariah” state, but even within the new paradigm , the Law of Return is at the extreme end of the spectrum and scores badly

This Article makes three moves. First it suggests and elaborates a distinction—already implicit in the literature—between what I will call the first and second order of arguments for justice (hereinafter FOAJ and SOAJ). In part, it is a distinction somewhat similar to that between just war and justice in war. SOAJ are akin to the rules governing justice in war or rules of engagement, while bracketing the reasons and causes of the conflict. FOAJ on the hand are those principles of justice and arguments that derive their power from the distribution of entitlements, rights and duties of the parties prior to the conflict they are supposed to adjudicate. FOAJ aim in many ways to restore the distribution of entitlements that existed on the eve of the conflict. Thus, all arguments for corrective or historical justice could be viewed as FOAJ. The second move in the paper associates FOAJ with the Palestinians and SOAJ with Zionism first and Israel later on. The more the settler Zionist project became a reality, the more the Palestinian population felt a threat to their national project and exercised resistance, including violent resistance. The more Palestinians showed resistance, the more appealing and more relevant SOAJ of self-defense, security, and emergency. The third move in the paper is to ask questions regarding the relation between FOAJ and SOAJ offer a critique of the distinction itself, and offers a critique of the way the distinction is being deployed in the case of Israel-Palestine. The Israeli claims for self-defense and security(SOAJ) are becoming so pervasive that they threaten to suspend the claims for historical justice forever (FOAJ), to the point that everything, even the regime that is crystallizing in front of our eyes as an Apartheid regime, is being justified as a temporal necessity. Israel deployment of SOAJ is done in bad faith.