Rafael Winkler

Born in 1900–1901 with the publication of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, phenomenology, as a critical method of reflection on consciousness and its cognitive achievements against its naturalisation in the natural sciences, has undergone many changes and developments. Critiques of both its methods and tasks have emerged, plus it has served as an inspiration for numerous thinkers, including Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Henry, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, in their attempts to address the question of value, the meaning of being, existence, the lived body, the Other, life, art, history and language in original and fresh ways. The current paper reflects upon the question of what the fate of phenomenology in the twenty-first century could be by considering some of the recent work presented at the first conference of the South African Centre for Phenomenology held at the University of Johannesburg earlier this year

In this paper we present a reconstruction of Hegel's critique of Kant. We try to show the congruence of that critique in both theoretical and practical philosophy. We argue that this congruence is to be found in Hegel's criticism of Kant's hylemorphism in his theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel is much more sympathetic to Kant's response to the distinction between matter and form in his theoretical philosophy and he credits Kant with ‘discovering’ here that thinking is an activity that always takes place within a greater whole. He, however, argues that the consequences of this are much more significant than Kant suspects and that, most importantly, the model of cognition in which thought (form) confronts something non-thought (matter) is unsustainable. This leads to Hegel's appropriation of Kantian reflective judgements, arguing that the greater whole in which thinking takes place is a socially shared set of meanings, something resembling what Kant calls a sensus communis. From here, it is not far to Hegel's Geist, which eventually gains self-consciousness in Sittlichkeit, a whole of social practices of mutual recognition. In practical philosophy, Hegel argues for the importance of situating oneself within such a whole in order to attain the self-knowledge required for autonomous, or ethically required, action. For this to happen, he claims, it is necessary to recognise the status of Kantian Moralität as a form of Sittlichkeit or social practice. This would justify our practices without an appeal to a ‘fact of reason’ and also allow a wider range of actions that could count as autonomous.

This book provides a persuasive account of how identity and difference factor in the debate on the 'self' in the humanities. It explores this topic by applying the question to fields such as philosophy, cultural studies, politics and race studies. Key themes discussed in this collection include: authenticity in Michel de Montaigne's essays, the limits of the narrative constitution of the self, the use and abuse of the notion of human nature in political theory and in the current political context of multiculturalism, and the feminist notion of the erotic and of sexual violence. This book will appeal to readers with an interest in new perspectives on the self within the humanities.

_ Source: _Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 366 - 387 In this article, I focus on Heidegger’s conception of hospitality in his first and final lectures on Hölderlin’s _Germania_, _Remembrance_, and _The Ister_. I argue that the hospitality of the foreigner for Heidegger is the condition of possibility of dwelling understood as the happening of history.In the first section I analyze the notions of hospitality in Levinas and Derrida. The second section unpacks some of the senses of the earth in Heidegger as the site of man’s historical dwelling, whereas in the third section I focus on holy mourning as the disposition that reveals the earth as the uncanny ground of history. In the final section, I spell out Heidegger’s conception of hospitality, the greeting, and the foreign guest.

Excited states in Si38,40,42 nuclei have been studied via in-beam γ-ray spectroscopy with multinucleon removal reactions. Intense radioactive beams of S40 and S44 provided at the new facility of the RIKEN Radioactive Isotope Beam Factory enabled γ-γ coincidence measurements. A prominent γ line observed with an energy of 742 keV in Si42 confirms the 2 + state reported in an earlier study. Among the γ lines observed in coincidence with the 2 +→0 + transition, the most probable candidate for the transition from the yrast 4 + state was identified, leading to a 41+ energy of 2173 keV. The energy ratio of 2.93 between the 21+ and 41+ states indicates well-developed deformation in Si42 at N=28 and Z=14. Also for Si38,40 energy ratios with values of 2.09 and 2.56 were obtained. Together with the ratio for Si42, the results show a rapid deformation development of Si isotopes from N=24 to N=28. © 2012 American Physical Society.

In this paper we examine Nietzsche’s relation to the life sciences of his time and to Darwinism in particular, arguing that his account of the will to power in terms of technics eschews three metaphysical prejudices, hylemorphism, utilitarianism, and teleological thinking. Telescoping some of Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the will to power with a Bergsonian lens, our reading of the will to power, as an operation productive of time, the future or life, offers an alternative to Heidegger’s. Rather than being reducible to a technics of domination or mastery, the will to power, we argue, is best interpreted as a technics of material forces that recasts all things past and future, near and far, moment by moment

Since the publication and reception of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger, it has become standard practice among some authors to argue that Heidegger’s thinking of being, both early and late, is an insistent meditation on the alterity of the self in the call of conscience and the alterity of being in relation to beings, and that this thought is consequently already ‘ethical’. This line of argument has been recently pursued by Dastur, Raffoul, and Ricoeur. None of them contests that there is a difference between the alterity of the self and the alterity of the other. But they argue that the experience of the first is the condition of possibility of gaining access to the second. There are several reasons why I have failed to be convinced by this argument. In this paper, I spell out those reasons and argue that Ricoeur’s attempt to carve out a path between Heidegger and Levinas remains unsuccessful

This collection reflects recent discussions on the relation between identity and difference in metaphysics, and in moral and political theory in both the analytic and continental traditions. The contributions to the volume tackle such issues as the role and place of the concept of identity in Hegel’s _Science of Logic_; the question of personal identity in Parfit, Riceour and Schechtman; the problem of inclusion and exclusion in Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy; Heidegger’s conception of the relation between philosophy and politics, the question of alterity in Levinas; and Foucault’s conception of the relation between sexual instinct, economic interest, and desire. This book was originally published as a special issue of the _Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. _.

At present, ‘naturalism’ is arguably the dominant trend in both Anglo-American and European philosophy. Owing to the influence of the works of W.V.O. Quine, Wilfred Sellars, and Hillary Putnam, among others, naturalism both as a methodological and ontological position has become one of the mainstays of contemporary analytic approaches to knowledge, mind and ethics. From the early 1990s onward, European philosophy in the English-speaking world has been witnessing a turn from the philosophies of the subjects of phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism and a revival of a certain kind of vitalism, whether Bergsonian or Nietzschean, and also of a certain kind of materialism that is close in spirit to Spinoza’s _Ethics_ and to the naturalism and monism of the early Ionian thinkers. This book comprises essays written by experts in both the European and the Anglo-American traditions such as John Sallis, David Papineau, David Cerbone, Dan Zahavi, Paul Patton, Bernhard Weiss, Jack Reynolds and Benedict Smith, who explore the limit of naturalism and the debate between naturalism and phenomenology. This book also considers the relation between Deleuze’s philosophy and naturalism as well as the critique of phenomenology by speculative realism. This book was originally published as a special issue of the _International Journal of Philosophical Studies. _.

This essay presents a defence of the hermeneutical and existential standpoint of Being and Time against Cristina Lafont’s historicist and relativist reading. I show that there are substantive and textual difficulties with the Kantian reading of the understanding of being she endorses, which leads her to ignore the existential and hermeneutical aspects of Heidegger’s theory of meaning. The first section shows that the understanding of being is neither an unrevisable synthetic apriori nor a historically contingent conceptual scheme but that it originates from care and that its articulation depends on the disclosure of a world . The second section turns to Heidegger’s theory of meaning qua worldhood. In the first place, I demonstrate that the relativity of meaning to Dasein doesn’t entail the kind of relativism Lafont ascribes to Heidegger and, in the second, how it avoids the supposed tension Lafont identifies in Being and Time between the claim that Dasein constitutes the world and the claim that it depends on a historically and linguistically constituted world. I conclude with some remarks on what is novel about Heidegger’s existential and hermeneutical outlook on meaning

This article offers a new reading of Heidegger's thesis of the animal in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Framing Heidegger's text through a brief analysis of Protagoras' genetic story of nature and of man's nature in Plato's eponymous dialogue, our reading brings out three key elements common to both texts: living nature as a normative rather than a physical order, the poverty of man's world in relation to the animal, and the attempted redemption of the latter through the acquisition of Weltbildung. Staying with the way Heidegger brings out man's poverty in world in the text allows us (i) to undo once for all the oft-repeated charge of Heidegger's anthropocentric interpretation of the animal, (ii) to stage the hypothesis that philosophy and the life sciences of his day draw upon a common basic experience of the autonomy of life in relation to everything human, all-too-human, and (iii) to demonstrate the normativity and poverty of life.