•  276
    The Limits of Toleration
    Constellations 11 (3): 312-325. 2004.
  •  241
    Toleration
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
    The term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, a monarch …Read more
  •  233
    Tolerance as a virtue of justice
    Philosophical Explorations 4 (3). 2001.
    This article argues that the civic virtue of tolerance has to be understood as a virtue of justice. Based on an analysis of the concept of toleration and its paradoxes, it shows that toleration is a 'normatively dependent concept' that needs to take recourse to a conception of justice in order to solve these paradoxes. At the center of this conception of justice lies a principle of reciprocal and general justification with the help of which a distinction between moral norms and ethical values is…Read more
  •  191
  •  170
    A Kantian Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination
    In Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink (eds.), Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics, Edinburgh University Press. 2013.
    This chapter explores the relationship between republican democracy and justice by comparing Philip Pettit's notion of neo-republicanism with that of Immanuel Kant. It begins by describing a republican, political conception of justice as nondomination and explaining why the discourse of republicanism and that of theories of justice often remain at odds with one another. It then considers the basis of a republican conception of justice as nondomination and locates it within the principle of justi…Read more
  •  167
    Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice
    Metaphilosophy 32 (1-2): 160-179. 2001.
    This paper argues for a conception of transnational justice that provides an alternative to globalist and statist views. In light of an analysis of the transnational context of justice, a critical theory is suggested that addresses the multiple relations of injustice and domination to be found in this context. Based on a universal, individual right to reciprocal and general justification, this theory argues for justifiable social and political relations both within and between states. In both of…Read more
  •  152
    How (not) to speak about identity: The concept of the person in a theory of justice
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 18 (3-4): 293-312. 1992.
  •  137
    Introduction: the foundation of justice -- Practical reason and justifying reasons: on the foundation of morality -- Moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality : toward a theory of normativity after Kant -- Ethics and morality -- The justification of justice: Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's discourse theory in dialogue -- Political liberty: integrating five conceptions of autonomy -- A critical theory of multicultural toleration -- The rule of reasons: three models of deliberative d…Read more
  •  124
    Noumenal Power
    Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (2): 111-127. 2014.
  •  118
    This article argues that alienation should be understood as a particular form of individual and social heteronomy that can only be overcome by a dialectical combination of individual and collective autonomy, recovering a deontological sense of normative authority. If we think about alienation in Kantian terms, the main source of alienation is a denial of standing or, in the extreme, losing a sense of oneself as a rational normative authority equal to all others. I call the former kind of alienat…Read more
  •  108
    The Rule of Reasons. Three Models of Deliberative Democracy
    Ratio Juris 14 (4): 345-378. 2001.
    In this paper, the author contrasts three models of deliberative democracy: a liberal one, a communitarian one, and an alternative to both. Rather than understanding deliberative democracy as the rule of principles of justice or of communal values, the third model conceives of it as the “rule of reasons.” On the basis of a discussion of seven components of an “ethos of democracy” (the cognitive capacities of citizens, political virtues, the cultural, institutional and material conditions of demo…Read more
  •  107
    Foundations of a Theory of Multicultural Justice
    Constellations 4 (1): 63-71. 1997.
  •  93
    The ground of critique: On the concept of human dignity in social orders of justification
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (9): 965-976. 2011.
    In the practice of social criticism, the concept of human dignity has played and still plays an important role. In philosophical debates, however, we find widely divergent accounts of that concept, ranging from views based on a conception of human needs to religious approaches trying to explain the ‘inviolability’ of the person. The view presented here reconstructs the basic claim of human dignity historically and normatively as resting on the moral status of the person as a reason-giving, reaso…Read more
  •  86
    The Injustice of Justice
    Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28 (2): 39-51. 2007.
  •  82
    Moral Autonomy and the Autonomy of Morality
    Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26 (1): 65-88. 2005.
    The original German version appeared as “Moralische Autonomie und Autonomie der Moral: Zu einer Theorie der Normativität nach Kant,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 52:2, pp. 179-97. The editors gratefully acknowledge permission granted by Akademie Verlag to publish the present version.
  •  80
    First Things First Redistribution, Recognition and Justification
    European Journal of Political Theory 6 (3): 291-304. 2007.
    This article analyses the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth in a dialectical fashion. Their controversy about how to construct a critical theory of justice is not just one about the proper balance between `redistribution' and `recognition', it also involves basic questions of social ontology. Differing both from Fraser's `twodimensional' view of `participatory parity' and from Honneth's `monistic' theory of recognition, the article argues for a third view of `justificatory monism and …Read more
  •  72
    A critical theory of politics
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (3): 225-234. 2015.
    In this article, I address the various objections raised by Simone Chambers, Stephen White and Lea Ypi concerning my version of a critical theory of politics. I explain the basic assumptions that inform my account of a critique of relations of justification, its particular method and aims.
  •  70
    What is important in theorizing tolerance today?
    with Wendy Brown, Jan Dobbernack, Tariq Modood, Glen Newey, Andrew F. March, and Lars Tønder
    Contemporary Political Theory 14 (2): 159-196. 2015.
  •  69
    Noumenal Power
    Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (14): 161-185. 2019.
    The same as with many other concepts, once one considers the concept of power more closely, fundamental questions arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination, a view that makes it difficult to identify legitimate forms of the exercise of power. To contribute to conceptual as well as normative clarification, I suggest a novel way to conceive of power. I argue that we only understand what power is and how it is exercised once we understand its …Read more
  •  64
    Toleration and its Paradoxes: A Tribute to John Horton
    Philosophia 45 (2): 415-424. 2017.
    This paper discusses John Horton’s influential theory of toleration. Starting from his analysis of the paradoxes of toleration, I argue that the avoidance of these paradoxes requires a moral justification of toleration based on practical reason. I cite the conception of toleration that Pierre Bayle developed to support this claim. But Horton is skeptical of such a moral justification, and this creates problems for his account of toleration.
  •  58
    Toleration and Democracy
    Journal of Social Philosophy 45 (1): 65-75. 2014.
  •  50
    Political Liberalism: A Kantian View
    Ethics 128 (1): 123-144. 2017.
    This article suggests a Kantian reading of Rawls’s Political Liberalism. As much as Rawls distanced himself from a presentation of his theory in terms of a comprehensive Kantian moral doctrine, we ought to read it as a noncomprehensive Kantian moral-political theory. According to the latter approach, the liberal conception of justice is compatible with a plurality of comprehensive doctrines as long as they share the independently defined and grounded essentials of that conception of justice—that…Read more
  •  46
    The Justification of Basic Rights
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 45 (3): 7-28. 2016.
  •  44
    The Power of Critique
    Political Theory 39 (1): 118-123. 2011.