•  210
    What evidence do you have?
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1): 89-119. 2008.
    Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that …Read more
  • Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question (review)
    Philosophical Review 116 (4): 657-663. 2007.
  •  368
    The Basing Relation
    Philosophical Review 128 (2): 179-217. 2019.
  •  46
    An evidentialist account of hinges
    Synthese 1-15. forthcoming.
    Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is sometimes read as providing a response to the skeptical puzzle from closure, according to which our commitment to the trustworthiness of our evidence is not itself evidentially grounded. In this paper, I argue both that this standard reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, and that a more accurate reading of Wittgenstein provides us with a more plausible solution to the Closure Puzzle.
  •  95
  •  2
    Current Controversies In Epistemology (edited book)
    Routledge. 2014.
    Epistemology is one of the oldest, yet still one of the most active, areas of philosophical research today. There currently exists many annotated tomes of primary sources, and a handful of single-authored introductions to the field, but there is no book that captures epistemology’s dynamic growth and lively debates for a student audience. In this volume, eight leading philosophers debate four topics central to recent research in epistemology: The A Priori: C. S. I. Jenkins and Michael Devitt The…Read more
  •  191
    Luminosity and the safety of knowledge
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4). 2004.
    In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but usele…Read more
  •  45
    Access Internalism and the Guidance Deontological Conception of Justification
    American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2): 155-168. 2016.
    Historically, prominent proponents of the guidance deontological conception of epistemic justification have thought that the guidance deontological conception entails access internalism. Alvin Goldman has argued that this is not so, and that there is no good argument from the guidance deontological conception of justification to access internalism. This paper refutes Goldman's argument. If the guidance deontological conception of epistemic justification is correct, then so is access internalism.
  •  122
  •  21
    Expression and the Inner
    Philosophical Review 117 (2): 310-313. 2008.
  •  10
    What Evidence Do You Have?: Articles
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1): 89-119. 2008.
    Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue…Read more
  •  135
    What is an inference?
    Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 388-407. 2013.
  •  122
    Undermining the case for contrastivism
    Social Epistemology 22 (3). 2008.
    A number of philosophers have recently defended “contrastivist” theories of knowledge, according to which knowledge is a relation between at least the following three relata: a knower, a proposition, and a contrast set. I examine six arguments that Jonathan Schaffer has given for this thesis, and show that those arguments do not favour contrastivism over a rival view that I call “evidentiary relativism”. I then argue that evidentiary relativism accounts for more data than does contrastivism
  •  99
    Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology
    Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 121-136. 2017.
    Goldman’s epistemology has been influential in two ways. First, it has influenced some philosophers to think that, contrary to erstwhile orthodoxy, relations of evidential support, or confirmation, are not discoverable a priori. Second, it has offered some philosophers a powerful argument in favor of methodological reliance on intuitions about thought experiments in doing philosophy. This paper argues that these two legacies of Goldman’s epistemology conflict with each other.
  •  16
    The nature and reach of privileged access
    In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Many philosophers accept a “privileged access” thesis concerning our own present mental states and mental events. According to these philosophers, if I am in mental state (or undergoing mental event) M, then – at least in many cases – I have privileged access to the fact that I am in (or undergoing) M. For instance, if I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap, then (in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap. Similarly,…Read more
  • The Instability of Skepticism
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1997.
    According to "skepticism about the external world", one cannot know whether there are any things that have these two characteristics: they exist, or occur, at, or come from, some place, and they might have existed even had no one been conscious of them. In attempting to show that one cannot know whether or not there are any such things, the skeptic appeals to the alleged fact that one cannot rule out various possibilities, e.g., the possibility that one is dreaming. But, if one cannot rule out t…Read more
  •  18
    Should we swap internal foundations for virtues?
    Critica 42 (125): 63-76. 2010.
    Internalist foundationalism was popular through much of the history of Western epistemology, but has been subjected to intense critical scrutiny in the last century. Ernest Sosa's new book presents some novel and seemingly powerful arguments against internalist foundationalism. After laying out these arguments, I attempt to rebut them. I argue that Sosa does not, after all, give us good reason for abandoning internalist foundationalism. El fundacionismo internista ha sido muy popular a lo largo …Read more
  •  50
    The Case Against Purity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 456-464. 2012.
  •  128
    S knows that P
    Noûs 36 (4). 2002.
    Rieber 1998 proposes an account of "S knows that p" that generates a contextualist solution to Closure. In this paper, I’ll argue that Rieber’s account of "S knows that p" is subject to fatal objections, but we can modify it to achieve an adequate account of "S knows that p" that generates a unified contextualist solution to all four puzzles. This is a feat that should matter to those philosophers who have proposed contextualist solutions to Closure: all of them have motivated their contextualis…Read more
  •  15
    Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 396-411. 2003.
    Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible “error theory” concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self-knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self-knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self-knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to posses…Read more
  •  26
    Stroud and Moore on skepticism
    Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1): 83-89. 1997.
  •  86
    Skepticism, contextualism, and semantic self-knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
    Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible "error theory" concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self-knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self-knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self-knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to posses…Read more
  •  17
    Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1): 296-325. 2004.
  •  6
    Reply to Gallimore
    Philosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.
  •  233
    Perceptual evidence and the new dogmatism
    Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 199-214. 2004.
    What is the epistemological value of perceptual experience? In his recently influential paper, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”1, James Pryor develops a seemingly plausible answer to this question. Pryor’s answer comprises the following three theses: (F) “Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible – there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs.” (517) (PK) “This justification that you get merely…Read more