• Free will
    In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2002.
  •  550
    Responsibility for Acts and Omissions
    In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 91-110. 2022.
    Accounts of moral responsibility commonly focus on responsibility for actions and their consequences. But we can be responsible as well for omitting to act or refraining from acting, and for consequences of these. And since omitting and refraining are not in every case performing an action, an account of responsibility for actions will not apply straightforwardly to these cases. This paper advances proposals concerning responsibility for omitting, refraining, and their consequences. Providing su…Read more
  •  40
    Reasons, intentions, and actions
    Philosophical Studies 181 (6). 2024.
    Several theorists maintain that a consideration is a reason to ϕ (where ϕ-ing is an act-type) if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend to ϕ, and some hold as well that a consideration is a reason not to ϕ if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend not to ϕ. The claims often stem from views about what it is to be a practical reason. Here it is argued that both equivalence claims are false. Although no view of practical reasons is advanced, views that imply either equiv…Read more
  •  210
    Negative Agency
    In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, Routledge. pp. 59-67. 2022.
    A comprehensive theory of agency will encompass not just acting but also omitting to act and refraining from acting. Some theorists maintain that a causal theory can be applied to acting, omitting, and refraining in a perfectly uniform manner, for each omission or instance of refraining can be identified with some garden-variety action. Here it is argued that in plenty of cases this strategy fails. Sufficient conditions for omitting or refraining are offered that do not require there to be, in e…Read more
  •  171
    Accounting for failure
    In Taylor W. Cyr, Andrew Law & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Value: Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer, Routledge. pp. 153-70. 2023.
  •  218
    I didn't think of that
    Philosophical Issues 33 (1): 45-57. 2023.
    Consider cases in which an agent simply doesn.t think to do a certain thing, or doesn't think of a crucial consideration favoring doing a certain thing, or intends to do a certain thing but forgets to do it. In such a case, is the agent able to do the thing that she fails to do? Assume that commonly we all‐in can do things that we do not do. Here I argue that, given this assumption, in the cases under consideration, too, commonly agents all‐in can do the things they fail to do.
  •  15
    Agent Causation
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Why Agent Causation? What Is Agent ‐ Caused, and What Else (if Anything) Causes It? What is Agent Causation? References Further reading.
  •  390
    Desert of blame
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1): 62-80. 2024.
    The blameworthy deserve blame. So runs a platitude of commonsense morality. My aim here is to set out an understanding of this desert claim (as I call it) on which it can be seen to be a familiar and attractive aspect of moral thought. I conclude with a response to a prominent denial of the claim.
  •  73
    Blameworthiness and Dependence
    Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 110-124. 2024.
    Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the a…Read more
  •  267
    The Source of Responsibility
    Ethics 133 (2). 2023.
    Although we are morally responsible for things of various kinds, what we bear direct responsibility for are certain exercises of our agency (and perhaps some omissions of these). Theorists disagree about what kind of agency is in this respect the source of our responsibility. Some hold that it is agency the exercises of which are actions. Others say that it is agency exercised in forming reasons-responsive attitudes on the basis of our take on reasons (or value). With attention to the relation o…Read more
  •  403
    True Blame
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3): 736-749. 2023.
    1. We sometimes angrily confront, pointedly ostracize, castigate, or denounce those whom we think have committed moral offences. Conduct of this kind may be called blaming behaviour. When genuine,...
  •  386
    Still guilty
    Philosophical Studies 179 (8): 2579-2596. 2022.
    According to what may be called PERMANENT, blameworthiness is forever: once you are blameworthy for something, you are always blameworthy for it. Here a prima facie case for this view is set out, and the view is defended from two lines of attack. On one, you are no longer blameworthy for a past offense if, despite being the person who committed it, you no longer have any of the pertinent psychological states you had at the time of the misdeed. On the other, you can cease to be blameworthy if you…Read more
  •  144
    Reply to Sartorio
    In Jesús Humberto Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, Bradford. pp. 161-65. 2010.
    This chapter is a contribution to an exchange with Carolina Sartorio about intentional omissions.
  •  268
    Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act
    In David Palmer (ed.), Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 107-23. 2014.
    We take it for granted that commonly we act freely and we are generally morally responsible for what we do when we so act. Can there be such a thing as freely omitting to act, or freely refraining or forbearing, and can we be similarly responsible for omitting, refraining, and forbearing? This paper advances a view of freely omitting to act. In many cases, freedom in omitting cannot come to the same thing as freedom in acting, since in many cases omitting to do a certain thing is not a matter of…Read more
  •  227
    Negligence and omission are closely related: commonly, in cases of negligent action, the agent has failed to turn her attention to some pertinent fact. But that omission is itself typically unwitting. A sufficient condition for blameworthiness for an unwitting omission is offered, as is an account of blameworthiness for negligent action. It is argued that one can be blameworthy for wrongdoing done from ignorance even if one is not blameworthy for that ignorance.
  •  267
    Ignorance, Revision, and Common Sense
    In Philip Robichaud & Jan Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition, Oxford University Press. pp. 233-51. 2017.
    Sometimes someone does something morally wrong in clear-eyed awareness that what she is doing is wrong. More commonly, a wrongdoer fails to see that her conduct is wrong. Call the latter behavior unwitting wrongful conduct. It is generally agreed that an agent can be blameworthy for such conduct, but there is considerable disagreement about how one’s blameworthiness in such cases is to be explained, or what conditions must be satisfied for the agent to be blameworthy for her conduct. Many theori…Read more
  •  264
    Reason to Feel Guilty
    In Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-36. 2022.
    Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. We also advance a third thesis connecting desert of feeling guilty with the fitti…Read more
  •  293
    It’s Up to You
    The Monist 103 (3): 328-341. 2020.
    Part of our ordinary conception of our freedom is the idea that commonly when we act—and often even when we don’t act—it is up to us whether we do this or that. This paper examines efforts to spell out what must be the case for this idea to be correct. Several claims regarding the basic metaphysics of agential powers are considered; they are found not to shed light on the issue. Thinking about agents’ psychological capacities provides some illumination, though the idea of freedom remains puzzlin…Read more
  •  658
    Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3): 747-764. 2019.
    Several philosophers claim that the phenomenology of one’s own agency conflicts with standard causal theories of action, couched in terms of causation by mental events or states. Others say that the phenomenology is prima facie incompatible with such a theory, even if in the end a reconciliation can be worked out. Here it is argued that the type of action theory in question is consistent with what can plausibly be said to be presented to us in our experience of our agency. Several routes to a cl…Read more
  •  123
    Agent-causal accounts of free will face two problems. First, such a view needs an account of rational free action, that is, of acting for reasons when one acts freely. And second, an intelligible explication of causation by an agent is required. This paper addresses both of these problems. Free actions are seen as caused both by prior events and by agents. Reasons (or their mental representations) can then be seen as figuring causally when one freely acts for reasons. It is suggested that agent …Read more
  •  15
    Review of Motivation and Agency (review)
    Mind 113 (451): 565-568. 2004.
  •  45
    Free will, causation, and absence
    Philosophical Studies 175 (6): 1517-1524. 2018.
    This paper comments on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will, challenging the non-modal conception of reasons-sensitivity that Sartorio advances.
  • An Agent-Causal View of Free Will
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1990.
    Freedom of the will is intrinsically valuable in deliberation and action, and it is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Free will is not a sufficient condition for the latter; other abilities, and the absence of certain responsibility-undermining conditions, are also necessary. The free will requisite for moral responsibility is a self-determination in coming to have a particular intention in action. It does not consist even partly in an ability to do otherwise. ;Deliberation require…Read more
  •  3
    Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions
    In Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel Charles Rickless (eds.), The Ethics and Law of Omissions, Oup Usa. pp. 63-83. 2017.
    This paper argues that agents can be directly blameworthy for unwitting omissions. The view developed focuses on the capacities and abilities of agents.
  •  667
    Free Will and Abilities to Act
    In Martin Bruel Aaron Langenfeld Klaus von Stosch Saskia Wendel (ed.), Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge, Schoeningh/brill. pp. 41-62. 2019.
    This paper examines the view of abilities to act advanced by Kadri Vihvelin in Causes, Laws, and Free Will. Vihvelin argues that (i) abilities of an important kind are “structurally” like dispositions such as fragility; (ii) ascriptions of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals; (iii) ascriptions of abilities of the kind in question can be analyzed similarly; and (iv) we have the free will we think we have by having abilities of this kind and being in circumstances …Read more
  •  861
    Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3): 323-331. 2018.
    Several theories of causation reject causation of or by absences. They thereby clash with much of what we think and say about what causes what. This paper examines a way in which one kind of theory, causal dispositionalism, can be modified so as to accept absence causation, while still retaining a fundamental commitment of dispositionalism. The proposal adopts parts of a strategy described by David Lewis. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the problem of the proliferation of causes.
  •  1
    Substance and Cause
    In Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    The chief difficulty for agent-causal accounts lies in defending the notion of agent causation. Either of two types of realist account of causation can be drawn on to explicate the claim that enduring substances are among the causes of things. But there remains the objection that, although this claim is intelligible, it is necessarily false. Several objections to the possibility of substance causation are considered, and it is concluded that there are, on balance, good reasons to reject this pos…Read more
  •  6
    Agent Causation and Control
    In Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at this goal and adequately characterizes free will. Such a view captures well the common idea that free agents are originators of their free actions. Responses are offered to Peter van Inwagen’s challenge to agent-causal views and to Galen Strawson’s argument that free will is impossible. A claim that…Read more