•  1008
    Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3): 470-492. 2013.
    McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is p…Read more
  •  895
    I argue that we find the articulation of a problem concerning bodily agency in the early works of the Merleau-Ponty which he explicates as analogous to what he explicitly calls the problem of perception. The problem of perception is the problem of seeing how we can have the object given in person through it perspectival appearances. The problem concerning bodily agency is the problem of seeing how our bodily movements can be the direct manifestation of a person’s intentions in the world. In both…Read more
  •  264
    Motor intentionality and the case of Schneider
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3): 371-388. 2009.
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the …Read more
  •  70
    McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens, colours and cardinals
    with Johan Gersel and Morten S. Thaning
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (1): 88-105. 2017.
    McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of…Read more
  •  33
    Guest Editors' Introduction
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3): 313-316. 2013.
    No abstract
  •  28
    In the light of experience: new essays on perception and reasons (edited book)
    with Johan Gersel, Morten S. Thaning, and Søren Overgaard
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    How does perception provide reasons for our empirical judgements? This volume offers a set of new essays which in different ways address this fundamental question, and investigate the implications for our understanding of perceptual experience.
  •  8
    The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity (edited book)
    Imprint: Springer. 2013.
    The 17 original essays of this volume explore the relevance of the phenomenological approach to contemporary debates concerning the role of embodiment in our cognitive, emotional and practical life. The papers demonstrate the theoretical vitality and critical potential of the phenomenological tradition both through critically engagement with other disciplines (medical anthropology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, the cognitive sciences) and through the articulation of novel interpretations of classi…Read more