Ravi Sharma

In discussing Gail Fine’s contribution, Sharma challenges the idea that the pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus can productively be interpreted using the philosophical devices of Plato’s Meno. Sharma then explores another approach to the Sisyphus, which involves reading the dialogue as an attack on the tendency to assimilate deliberation to theoretical inquiry and, relatedly, as an attempt to call attention to the practical skills that are uniquely involved in deliberation. Sharma ends by speculating that the dialogue was composed by a member of the school of Isocrates and was intended as a criticism of the intellectual orientation of Plato’s Academy.

Are people at bottom motivated entirely by self-interest? Or do they act only sometimes out of self-interest, and sometimes for other reasons—say, to help out a friend for her own sake, with no expectation of being benefitted in return? Scholars have often thought they could discern in the works of classical Greek thinkers a commitment to psychological egoism, the thesis that one is motivated to act only by considerations of the expected benefits and harms that will accrue to oneself. For instance, a host of influential interpreters have taken Plato to be wedded to psychological egoism throughout his corpus. Often, the commitment is thought to run so deep that Plato rarely, if ever, manages to articulate it explicitly, let alone to examine it critically and defend it. That kind of approach obviously invites challenges, and lately there has been a small but growing resistance to the egoistic interpretation of Plato. The challenges are especially welcome given the general lack of support for psychological egoism in the present intellectual climate: egoistic readings have increasingly seemed to imply a crippling weakness in the Platonic system.

ABSTRACT M.M. McCabe argues that in Plato’s Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus hold a view she calls ‘chopped logos’. Chopped logos implies that nothing said is false, or opposed to any other statement, or entailed by any other statement. We focus on a key piece of evidence for chopped logos, the argument concluding that there is no such thing as contradiction (285e9–286b6), and defend a competing interpretation. The argument in question, and the eristic exchanges as a whole, are simply examples of a dialectical game, a contest that is the verbal equivalent of physical competitions like wrestling or the pankration. The argument has no doctrinal significance and no deep connection with the other arguments of the dialogue. Its interest proves to be broadly methodological rather than doctrinal, a showpiece of eristic display.

This handbook provides detailed philosophical analysis of the life and thought of Socrates across fifteen in-depth chapters. Each chapter engages with a central aspect of the rich tradition of Socratic studies and, after surveying the state of scholarship, points the way forward to new directions of interpretation. A leading team of scholars present dynamic readings of Socrates, extracted from the historical context of Plato's dialogues, covering elenchus, irony, ignorance, definitions, pedagogy, friendship, politics and the daemon. Building on these core Socratic topics, this edition includes new accounts of Socrates in the work of philosopher and historian, Xenophon, the comic playwright, Aristophanes, as well as important scholarship on topics such as emotions, the afterlife, motivational intellectualism and virtue intellectualism. Fully revised and updated, the Bloomsbury Handbook of Socrates elucidates the complex landscape of Socratic thought and interpretation.

The dissertation analyzes the ontological and epistemological arguments that motivate Plato's theory of Forms. ;The first chapter explains how the word 'ontology' will be used and, in so doing, compares two ways of determining ontological commitments. ;The second chapter argues that Plato subscribes to the first of those two ways. For at 95E--103C of Plato's Phaedo, the theory of Forms is introduced in a context that is best interpreted as embodying a concern with ontological explanation. Scholars who have previously thought as much have been unable to explain the passage adequately; but the reason is that they have mistakenly assumed Plato adheres to the second way of determining ontological commitments---a way that first enters the philosophical tradition with Aristotle rather than with Plato. ;The third chapter discusses the epistemological role that Plato would have the Forms play. For him, the Forms are standards by which to determine the true applications of general terms. The notion of an epistemological standard is adumbrated in the ethical discussions of the early dialogues and is given a fuller formulation in the "recollection theory of knowledge" as set forth in the Meno and Phaedo. In the latter work, the standards are for the first time characterized as Forms. ;An important consequence of the argument of the second and third chapters is that, notwithstanding the trend of much recent scholarship, the philosophical roles played by the Forms do not commit Plato to "self-predication"---the thesis that the Form Beauty, for example, "is beautiful" in the sense that the term 'beautiful' is predicated of it. In reality, Plato's ontological and epistemological arguments preclude any commitment to self-predication, and Plato is never tempted to suppose otherwise