Rebecca Copenhaver

Thomas Reid draws a distinction between the social and solitary operations of mind—acts of mind that require other intelligent beings versus those that may performed on one’s own. Yet his distinction obscures the irreducibly social character of the solitary operations. This paper preserves Reid’s distinction while accommodating the social character of the solitary operations. According to Reid, the solitary operations presuppose the social operations, expressed in what he calls the ‘natural language’ of mankind—a language that communicates the intentions that give rise to the agreements by which the conventions of artificial languages are developed. Using artificial languages, we begin to sort the world into kinds and to anticipate the regular events that make a practical difference in our lives, providing the general conceptions that give our trains of thought the order and regularity required to form the solitary operations. By using artificial languages, we adapt social operations to solitary ends, to think alone and in silence.

Philosophers from the modern age and current philosophers share some common concerns. One is whether the ordinary objects of human perception—the objects humans see, hear, feel, taste, and smell—exist independently of our perception of them in a shared, stable, spatially-localized environment that also exists independently of perception. Another is whether a particular range of properties—colors, flavors, odors, sounds, feels—are properties of the ordinary objects of human perception, relations whose relata are properties of ordinary objects and types of typical human experiences, or properties of, or identical with, types of typical human experiences.Because both modern and current philosophers have...

For Thomas Reid and Immanuel Kant, the problem of perceptual objectivity is not whether we're getting it right about the world, but whether we're getting at a world about which we can be right . This dissertation is an examination of one aspect of Reid and Kant's philosophy of mind: their theories of perception. Reid and Kant were less concerned about the truth, accuracy or justification of any particular perceptual states than they were with examining the conditions required for forming intentional, representational mental states at all. I argue that their shared concern with the conditions of the ability to represent objects at all leads them to similar answers to the problems posed by the theory of ideas, answers that are best seen in the light of Reid and Kant's anti-sensationalism and direct realism ;I argue that Reid and Kant are both non-naive direct realists. Their non-naIve direct realism is based on their anti-sensationalism. Anti-sensationalism is the position that the qualitative character of sensations alone, by itself, cannot account for the representational content of perception. Reid and Kant's direct realism is not naive because they do not deny that perception is mediated; they deny instead that perception is mediated by a representational relation internal to sensations and objects, a relation based on the intrinsic features of the relata

The History of the Philosophy of Mind is a major six-volume reference collection, covering the key topics, thinkers and debates within philosophy of mind, from Antiquity to the present day. Each volume is edited by a leading scholar in the field and comprises chapters written by an international team of specially commissioned contributors. Including a general introduction by Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields, and fully cross-referenced within and across the six volumes, The History of the Philosophy of Mind is an essential resource for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, and will also be of interest to those in many related disciplines, including Classics, Religion, Literature, History of Psychology, and Cognitive Science.

From around 1800, shortly before Pasquale Galluppi's first book, until 1950, just before Benedetto Croce died, the most formative influences on Italian philosophers were Kant and the post-Kantians, especially Hegel. In many ways, the Italian philosophers of this period lived in turbulent but creative times, from the Restoration to the Risorgimento and the rise and fall of Fascism. From Kant to Croce is a comprehensive, highly readable history of the main currents and major figures of modern Italian philosophy, described in a substantial introduction that details the development of the discipline during this period. Brian P. Copenhaver and Rebecca Copenhaver provide the only up-to-date introduction in English to Italy's leading modern philosophers by translating and analysing rare and original texts and by chronicling the lives and times of the philosophers who wrote them. Thoroughly documented and highly readable, From Kant to Croce examines modern Italian philosophy from the perspective of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and as direct as original perception. Perception is grounded in a productive and developing relationship between the mind and world

: Some critics find that Thomas Reid thinks the mind especially problematic, "hid in impenetrable darkness". I disagree. Reid does not hold that mind, more than body, resists explanation by the new science. The physical sciences have made great progress because they were transformed by the Newtonian revolution, and the key transformation was to stop looking for causes. Reid's harsh words are a call for methodological reform, consonant with his lifelong pursuit of a science of mind and also with his frequent (though overlooked) optimism about such a science

Some interpret Reid’s notion of a moral sense as merely analogical. Others understand it as a species of acquired perception. To understand Reid’s account of the moral sense, we must draw from his theory of perception and his theory of aesthetic experience, each of which illuminate the nature and operation of the moral faculty. I argue that, on Reid’s view, the moral faculty is neither affective nor rational, but representational. It is a discrete, basic, capacity for representing the real moral properties of humans and human conduct.

This volume offers a fresh view of the work of Thomas Reid, a leading figure in the history of eighteenth-century philosophy. A team of leading experts in the field explore the significance of Reid's thought in his time and ours, focusing in particular on three broad themes: mind, knowledge, and value. Together, they argue that Reid's philosophy is about developing agents in a rich world of objects and values, agents with intellectual and active powers whose regularity is productive. Though such agents are equipped at first with rudimentary abilities, those abilities are responsive. Our powers consist in a fundamental and on-going engagement with the world, a world that calls on us to be flexible, sensitive, astute, and ultimately, practical. Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value represents both the vitality of Reid's work, and the ways in which current philosophers are engaging with his ideas