•  230
    Explaining attitudes: A practical approach to the mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 513-523. 1999.
    Explaining Attitudes is an important contribution to the philosophy of mind. It is the latest installment in Lynne Rudder Baker’s work, which began with her equally important book, Saving Belief, to restore the attitudes to their proper place. In Explaining Attitudes, she undertakes two important projects. The first is a critique of recent attempts to either naturalize the mind or to cast folk psychology as a discredited theory. The second is the development of an alternative view of the mind, o…Read more
  •  137
    Logical form and the vernacular
    Mind and Language 16 (4). 2001.
    Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available…Read more
  •  115
    Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's 'Context and Logical Form'. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a subsentential expression—where by 'subsentential expression' we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truthc…Read more
  •  69
    Burge on content
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 367-84. 1993.
  •  64
    Functionalism and the Absent Qualia Argument
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2): 161-179. 1983.
    And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work on one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.Gottlieb Leibniz, The Mondadology, Section 17Functionalism, as it is currently understood, is the view that each type of mental state is…Read more
  •  60
    Machine realization and the new lilliputian argument
    Philosophical Studies 43 (2): 267-75. 1983.
  •  44
  •  41
    The predicate view of proper names
    In Gerhard Preyer Georg Peter (ed.), Logical Form and Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 467503. 2002.
  •  37
    Skidmore on properties
    Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2): 189-193. 2004.
  •  34
    Philosophy After Objectivity
    Review of Metaphysics 48 (2): 418-419. 1994.
    Moser's book, which contains five chapters and an appendix, consists of two theses. First, we cannot know whether we have knowledge of a mind-independent world or whether we know that idealism holds. Second, because we have no choice but to accept ontological agnosticism, we must explore issues in a more pragmatic and relativistic vein.
  •  25
    Marcus’s Puzzle About Belief-Attribution
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (2): 201-218. 1986.
  •  21
    Reality and Representation
    Noûs 26 (3): 379-389. 1987.
  •  20
    Lewis's puzzle about singular belief-attribution
    Philosophia 17 (4): 461-476. 1987.
    In this paper, I have argued that Lewis fails to undermine thatP-theory by means of a variation of Kripke'sPuzzle. The flaw in Lewis's argument, given a wide interpretation ofworld-fitness, is that it simply begs the question against theP-theorist. I then argued that, given the narrow interpretation ofworld-fitness, Lewis's argument fails because Pierre doesn't have a belief that is narrowly characterizable by a sentence like,Pierre believes that the city that he identifies asLondon is pretty in…Read more
  •  14
    Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3): 119-119. 1996.
  •  8
    Descriptions, Indexicals and Speaker Meaning
    ProtoSociology 10 155-190. 1997.
    In his paper, “Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas ” ), Stephen Schiffer presents a powerful argument against anyone who accepts a Russellian account of definite descriptions and who also accepts a direct referential account of indexicals. On the one hand, the most plausible version of the Theory of Descriptions, namely, the Hidden-Indexical Theory of Descriptions, entails that a speaker who uses an incomplete description, “the F”, referentially means some description-the…Read more
  •  7
    Landesman on abstract particulars
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (3): 411-414. 1975.
  •  5
    with Reinaldo Elugardo and Robert J. Stainton
    Synthese 142 (3): 269-271. 2005.
  •  2
    Book reviews (review)
    with Frank E. Ritter, Christopher Gauker, W. Kent Wilson, Robert M. Francescotti, John Bricke, and Willem de Vries
    Philosophical Psychology 8 (3): 301-325. 1995.