If no one is surprised by its presence in the political sphere, lying is rarely a good thing and generally leads to public scandal. However, it is perhaps even more infamous when political actors, especially leaders, claim to formulate truths during their political activity. This is the hypothesis that this article aims to develop by drawing on a conceptual framework inspired by Hannah Arendt. In its first part, we explain how telling the truth and acting politically are two incompatible activit…
Read moreIf no one is surprised by its presence in the political sphere, lying is rarely a good thing and generally leads to public scandal. However, it is perhaps even more infamous when political actors, especially leaders, claim to formulate truths during their political activity. This is the hypothesis that this article aims to develop by drawing on a conceptual framework inspired by Hannah Arendt. In its first part, we explain how telling the truth and acting politically are two incompatible activities that mutually threaten each other. In the second part, we analyze: first, how truth conditions (pre-politically) politics; then, why there is a specifically political interest in the establishment and preservation of truth; finally, how political institutions can, without risking scandal or damaging the truth, satisfy this interest.
Si personne ne s’étonne de sa présence dans la sphère politique, le mensonge est rarement une bonne chose et conduit généralement au scandale public. Toutefois, il est peut-être encore plus infâme que des acteurs, et a fortiori des responsables, politiques prétendent ès qualités formuler des vérités. C’est l’hypothèse que cet article entend développer en puisant dans une conceptualité d’inspiration arendtienne. Nous expliquons dans sa première partie en quoi dire la vérité et agir politiquement s’avèrent deux activités incompatibles qui se menacent mutuellement. Dans la seconde, nous analysons : d’abord, comment la vérité conditionne (prépolitiquement) le politique ; ensuite, pourquoi il existe un intérêt spécifiquement politique à l’établissement et à la sauvegarde de la vérité ; enfin, de quelle manière les institutions politiques peuvent, sans risquer le scandale ou d’abîmer la vérité, satisfaire cet intérêt.