Reza Mahoozi

In the early works of the eighteenth-century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, besides explaining the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of various sciences, has illustrated a comprehensive philosophical system and desirable metaphysical critique. In his later works, through emphasizing the concept of Nature and the growth of Reason, he has considered special and multifaceted responsibilities for the Education and the University. For him, the alignment of knowledge and Nature in the university is the main mission of this institution; a mission that is required by the Faculty of Philosophy in a legitimate conflict with the top three faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine to bring them in line with the design of Nature. This effort, in fact, is a necessary condition for accomplishing the future metaphysics and attaining the unity of knowledge and a complete philosophical system. This article, apart from explaining the idea of "the unity of knowledge" and a model of the unity of knowledge and nature in the conflict of faculties, attempts to show the relationship of this model with the plan of a complete future philosophical and metaphysical system in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In the following, the lessons of this approach have been considered, especially in the discussion of university independence for the reconstruction of Iran's higher education.

Whether objects have a substance or not has always been the focus of philosophers. Substratum theory is one of the well-known theories in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It tries to analyze the structure of an object based on the two components of substance and properties. This theory, by introducing the essence of objects as substratum, introduces properties in an empirical approach and provides an explanation of concrete objects or things. Contrarily, a collection of theories from an ontological point of view, with the denial of substratum, considers concrete things to be merely composed of properties and explains the clustering process of the same. This article, while explaining these two theories and judging their claims against each other, implicitly tries to show that modern physics not only needs philosophy to explain the ontological structure of concrete objects, but to go this science beyond the level of properties and phenomena it requires philosophy using specialized concepts to present a picture of the world around.

In Kant’s moral theory, he describes two levels of highest good as sensible and supersensible. He mentions to these concepts in all his works, without shedding light on fundamental conflict and dispute inherited in the simultaneousness of these two. In accordance with the first level of this concept, have been known as a theological reading of the highest good concept, comparison, and accompaniment of two component of the highest good, that is happiness and virtue, only is achieved with the help of God. In addition to the postulate of God, this subject needs two other reasonable ideas of immortality and freedom. Besides, in accordance with the second level of this concept known as the secular and political reading of the highest good, the comparison is achieved with the help of human activity in this world in form of civil society. This content conflict, contrary to the view of some scholars, refers to two complementary forms in Kant’s thought and it corresponds with the general principles of his critical thinking. While explains Kant’s twofold positions on the highest good, this paper tries to demonstrate how these two forms need to another and otherwise, the complementary component cannot be explained.

In Kant's transcendental philosophy, "sensible" is an object composed of multiple sense intuitions and a priori constitutive of mind. In this philosophy, sensible nature is empirical and mechanical that becomes universal and necessary under determinate concepts and principles of Understanding. But, there is another space not determined by concepts and principles of Understanding. This space is "super sensible". This super sensible is the space of noumenal objects and is very important in Kant's system of philosophy. This sphere is important for explaining the principle of uniformity of nature as a supporter to induction, some ethical items and religion theory, organisms and culture. But how can we get at this realm? And is this realm compatible with the realm of empirical knowledge? In this paper we want to explain these matters.

Leibniz’s account of perception for understanding of German rationalistic aesthetic tradition in 18 century is very crucial and important. His account of sense qualities has a Cartesian framework and it is so central to his views on aesthetic experience. He explains the concept of perfection and pleasure based on the clear but confused nature of perception. Accordingly, he defines beauty as follows: perfection is the ability or power to unite multiple properties into one; pleasure is feeling perfection in things. Beauty, for him, is the contemplation or reflection upon the pleasurable, or perfection of things. Having investigated the importance of Leibniz in German aesthetics, we intend to figure out the nature of perfection and its relationship to aesthetic experience, perfection, and beauty in his aesthetics.

Kant shows a picture of mechanical nature in Newtonian Physics in Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena. One of the basic elements of this picture is principle of causality. This principle with other principles of understanding product the empirical knowledge. This principle is necessary and indispensable. However, in Critique of Judgment, he considered organisms and nature as a whole with other causality that is conscious. This paper wants to illustrate the contact between these two causalities in Kant's thought.

In Kant's point of view, we need a third thing as a mediating between predicate and subject in synthetic judgments. This issue about synthetic judgment a priori is a puzzle, because this judgment is not empirical and we can not use empirical intuition as a mediate thing in it. So, the third thing in this case must be pure and a priori. It's pure intuition of time. Time in imagination has two functions; first, when it combine pure concepts and empirical intuitions and second, when it make synthetic judgment a priori possible. In this paper I want justify this matter.

Christian Wolff’s view regarding sensory perception – which is formed on a Leibnizian framework – forms the base of his aesthetics. He explains the concept of perfection and pleasure according to the clear but disordered essence of sensory perception that is present in this framework and through this very path guides towards the definition of beauty. Thus, according to him, perfection is the consistency or accordance of diversity or the abundance of things or their parts; pleasure is the result of the intuition of the perfection present in things; and beauty is the perfection of a thing from the aspect of it being suitable in creating pleasure in us. Therefore, in this article we intend to explore the essence of sensory perception according to him and the relation between it, perfection and pleasure with beauty in his aesthetics so that it becomes clear how aesthetics emerges from the heart of epistemological discussions in general and from the depths of sensory perception in particular. Finally, while keeping in mind the important fact that he did not directly claim to have an independent theory in the field of aesthetics, we will critique and give our views in regards to the requisites connected to his aesthetics so that the limits of his extreme rationalist views in dealing with issues such as the extent that beauty covers, the levels of beauty and the difference of views in relation to taste and liking become clear.

According to Kant, in order to gain experience, as a necessary and universal knowledge of entities and nature, we need several philosophical and, sometimes, logical concepts which, based on Hume's analyses, are not rooted in experience. This problem prompted Kant to consider the origin of these concepts in the mind and explain their ontological nature as content-free forms and patterns which grant knowledge only if they acquire their content from pure and empirical intuitions. This approach has initially resulted in limiting Man's knowledge to the realm of experience. Besides, in the acquisition of this knowledge, the activity of the mind leads to a kind of idealism and denying the realistic aspects of knowledge. The present paper, after clarifying the epistemological scope of philosophical concepts in Kant's philosophy and analyzing the resulting philosophical consequences, intends to demonstrate the falsity of this standpoint based on the analyses of the Transcendent Philosophy from the whatness and quality of the acquisition of knowledge, in general, and philosophical concepts , in particular