•  233
    Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1): 27-60. 2017.
    Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “del…Read more
  •  81
    The Rationality Assumption
    In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett, Springer. pp. 93-110. 2015.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will no…Read more