Richard Moorhead

In this article, we look at the contested role of in-house lawyers in regulated organisations in the financial sector. A recent Financial Conduct Authority consultation on whether to designate the head of legal of banks, insurance companies and other financial firms as ‘Senior Managers’ and the decision which flowed from it, reflected a flawed view of lawyers as a neutral technocracy of mere legal technicians; we show how the FCA’s decision is potentially damaging to the public interest and failed to take into account that in-house lawyers are often important decision-makers and influencers within their organisations. We put the case for an alternative view; that in-house lawyers are professionals, with agency that requires them to act in accordance with ethical norms and means they should be made more accountable for their conduct.

ABSTRACTCommercial lawyers often signal that ‘client first’ is an essential element of their professional DNA, and some scholarly proponents have laid claim to a moral justification for zeal. That moral justification is found, in particular, in the notion of lawyers as friends. One critique of zeal is that this moral claim is bogus: that ‘client first’ is a convenient trope for disguised self-interest. This paper explores the empirical validity of this ‘client first’ ideal through a value-based analysis of zeal in lawyering. Our data suggest plausible differences in ethical decision-making related to those values. The data are consistent with more zealous lawyers having stronger self-interested rather than client-interested motivations. More zealous lawyers are also less constrained by valuing conformity to rules. If our results are valid, they suggest that the claim that zeal is motivated by placing a high value on the interests of the client is false.

This article revolves around the issue of whether or not legal professions deserve their status as professions. It looks at how empirical literature addresses this issue, concentrating on lawyers working within law firms in common law systems. A discussion of the way the profession is structured, and the creation of elites within elites, has intersected with arguments about the demography of the profession. In addition, this article considers the literature that looks at the quality of lawyering. It compares, through a research study, how the quality of the work of non-lawyers compared with the work of formally qualified lawyers. This article concludes by considering how economic incentives are a necessary part of any market-based service and suggests a need of more nuanced understanding of professional competence and the contribution of professionalism to the quality of services.