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255The phenomenology and ontology of the selfIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, John Benjamins. pp. 23--39. 2000.
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Dreams of final responsibilityIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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2David Hume: Objects and PowerIn Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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The Secrets of All Hearts' : Locke on personal identityIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind, Self and Person, Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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19Things that bother me: death, freedom, the self, etcNew York Review Books. 2018.The sense of the self -- A fallacy of our age -- I have no future -- Luck swallows everything -- You cannot make yourself the way you are -- The silliest claim -- Real naturalism -- The unstoried life -- Two years' time.
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83Causation and Universals.The secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume.Causation: A Realist ApproachPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 494-498. 1991.
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42Physicalist PanpsychismIn Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.Panpsychism is a plausible theory of the fundamental nature of reality. It is fully compatible with everything in current physics, and with physicalism. It is an error to think that being physical excludes being mental or experiential. Anyone who endorses the following three views – [i] materialism or physicalism is true, [ii], consciousness is real, [iii] there is no ‘radical emergence’ – should at least endorse ‘micropsychism’ or psychism, the view that [iv] mind or consciousness is a fundamen…Read more
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30XI-Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of SpontaneityProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 227-256. 2003.It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought and judgment essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action—intentional, voluntary and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought and judgment neither are nor can be a matter of action. Any spontaneity that reason, thought and judgment involve can be connected with freedom only when the word 'freed…Read more
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35The Unstoried LifeIn Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 113-133. 2018.Should ethically serious people seek for unity in their lives, for harmony, for coherence? Is this a requirement on living a good life, a requirement on flourishing or eudaimonia? Should we aim for some kind of self-authorship or narrative self-constitution, as Marya Schechtman and Dan McAdams have suggested? Many think we should. This chapter argues for the opposite view, assembling and reflecting on a dossier of contrary quotations from many sources, including Proust, Montaigne, Alice Munro, G…Read more
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8Real naturalism v2Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 1 (2): 101-125. 2013.
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4ReferencesIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 253-258. 2011.
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11Precis of Mental RealityMind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 433. 1998.
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402. On "Freedom and Resentment"In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Cornell University Press. pp. 67-100. 1993.
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9Muddling Through: An Episodic Conversation on Self, Narrativity, Transience, and Other PleasantriesIn Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 135-163. 2018.In your article “The unstoried life”, you criticize the idea that having a ‘storied life’ is necessary for a Good life. Some authors would probably admit that having a storied life is perhaps not necessary in order to simply exist as an Individual, singular being, but they would probably not accept that what you call a ‘Whole human being’ is possible without such narration.
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88Identity MetaphysicsThe Monist 104 (1): 60-90. 2021.Identity metaphysics finds identity or unity where other metaphysical theories find difference or diversity. It denies the fundamentality of ontological distinctions that other theories treat as fundamental. It’s opposed to separatism, which mistakes natural conceptual distinctions for ground-floor ontological differences. It proposes that the distinctions between the concepts substance, object, quality, property, process, state, and event are metaphysically superficial; so too the distinctions …Read more
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42Identity MetaphysicsThe Monist 104 (1): 30-60. 2021.Identity metaphysics finds identity or unity where other metaphysical theories find difference or diversity. It denies the fundamentality of ontological distinctions that other theories treat as fundamental. It’s opposed to separatism, which mistakes natural conceptual distinctions for ground-floor ontological differences. It proposes that the distinctions between the concepts SUBSTANCE, OBJECT, QUALITY, PROPERTY, PROCESS, STATE, and EVENT are metaphysically superficial; so too the distinctions …Read more
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20Internal and External Content: A New AlignmentPhenomenology and Mind 22 (22): 18. 2022.The debate about mental content is not well framed as internalists versus externalists, because there is both internal and external mental content. There is also a question about how best to draw the line between them, and this paper argues that this line is not usually drawn in the right place. It proposes a new alignment: the expression ‘internal content’ is to be taken to denote actually occurring, concrete, immediately phenomenologically given content. Absolutely everything else that can be …Read more
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1IndexIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 259-261. 2011.
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14Galen Strawson, O niemożliwości całkowitej odpowiedzialności moralnejRoczniki Filozoficzne 65 (1): 109-129. 2017.Jedną z centralnych kwestii dotyczących problemu wolnej woli stanowi zagadnienie moralnej odpowiedzialności. Na ogół utrzymuje się, iż ma ono najdalej idące konsekwencje dla życia społecznego oraz prawa. Jak jednak argumentuje Galen Strawson, nie można odpowiadać moralnie za własne działania. Argument przebiega następująco: dana osoba podejmuje decyzję w oparciu o swój charakter, osobowość lub inne czynniki umysłowe. Z drugiej strony, za czynniki te nie można ponosić odpowiedzialności, wydaje si…Read more
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23Fizykalistyczny panpsychizmRoczniki Filozoficzne 66 (1): 181-205. 2018.W najogólniejszym sformułowaniu panpsychizm to pogląd, który głosi, że wszystko jest umysłem lub świadomością. Mimo że stanowisko to ma długą tradycję i staje się coraz popularniejsze we współczesnej debacie, wciąż ma ono wielu przeciwników. Celem tego artykułu jest dowiedzenie, że panpsychizm stanowi najlepsze metafizyczne wyjaśnienie natury tego, co stanowi ostateczne tworzywo rzeczywistości. Jest to zarazem odmiana fizykalizmu, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie jest budulcem wszystkich konkretnie…Read more
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12Episodic EthicsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116. 2007.I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
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17Episodic EthicsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116. 2007.I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
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51Descartes and the Buddha—a rapprochement?In Christian Coseru (ed.), Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits, Springer. pp. 63-86. 2023.Descartes’s conception of the mind is nothing like what most people suppose. I believe it may have interesting affinities with certain Asian—even Buddhist!—conceptions of the mind. I’m not qualified to comment on the Asian side, so I’m going to describe what I take to be his position and invite others to judge.
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11Chapter Three. “Person... is a forensic term”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 17-21. 2011.
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2Chapter Twelve. TransitionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 93-96. 2011.
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9Chapter Ten. Personal IdentityIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 77-87. 2011.