My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes Very weak form of a priori; we have to take seriously, if only tentatively, immediate seemings of necessity (or at least correctness), else we can't reason at all.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective If not subjective, then an objective response-dependent property that can vary from one observer to the next.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism Compatibilism, but not as the result of conceptual analysis; rather, as a reconstruction from interesting differences between the causal history of different kinds of actions.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism If knowledge is going to be an interesting kind of thing (a natural property worthy of investigation); although contextualism might be right as a description of actual word usage.
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism Externalism plus important facts about realizers -- which one may or may not think count as part of a theory of _content_.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral anti-realism If there are moral facts, they are very different in nature from what's entailed by our moral judgments
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism As a psychological thesis.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Agnostic/undecided
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept another alternative Either there are no moral facts, or moral facts concern what each of should want given our conception of what it is to live and fare well and a desire that we ourselves and the people we care about live and fare well.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view There is no fact of the matter
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Reject one, undecided between others
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian I accept a Millian view, but recognizing the contribution of important facts about realizers of mental representations of names (a roughly Fodorian view).
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival Insofar as there is a fact of the matter.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible So long as the standards of conceivability are weak. Otherwise, inconceivable.