Robert Fine

s theory of cosmopolitan right is widely viewed as the philosophical origin of modern cosmopolitan thought. Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right, by contrast, is usually viewed as regressive and nationalistic in relation to both Kant and the cosmopolitan tradition. This paper reassesses the political and philosophical character of Hegel’s critique of Kant, Hegel’s own relation to cosmopolitan thinking, and more fleetingly some of the implications of his critique for contemporary social criticism. It is argued that Hegel’s critique was neither regressive nor nationalistic, but rather that he advanced the theory of cosmopolitan right beyond the Kantian framework of formal natural law. The main proposition is that Hegel was not only the first to recognize cosmopolitanism as a definite social form of right, relative to other forms in the modern system of right, but that his ‘scientific and objective’ approach to the issue makes a substantial contribution to restoring the severed connections between the realism of war between nations and the normativism of perpetual peace. Key Words: cosmopolitanism • Habermas • Hegel • Kant • nationalism • peace • right • war.

In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post‐1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth‐century vision: that if we are to grapple with the complexities of present‐day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation‐states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl‐Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy.

This paper reviews the contribution of Hannah Arendt's 1963 monograph, On Revolution, to the theme of this collection: “contestatory cosmopolitanism.” I am critical of normative interpretations of the text that treat it as a wholesale rejection of the French revolutionary tradition and as a tribute either to American constitutionalism, in more liberal readings, or to the council system of direct democracy, in more radical readings. I read it against this doctrinal grain as a dialectical analysis of the modern revolutionary tradition as a whole. I argue that it is more productive for our own purposes and more faithful to Arendt's own approach to read the book as an exploration of the developmental forms of the modern revolutionary tradition, beginning with the “perplexities” present in the modern concept of revolution and then moving on to the more applied and practical “perplexities” involved in the realization of the concept: first in the French Revolution, then in the American Revolution and finally in..

The core argument in this paper is that, to reconstruct the last unwritten section on Judging in Hannah Arendt's Life of the Mind , it is necessary to address what Arendt was doing with the book as a whole and how the different parts relate internally to one another. This is no easy matter, especially as the existing sections on Thinking and Willing are quite different in tone from one another. My proposition is that the work should be read as a critique of the life of the `modern' mind, and especially of the differentiation of the modern mind into distinct and reified faculties. The work as a whole is an attempt to understand the distorted forms of modernization that result from the division of the life of the mind into opposing faculties. It is, so to speak, a critique of the combined and uneven development of the life of the modern mind. While Arendt famously argues that the activity of thinking itself conditions people against evildoing, the spectre that informs her analysis of both thinking and willing is the danger of nihilism inherent in these mental activities. The work raises vital questions concerning the conditions under which this danger is actualized and the means by which it might be averted. What this entails for our reconstruction of the missing section on judgment is that, rather than see it as the core of Arendt's contribution to political thought or as the promised solution to an impasse, we should explore the equivocations of judging. This aporetic reading of the text helps clarify Arendt's concerns over the separation of the life of the mind from the world and the role of both judging and understanding in renewing its connections to the world

“Futility of futilities,” said Kohelet, “futility of futilities, all is futile!” Once again we are exploring futility, a concept understood by humanity at least from the beginning of the written word. Our oldest written story, the Epic of Gilgamesh, reminds us of the futility of chasing immortality. At least a millennium later, yet still in ancient times, the Book of Kohelet teaches that all human pursuits, not only the pursuit of immortality, are futile or vain—terms once used synonymously. The ancient Greeks introduced an element of punishment into their stories of futility—for example the Danaides sisters were condemned for the murder of their betrothed to use small urns to fill a leaky...

In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post‐1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth‐century vision: that if we are to grapple with the complexities of present‐day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation‐states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl‐Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy.

There is a conflict between the wishes of terminally ill patients to allow withdrawal of treatment and become donors after cardiac death (DCD) and the limit on interventions required by the dead-donor rule (DDR). Once a breathing tube is removed, hours can pass before the patient expires. This interim time complies with the DDR, but often makes donation impossible. The consequences are the nullification of donors’ wishes and the waste of organs for transplantation. Since the DDR was developed, attitudes on end-of-life interventions have evolved, organ donation has been embraced, and the field of organ transplantation has been firmly established. A new ethical approach is needed that, based on patients’ autonomy, considers organ donation a goal of care and views the donated organs as having a profound value for the donor and recipient. It is time to prioritize patients’ autonomous desire to donate life-giving organs to others and thus promote continuity of care for the donated organs over the modality of death pronouncement. To support patients’ desire to be organ donors, the conversation should be open to allow medical intervention in the peri-extubation period.

In this highly innovative book Robert Fine compares three great studies of modern political life: Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Marx's Capital and Hannah Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism, and argues that they are all profoundly radical texts, which jointly contribute to our understanding of the modern world. Fine maintains that these works are far more revealing when read together than in opposition, and draws a direct parallel between Hegel's critique of social forms of right and Marx's critique of social forms of value. Fine shows how fruitfully their work can and should be combined. Hannah Arendt was in turn critical of what she saw as the historicism of both Hegel and Marx, but Fine argues that her study of the origins of totalitarianism directly picks up on their insights into the modern potential for fanaticism and destructiveness. Arendt never disavowed any of the nineteenth century thinkers who prefigured the catastrophes to come, but Fine shows her indebtedness to Hegel and Marx. This fascinating book offers a re-reading of these texts as three pivotal moments in the construction of a critical humanist tradition.

In what has become a famous quotation, the philosopher Theodor Adorno commented that to write poetry "after Auschwitz" is barbaric. If the holocaust is an "event" that may legitimately be described as unspeakable, it is hard to see why poetry deserves more opprobrium than other ways of framing it, including what may broadly be called social theory. After all, if social theory were once guilty of ignoring the holocaust, it has also exhibited the barbarism of reason involved in transforming this "event" into social processes, conditions, systems, classificatory schemes and statistical tables. This collection of essays explores the character, impact and abiding legacy upon social theory of the Nazi holocaust. The premise which informs the contributions is that Zygmunt Bauman's claim that social theory has failed to address the holocaust remains true.

Mir scheint hinter dem Konzept der Dialektik der Aufklärung die Hypothese zu stehen, dass eine kategorische Ablehnung der Naturrechtsidee uns im Kampf gegen das totalitäre Potenzial der Moderne schwächt. Die Betonung der Historizität, Vergänglichkeit und Relativität des Rechts ist nicht falsch. Verabsolutiert man sie aber, ebnet man dem Rechtsnihilismus den Weg. Die Überzeugung, alle Gesetze würden lediglich positives Recht darstellen, allein von Menschenhand geschaffen, droht jegliche Beschränkung dessen, was Menschen postulieren können, zu beseitigen. Das Konzept der Dialektik der Aufklärung nimmt es zugleich mit jenem liberalen Ethos, das das Naturrecht positivistisch auffasst und zur Bestätigung des Status quo einsetzt, und mit jenem totalitären Ethos auf, das das positive Recht den sogenannten Gesetzen der Natur und der Geschichte unterwerfen will. Um diesen beiden Doktrinen etwas entgegenzusetzen, wendet das Konzept von der Dialektik der Aufklärung sich der Naturrechtsphilosophie wieder zu und widmet sich der gleichzeitigen Denaturalisierung und Regeneration des Rechtsbegriffs.