My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes I don't know the field well, but my hunch is that we can know certain mathematical truths a priori, and that there are some conditions our minds need to impose on the sensible world in order to be able to experience it, and that coming to know what these conditions are might count as a kind of a priori knowledge.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism From what I read, the arguments for Platonism appear pretty strong, but I have a really hard time wrapping my mind around the notion that, say, numbers "exist". It seems like the wrong term to use to describe the status of numbers.
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept an intermediate view My hunch is that there are better and worse pieces of art within a genre, but that you can't rationally compare certain genres to each other. Thus, as far as mob movies go, Goodfellas is objectively better than mobsters, but Goodfellas is neither better nor worse than Groundhog Day. So there's some objectivity and some subjectivity.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes Again, I don't know the literature, but I think we know statements like "all bachelors are unmarried males" and "7=7" through analysis, so I think there are analytically true and synthetically true statements.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism I think internalism is correct about justification and externalism is correct about knowledge.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: idealism This, more than any other of my views, is a hunch. A hunch based on its quirkiness.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: libertarianism I think I'm literally incapable of believing that my actions and thoughts are all completely determined, and I think I'm free, so libertarianism, you're the winner!
God: theism and atheism Accept: theism I like both Thomistic cosmological arguments and Kant's moral argument.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: rationalism I take it to be the case that we can come to know non-empirical truths in mathematics; moreover, I believe we can show there to exist at least one entity (God) through a mix of empirical and non-empirical considerations (i.e., "something exists" and the principle of sufficient reason).
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean Another one of my rare, strong philosophical convictions: I think substances have essences, and that these essences give them a range of powers, and that what is causally possible depends on what powers various substances have.
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical I don't think a sentence like "this sentence is not true" has a truthmaker. Consequently, I don't think it counts as a true contradiction, because there's nothing to make it true. So, to avoid true contradictions and having to adopt a paraconsistent logic, I accept truthmakers. (Until someone tells me of the insuperable problems with truthmakers.)
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept an intermediate view I accept Kant's answer on the question. I don't know whether that makes me a realist or anti-realist.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism Well, I'm a theist, so I'm not a naturalist. I think, further, that naturalism has a problem with making sense of normativity and qualia, so I wouldn't be a naturalist even if I were an atheist.
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism I think reducing qualia to physical facts is akin to ignoring them. In addition, I'm open to the possibility that intentionality can't be explained physically either, and I suspect there are probably big problems accepting a coherent account of mental causation if you're a physicalist.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept an intermediate view I accept Kant's answer on the question. I don't know whether that makes me a cognitivist or a noncognitivist.
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death This is, strangely, one of my firmest convictions.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue I think I'm entirely here right now, so I don't think I'm a space-time worm. If that means I have to reject the B-theory, then I reject the B-theory, though I'm not sure it does.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept an intermediate view I accept Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, so I don't think we can know (at least, not right now) whether zombies are possible.