Cambridge University
Faculty of Philosophy, Fitzwilliam College
PhD, 2013
Areas of Specialization
 Metaphysics Objects Properties Ontology
Areas of Interest
 Objects Properties Ontology Metaphysics Philosophy of Language Reference Truth Propositions Fregean Theories of Meaning Meaning Logic and Philosophy of Logic Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous 20th Century Logic Philosophy of Mathematics Logicism in Mathematics
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• ##### Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
In this book, I articulate and defend Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege’s insight that properties are not objects. According to this theory, properties are nothing but the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Fregean realism is the key to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley’s Regress and the Problem of Universals. I also argue that Fregean realism can be extended to cover states of affairs and propositions. According to this extended the…Read more
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##### Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth Mind. forthcoming.
In a recent article, Hofweber presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premiss from the philosophy of language: that ‘that’-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I agree with Hofweber that what we say about ‘that’-clauses has important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that, far from leading us into ide…Read more
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##### Propositional Functions in Extension Theoria 77 (4): 292-311. 2011.
In his “The Foundations of Mathematics”, Ramsey attempted to marry the Tractarian idea that all logical truths are tautologies and vice versa, and the logicism of the Principia. In order to complete his project, Ramsey was forced to introduce propositional functions in extension (PFEs): given Ramsey's definitions of 1 and 2, without PFEs even the quantifier-free arithmetical truth that 1 ≠ 2 is not a tautology. However, a number of commentators have argued that the notion of PFEs is incoherent. …Read more
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##### Forall x: Calgary. An Introduction to Formal Logic with P. D. Magnus, Tim Button, Aaron Thomas-Bolduc, and Richard Zach . 2019.
forall x: Calgary is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity of arguments, the syntax of truth-functional propositional logic TFL and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic FOL with identity (first-order interpretations), translating (formalizing) English in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as truth-functional…Read more
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##### Substitution in a sense Philosophical Studies 175 (12): 3069-3098. 2018.
The Reference Principle states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that …Read more
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##### The Prenective View of propositional content Synthese 195 (4): 1799-1825. 2018.
Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you can refer to…Read more
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##### Reducing Truth Through Meaning Erkenntnis 78 (4): 823-832. 2013.
Horwich has attempted to combine an anti-reductionist deflationism about sentential truth with a reductionist theory of meaning. Price has argued that this combination is inconsistent, but his argument is fallacious. In this paper I attempt to repair Price’s argument
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##### The concept horse with no name Philosophical Studies 172 (7): 1889-1906. 2015.
In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful
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##### Neutralism within the Semantic Tradition Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 246-251. 2012.
A neutralist framework is an account of the second-order quantifiers which does not by itself tell us what the ontological commitments of second-order quantification are, but which does tell us that those commitments cannot exceed those of predication. Recently, Wright has suggested that an inferentialist account of the second-order quantifiers is an adequate neutralist framework. I show that we do not have to become inferentialists in the pursuit of a neutralist framework: such a framework can …Read more
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##### A Dilemma for Neo-Fregeanism Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3): 361-379. 2014.
Neo-Fregeans need their stipulation of Hume's Principle — $NxFx=NxGx \leftrightarrow \exists R (Fx \,1\hbox {-}1_R\, Gx)$ — to do two things. First, it must implicitly define the term-forming operator ‘Nx…x…’, and second it must guarantee that Hume's Principle as a whole is true. I distinguish two senses in which the neo-Fregeans might ‘stipulate’ Hume's Principle, and argue that while one sort of stipulation fixes a meaning for ‘Nx…x…’ and the other guarantees the truth of Hume's Principle, nei…Read more
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##### Dolby substitution (where available) Analysis 72 (1): 98-102. 2012.
Alex Oliver has offered a variety of counterexamples to Crispin Wright's Reference Principle. I suggest that these counterexamples rely on too simple a notion of substitution to be compelling. However, this is not a satisfactory place to leave the discussion: we need some alternative account of substitution in English. In his recent paper, Dolby has attempted to give just such an account. I argue that Dolby's account is viciously circular. I then draw some morals from the discussion
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##### Eliminating identity: a reply to Wehmeier Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1): 1-8. 2014.
Wehmeier [2012] argues that identity is a problematic relation and that we can eliminate all mention of it. In this note I show, to the contrary, that if identity is problematic then Wehmeier has not given us the means to dispense with it.