Roberto De Andrade Martins

The sixth chapter of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species is called “Difficulties of the Theory.” In that part of his work, Darwin reveals some possible objections to his theory and attempts to provide an answer to all of them. Such a chapter was part of the first edition of the Origin of Species; therefore, the difficulties described were not reactions derived from the publication of the book. Instead, friends like Charles Lyell have probably presented some of them. Others can be found in works published before Darwin’s work, such as Natural Theology by William Paley, which argued for creationism and introduced arguments against any natural explanation of the origin of species. Many other problems dealt with in the sixth chapter were born, however, from Darwin’s own internal dialogue, his own initial doubts concerning the theory, and his anticipation of criticism, as one can gather from his manuscripts. This paper describes the main difficulties shown in the sixth chapter of the Origin of Species, providing a more detailed exposition of a few topics, and analyzing Darwin’s defense, in those cases. It also discusses some of the weak points in Darwin’s line of reasoning from a diachronic point of view.

: Suppose a scientist discovers a new, unpredicted phenomenon. How can one ascertain the causes, properties and laws of the phenomenon? How can one plan the investigation of the circumstances that affect the phenomenon, and of the effects that the new phenomenon could produce? If the phenomenon is completely unexpected and does not fit any previous theory, it is impossible to provide a theoretical prediction of its likely properties. In the empiricist tradition, therefore, the recommended method was to investigate all possibilities, because in such cases it is impossible to exclude a priori anything. William Stanley Jevons provided a clear criticism of this method. It is impossible to investigate all possibilities, because they are boundless. Is it then impossible to plan the research of unexpected new phenomena? No. Jevons pointed out an alternative. According to Jevons, a scientist confronting a new, unexpected phenomenon, should compare it to other known phenomena to establish analogies. This comparison should allow the researcher to find out one or several known phenomena similar to the new one. This paper will present and discuss Jevons’ proposal in the context of late 19th century methodology of science. Keywords: scientific method; empirical research; analogy; Jevons, William Stanley.

The focus of this paper is one of James Prescott Joule’s scientific contributions: the laws of heat production by electric currents in conductors. In 1841, the 22 years old Joule published a paper with the title “On the heat evolved by metallic conductors of electricity, and in the cells of a battery during electrolysis” where he presented an experimental study of that phenomenon and proposed two laws that were allegedly supported by his trials. On closer inspection, both his laboratory work and his inferences can be challenged. The emphasis of this article is an attempt to understand Joule’s experimental undertaking, its highpoints and shortcomings, by a detailed analysis of this specific episode and by studying the precedents of his work and subsequent advancements. It is possible to point out several serious deficiencies of that investigation, and Joule’s contemporaries, such as Edmond Becquerel and Heinrich Lenz, did criticize some of his flaws and undertook new experiments to provide a sound basis for those laws. Besides providing a historical examination of that specific episode, this article uses this case study to tackle some features of the nature of science that may contribute to scientific education.

ConclusionThe common assumption that Becquerel had no special reason to study uranium compounds in his search for substances emitting penetrating radiation cannot explain (a) Becquerel's own accounts, which refer to his choice as due to “the peculiar harmonic series of bands”; (b) Becquerel's systematic test of all uranium compounds (and metallic uranium), in contrast to his neglect of other substances; and (c) Becquerel's belief in invisible phosphorescence as an explanation of the radiation emitted by uranium compounds, even after his discovery that non-luminescent and metallic uranium also emit penetrating radiation.By comparing Becquerel's older studies of uranium to his radioactivity research, this paper has presented a reconstruction that can explain all of these points above. According to the historical evidence presented here, it is likely that Becquerel concentrated his attention on uranium and its compounds because the mechanical theory of luminescence opened up the possibility that, precisely in the case of uranium and its compounds, a violation of Stokes's law could occur, and penetrating short-wavelength radiation could be emitted through a special type of phosphorescence.

In his celebrated historic-epistemological work Identité et réalité, Émile Meyerson claimed that the scientific conservation principles were first suggested and accepted for philosophical reasons, and only afterwards were submitted to experimental tests. One of the instances he discussed in his book is the principle of mass conservation in chemical reactions. Meyerson pointed out that several authors, from Antiquity to Kant, accepted the idea of quantitative conservation of matter; and Lavoisier himself was strongly influenced by a priori ideas, using this principle instead of attempting to test it. This paper will review Meyerson’s claim and historic evidence, focusing especially the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the principle of mass conservation was tested in highly accurate experiments. Instead of confirming the principle, some of those experiments led to the detection of anomalies. Hans Landolt, for instance, noticed that there were some small violations of the principle. He observed mass variations of about 10−6 in chemical reactions produced in hermetically sealed glass tubes. Since Landolt was a famous chemist, his results produced a strong response. Several researchers repeated his experiments, with different results. Landolt himself improved his experiments, with a balance that could detect mass changes of 10−7. After changes of the experimental procedure, the chemical reactions did not show significant mass changes. There was not, however, any “crucial experiment” “proving” that mass was conserved. The observed anomalies were set aside mainly by theoretical reasons, after the discovery of radioactivity and the development of the theory of relativity.

Dans cet article nous étudions le Trattato della sfera de Galilée, écrit avant 1600. C’est un traité d’astronomie géocentrique qui suit la structure du Tractatus de sphæra de Johannes de Sacrobosco. Nous analysons quelques particularités du traité, en le comparant à d’autres travaux astronomiques du xvie siècle, et nous discutons ses sources probables. Nous soutenons que l’influence du commentaire de Christoph Clavius sur la Sphæra de Sacrobosco ne peut pas être considérée comme son influence unique ou principale. Le traité de Galilée était probablement inspiré par la Sfera del mondo de Piccolomini, un travail qui anticipait plusieurs particularités du Trattato della sfera. Cette influence est établie par de nombreuses annotations de Galilée trouvées dans un exemplaire du livre de Piccolomini.

This paper discusses the role of analogy in pre-theoretical experimental research, studying a particular historical case (the discovery and early investigation of X rays) and using the methodological ideas of William Stanley Jevons. The historical data and Jevons’ analysis suggest that the discovery of a completely new phenomenon is due to chance, but soon afterwards it is necessary that some assumptions provide a guidance to the research – otherwise, observations and experiments would occur at random, and that would sendom lead to significant results. It is impossible to study all the factors that could possibly affect a give phenomenon, and hence the attention of the researcher must focus upon a small number of features. This choice, in a pre-theoretical context, must be guided by analogies. Contrary to tradicional analyses, this paper associates a peculiar epistemological status with analogies used in that kind of investigation: they are interpreted as originating desiderata, instead of probable hypotheses. RESUMO: A partir do estudo de um caso histórico particular (descoberta e investigação preliminar dos raios X), utilizando as concepções metodológicas de William Stanley Jevons, este artigo analisa o papel das analogias no processo de pesquisa experimental pré-teórica. A análise de Jevons e os dados históricos indicam que a descoberta de um fenômeno totalmente novo se dá ao acaso, porém logo em seguida é necessário que algumas suposições guiem a pesquisa, caso contrário as observações e experimentos seriam realizados totalmente ao acaso, o que dificilmente levaria a algum resultado. É impossível estudar todos os fatores que podem influenciar um fenômeno, e assim a atenção do pesquisador deve ser focalizada apenas sobre alguns aspectos, e essa escolha, em um contexto pré-teórico, deve ser guiada por analogias. Ao contrário das análises tradicionais, este artigo atribui um status epistemológico diferente às analogias empregadas nesse tipo de investigação, interpretando-as como geradoras de desiderata e não de hipóteses prováveis.

In the first chapter of the Origin of species and in two chapters of the Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discusses the origin of domestic pigeons, claiming that all the known breeds were produced from a single species: Columba livia, the rock pigeon. The detailed defense of this point is of high relevance in Darwin’s argumentation strategy, since the differences between the several domestic breeds is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they could be classified as different species or genera. If man was able to produce such large differences, it becomes plausible that nature can produce even larger differences, and therefore the process of natural selection becomes acceptable. Darwin emphasizes the enormous differences between the several domestic breeds (that may have dissimilar cranial structures and a varying number of vertebrae), and at the same time he attempts to show that there are connections and transitions between the extreme types, arguing for their common origin. One of the several interesting parts of his argument is an experiment of crossing between widely different breeds, which led him to obtain pigeons similar to the wild species. The detailed analysis of Darwin’s study of pigeons shows the extreme care he took in his attempt to provide strong arguments for his theory. RESUMO: No primeiro capítulo do Origin of species, e em dois capítulos do Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discute a origem dos pombos domésticos, defendendo que todas as raças conhecidas provêm de uma única espécie: Columba livia, o pombo de rocha. A defesa detalhada desse ponto é de grande importância na estratégia argumentativa de Darwin, pois as diferenças entre as várias raças de pombos são tão grandes que, se fossem encontradas em estado selvagem, poderiam ser classificadas como espécies ou gêneros diferentes. Se o homem foi capaz de produzir mudanças tão grandes como essas, torna-se plausível que a natureza possa produzir diferenças ainda maiores, e assim o processo de seleção natural se torna aceitável. Darwin enfatiza as grandes diferenças entre as raças de pombos (que chegam a possuir, por exemplo, diferentes estruturas cranianas e diferentes números de vértebras), e ao mesmo tempo procura mostrar a existência de nuances e transições entre os tipos extremos, para defender a origem comum. Um dos aspectos interessantes de sua argumentação é um experimento de cruzamento entre raças bem diferentes, através da qual obtém pombos semelhantes à espécie selvagem. A análise detalhada desse estudo de Darwin mostra o extremo cuidado que ele tomava para tentar proporcionar fortes argumentos a favor de sua teoria.

Towards the middle of the 18th century, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis proposed the “principle of least action” as a fundamental law of physics and as a proof of the existence of God. Samuel König and other contemporary authors criticized Maupertuis’ work. There ensued a fierce discussion concerning this subject, in which Leonhard Euler, the king Frédéric II of Prussia and Voltaire took part. This paper discusses that debate, emphasizing its extrascientific features and analyzing the interests that motivated the actions of the people involved in that episode. RESUMO: Em meados do século XVIII, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis propôs o “princípio de ação mínima”, que seria uma lei fundamental da física, além de constituir uma prova da existência de Deus. O trabalho de Maupertuis foi criticado por Samuel König e outros autores da época. Ocorreu uma violenta discussão a respeito desse assunto, da qual participaram Leonhard Euler, o rei Frédéric II da Prússia e Voltaire. Este artigo estuda o debate ocorrido, enfatizando especialmente os aspectos extracientíficos e analisando os interesses que motivaram as ações das pessoas envolvidas nesse episódio.

The issue concerning the nature of science can be dealt in different ways. The question “What is science?” can receive empirical answers (what has been science, historically?), normative answers (what should be science?) and analytical ones (what could be science?). The two later approaches concern Philosophy. This paper criticises some philosophical attitudes towards science (relativism, dogmatism, scepticism, ecletism). It claims the existence of a well grounded acquired epistemological wisdom, encompassed by “impotence principles” that exhibit some limits of the human thought and point out what science cannot be. On the other side, there are no acceptable science/non-science demarcation criteria. This does not lead necessarily to a relativist or anarchist view, because it is possible to argue for a non-prohibitive axiological concept of science that could evaluate and guide research. RESUMO: A questão da natureza da ciência pode ser respondida sob diferentes pontos de vista. A pergunta “O que é a ciência?” pode receber respostas de tipo empírico (o que tem sido, historicamente, a ciência?), de tipo normativo (o que deveria ser a ciência?) e de tipo analítico (o que poderia ser a ciência?). Apenas esses dois últimos enfoques são pertinentes à Filosofia. Este artigo critica algumas atitudes filosóficas frente à natureza da ciência (relativismo, dogmatismo, ceticismo, ecletismo), defendendo no entanto a existência de pontos bem estabelecidos na Epistemologia, dados por “princípios de impotência” que mostram limites do pensamento humano e que indicam o que a ciência não pode ser. Por outro lado, não há critérios aceitáveis de demarcação entre ciência e não-ciência. Isso não leva necessariamente a uma posição relativista ou anarquista, pois é possível defender uma concepção axiológica não-proibitiva da ciência que permite avaliar e orientar a pesquisa.

The Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone is a non-profit academic association, founded on May 5th, 2000, in Quilmes, Argentina, at the closing ceremony of the 2nd Meeting of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone. The creation of this Association was the result of the interest to deepen and strengthen the exchange between the researchers in Philosophy and History of Science from the countries of the South Cone, from the two first meetings that took place in Porto Alegre and Quilmes onwards. Since then, there have been biennial meetings organized as its responsibility. The main aim of AFHIC is to contribute to a better understanding of science from a philosophical as well as a historical point of view in the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries, especially in those which belong to the American South Cone, promoting a space for reflection, exchange, discussion, communication, and dissemination of such an understanding. This volume is - with minor changes - the English version of Fisica: Estudos Filosofi cos e Historicos. It is composed of refereed and, in some cases, opportunely modifi ed contributions made by members of the Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone, some of them who are unfortunately no longer among us. Pablo Lorenzano Director of AFHIC's Book Series.

From Antiquity to the 19th century it was very common to explain natural phenomena (especially biological ones) through final causes. This paper analyses one of the periods of development of this concept, in Antiquity, with special emphasis upon the contributions of Socrates and Plato. They introduced the idea of an intelligent and beneficial god, who plans the structure of the universe and of all beings in the best possible way. This concept was strongly influential in later periods. RESUMO: Da Antiguidade até o século XIX foi muito comum procurar-se entender os fenômenos naturais (especialmente os biológicos) através de causas finais. Este artigo analisa um dos períodos de formação dessas concepções, na Antiguidade, dando especial atenção às contribuições de Sócrates e Platão. Estes introduzem a ideia de uma divindade inteligente e bondosa, que planeja a estrutura do universo e de todos os seres da melhor forma possível. Essa concepção teve grande influência, no período posterior.

Este trabajo discute si hoy todavía es posible admitir que hay principios a priori que no pueden ser abandonados por la física. La historia indica que ciertas “imposibilidades” filosóficas (como el movimiento, el vacuo y la acción directa a distancia) fueron sucesivamente abandonadas por la física. En el siglo XX, la mecánica cuántica rechazó al determinismo y al principio de simetría. La opinión más común entre los científicos es la de que cuando hay un conflicto entre física y filosofía hay que despreciar a los principios a priori. Sin embargo, hay todavía casos en los cuales es posible negar la posibilidad de determinados objetos físicos que entran en conflicto con nuestros conceptos espaciales. El autor defiende que existen principios a priori válidos en la física, y que su abandono es una deficiencia de determinadas teorías físicas modernas. Tal postura no tiene por consecuencia la negación de tales teorías, pero impone la tarea de complementarlas o interpretarlas de un novo modo para que sean compatibles con los principios filosóficos.

Although historians and philosophers of science usually try to explain the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories by scientists, there are no well definite criteria to evaluate when a scientist accepts or rejects a theory/hypothesis. This work proposes a new method of analysis. The attitudes of scientists towards a theory or hypothesis are classified according to three dimensions (cognitive, instrumental and strategic). This method is exemplified by the study of the attitude of the British naturalist William Bateson (1861-1924) towards chromosome theory. The analysis shows that Bateson never rejected the chromosome theory – a conclusion opposite to most historical accounts. RESUMEN: Los historiadores y los filósofos de la ciencia intentan explicar la aceptación o lo rechazo de determinadas hipótesis ó teorías por los científicos, pero no hay criterios claros que nos permitan decir lo qué es aceptación o rechazo. Este trabajo propone un nuevo método de análisis. Las actitudes de los investigadores son analizadas en relación a tres dimensiones (cognitiva, instrumental y estratégica). El método es ejemplificado por el estudio de la postura del naturalista inglés William Bateson (1861-1924) frente a la teoria cromosómica. El análisis que se realizó permitió verificar que Bateson jamás rechazó la teoría cromosómica, en contrario de lo que la mayoría de los historiadores afirman.

Apresentação / Pablo Lorenzano Introdução / Os editores Princípios em cosmologia / Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Aleatoriedad vs. arbitrariedad en la mecánica estadística clásica / Eduardo H. Flichman La teoría galileana de la materia: resolutio e infinitos indivisibles / Fernando Tula Molina Ciencia y música en la obra de Vincenzo Galilei (ca. 1520-1591) / Guillermo Boido & Eduardo Kastika T-invariancia, irreversibilidad, flecha del tiempo: similares pero diferentes / Olimpia Lombardi Mapa das interpretações da teoria quântica / Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. Aspectos epistemológicos y geométricos de la teoría del campo unificado de Schrödinger / Victor Rodríguez & Pedro W. Lamberti

O conceito de pseudo-ciência procura identificar propostas que têm uma aparência científica mas que não satisfazem critérios rigorosos de cientificidade. Alguns exemplos muito citados de pseudo-fenômenos estão os fatos alegados pela parapsicologia e pela astrologia. Para caracterizar a pseudo-ciência alguns autores propuseram critérios psicológicos, sociológicos ou metodológicos. O objetivo básico de uma caracterização metodológica dos pseudo-fenômenos é permitir identificar aquilo que parece existir, mas não existe. Trata-se, portanto, de uma distinção essencialmente ontológica. Este trabalho irá descrever várias tentativas de estabelecer critérios desse tipo e mostrará que nenhuma delas é satisfatória. Será apresentada uma abordagem alternativa, compatível com o caráter provisório do conhecimento científico, que permite avaliar a proposta de existência de um novo fenômeno e guiar a pesquisa, sem no entanto permitir concluir se o fenômeno existe ou não.

This paper discusses George John Romanes’ (1848-1894) contributions to evolution theory. In his early evolutionary work, Romanes could be regarded as a mere disciple and collaborator of Darwin. Strictly speaking, a follower of Darwin would only attempt to develop and to diffuse Darwin’s ideas, to apply them to new cases, to obtain new evidence for this theory and to answer to problems and objections against Darwin’s theory. However, after working for some time under Darwin’s guidance (for instance, trying to provide an experimental foundation for the hypothesis of pangenesis), Romanes adopted another strategy. As several other so-called Darwinians of the late 19th century, he endeavored to correct and to complement Darwin’s theory, with the introduction of new concepts and hypotheses (especially his “physiological selection”). Romanes’ new attitude might be regarded as an effort to step out of Darwin’s shadow and to exhibit his own brightness. Besides that, Romanes strove to undermine the work of other Darwinians that aimed at similar goals.

According to Aristotelian physics, there was a fundamental distinction between natural and violent motion. When the cause of the motion was internal to the moving body, that motion was regarded as natural. Violent motion was supposed to have an external efficient cause. It should stop as soon as this external cause ceased its action. The fall of a body was believed to have an internal cause – the very nature of the heavy body – but the motion of a projectile was supposed to be accidental and a violent one, produced by an external agent and maintained by the continuous action of the air around it. Those distinctions disappeared from physics during the 17th century. Descartes and Newton do not address those problems. However, in Galileo’s thought those distinctions were still present, and they did play a relevant role in his physics. Some central arguments presented by Galileo Galilei in the Dialogues concerning the two chief world systems depended on the characterisation of circular motion as “natural”. Considerations concerning natural or violent motion, circular and straight motions, provided a trap that led Galileo astray to ideas that seem extremely odd, from the point of view of classical mechanics. This article shows how Galileo struggled with those Aristotelian concepts when he tried to understand the nature of the motion of falling bodies.