Roberto De Andrade Martins

This paper studies Lamarck's scientific method both from the point of view of his methodological discourse and according to his scientific praxis. Lamarck's methodology is compared to Condillac's as well as to that of the idéologues - a group in which Lamarck is usually included. The analysis of this paper shows that Lamarck's methodological discourse is very similar to Condillac's, but his scientific praxis does not follow this view. Instead of following an empiricist approach, Lamarck's work is grounded upon general metaphysical principles concerning nature. Thus, from the ideologues's point of view, Lamarck's work should have been rejected -and that is what really happened - as being a mere metaphysical system grupo no qual se costuma incluir o próprio Lamarck. Mostra-se que o discurso metodológico de Lamarck assemelha-se ao dos ideólogos; no entanto, sua prática científica não se coaduna com esse enfoque. Em vez de seguir uma abordagem empirista, a obra de Lamarck se fundamenta em princípios metafísicos gerais sobre a natureza. Sob o ponto de vista dos ideólogos, seu trabalho deveria ser rejeitado - o que de fato ocorreu - como um mero sistema metafísico - no sentido pejorativo utilizado pelos seguidores de Condillac. No entanto, o presente artigo argumenta que esse é justamente um importante e inovador aspecto da obra de Lamarck, que permitiu a eclosão do evolucionismo moderno

This paper discusses the possibility of an absolute vacuum - a space without any substance. The motivation of this study is the contrast between most philosophers, up to Descartes, who stated that a vacuum was impossible, and the 17th century change of outlook, when the possibility and effective existence of the vacuum was accepted after the experiments of Torricelli and Pascal. This article attempts to show that, contrary to the received opinion, the acceptance of an ether is preferable to the acceptance of a vacuum for several reasons. First: it is impossible to provide an empirical proof of the non-existence of the ether; second, an absolute vacuum is unthinkable; third, the ether concept is useful for the understanding of physical phaenomena; and fourth, the hypothesis of an ether in apparently void spaces is useful for the future development of science. The paper also endeavours to show that no recent advance of science changed those conclusions and that no future development can change them.

O conceito de pseudo-ciência procura identificar propostas que têm uma aparência científica mas que não satisfazem critérios rigorosos de cientificidade. Alguns exemplos muito citados de pseudo-fenômenos estão os fatos alegados pela parapsicologia e pela astrologia. Para caracterizar a pseudo-ciência alguns autores propuseram critérios psicológicos, sociológicos ou metodológicos. O objetivo básico de uma caracterização metodológica dos pseudo-fenômenos é permitir identificar aquilo que parece existir, mas não existe. Trata-se, portanto, de uma distinção essencialmente ontológica. Este trabalho irá descrever várias tentativas de estabelecer critérios desse tipo e mostrará que nenhuma delas é satisfatória. Será apresentada uma abordagem alternativa, compatível com o caráter provisório do conhecimento científico, que permite avaliar a proposta de existência de um novo fenômeno e guiar a pesquisa, sem no entanto permitir concluir se o fenômeno existe ou não.

The issue concerning the nature of science can be dealt in different ways. The question “What is science?” can receive empirical answers (what has been science, historically?), normative answers (what should be science?) and analytical ones (what could be science?). The two later approaches concern Philosophy. This paper criticises some philosophical attitudes towards science (relativism, dogmatism, scepticism, ecletism). It claims the existence of a well grounded acquired epistemological wisdom, encompassed by “impotence principles” that exhibit some limits of the human thought and point out what science cannot be. On the other side, there are no acceptable science/non-science demarcation criteria. This does not lead necessarily to a relativist or anarchist view, because it is possible to argue for a non-prohibitive axiological concept of science that could evaluate and guide research. RESUMO: A questão da natureza da ciência pode ser respondida sob diferentes pontos de vista. A pergunta “O que é a ciência?” pode receber respostas de tipo empírico (o que tem sido, historicamente, a ciência?), de tipo normativo (o que deveria ser a ciência?) e de tipo analítico (o que poderia ser a ciência?). Apenas esses dois últimos enfoques são pertinentes à Filosofia. Este artigo critica algumas atitudes filosóficas frente à natureza da ciência (relativismo, dogmatismo, ceticismo, ecletismo), defendendo no entanto a existência de pontos bem estabelecidos na Epistemologia, dados por “princípios de impotência” que mostram limites do pensamento humano e que indicam o que a ciência não pode ser. Por outro lado, não há critérios aceitáveis de demarcação entre ciência e não-ciência. Isso não leva necessariamente a uma posição relativista ou anarquista, pois é possível defender uma concepção axiológica não-proibitiva da ciência que permite avaliar e orientar a pesquisa.

Dans cet article nous étudions le Trattato della sfera de Galilée, écrit avant 1600. C’est un traité d’astronomie géocentrique qui suit la structure du Tractatus de sphæra de Johannes de Sacrobosco. Nous analysons quelques particularités du traité, en le comparant à d’autres travaux astronomiques du xvie siècle, et nous discutons ses sources probables. Nous soutenons que l’influence du commentaire de Christoph Clavius sur la Sphæra de Sacrobosco ne peut pas être considérée comme son influence unique ou principale. Le traité de Galilée était probablement inspiré par la Sfera del mondo de Piccolomini, un travail qui anticipait plusieurs particularités du Trattato della sfera. Cette influence est établie par de nombreuses annotations de Galilée trouvées dans un exemplaire du livre de Piccolomini.

This paper discusses George John Romanes’ (1848-1894) contributions to evolution theory. In his early evolutionary work, Romanes could be regarded as a mere disciple and collaborator of Darwin. Strictly speaking, a follower of Darwin would only attempt to develop and to diffuse Darwin’s ideas, to apply them to new cases, to obtain new evidence for this theory and to answer to problems and objections against Darwin’s theory. However, after working for some time under Darwin’s guidance (for instance, trying to provide an experimental foundation for the hypothesis of pangenesis), Romanes adopted another strategy. As several other so-called Darwinians of the late 19th century, he endeavored to correct and to complement Darwin’s theory, with the introduction of new concepts and hypotheses (especially his “physiological selection”). Romanes’ new attitude might be regarded as an effort to step out of Darwin’s shadow and to exhibit his own brightness. Besides that, Romanes strove to undermine the work of other Darwinians that aimed at similar goals.

According to Aristotelian physics, there was a fundamental distinction between natural and violent motion. When the cause of the motion was internal to the moving body, that motion was regarded as natural. Violent motion was supposed to have an external efficient cause. It should stop as soon as this external cause ceased its action. The fall of a body was believed to have an internal cause – the very nature of the heavy body – but the motion of a projectile was supposed to be accidental and a violent one, produced by an external agent and maintained by the continuous action of the air around it. Those distinctions disappeared from physics during the 17th century. Descartes and Newton do not address those problems. However, in Galileo’s thought those distinctions were still present, and they did play a relevant role in his physics. Some central arguments presented by Galileo Galilei in the Dialogues concerning the two chief world systems depended on the characterisation of circular motion as “natural”. Considerations concerning natural or violent motion, circular and straight motions, provided a trap that led Galileo astray to ideas that seem extremely odd, from the point of view of classical mechanics. This article shows how Galileo struggled with those Aristotelian concepts when he tried to understand the nature of the motion of falling bodies.

Einstein knew and accepted some philosophical ideas similar to Bridgman's operationalism, at the time when he developed the theory of relativity. It is possible to detect the influence of those ideas both in the special and the general theories. Some of the basic steps taken by Einstein were essentially operationalistic: they could not be justified without epistemological principles of that kind. The common opinion is held that the special theory of relativity embodied a complete and coherent operational elucidation of physical magnitudes. This paper, however, points out some instances of physical magnitudes used in special relativity – such as the force that acts upon a moving body, its mass and its temperature – that could not be measured. It is claimed that this shows an early empistemological inconsistency in Einstein's work. RESUMO: Einstein conhecia e aceitava idéias filosóficas aparentadas ao operacionalismo de Bridgman na época em que desenvolvia a teoria da relatividade. Pode-se detectar essa influência nas teorias especial e geral da relatividade. Alguns dos passos básicos de Einstein foram essencialmente operacionalistas. Assim, é comum a opinião que supõe ter sido completamente efetuada, na teoria especial, de modo coerente, a elucidação operacional das grandezas físicas. Neste artigo, porém, apresentam-se exemplos de grandezas físicas utilizadas na relatividade especial – como a força que age sobre um corpo em movimento, sua massa e sua temperatura – que não eram mensuráveis. Isso revela uma inconsistência epistemológica no trabalho inicial de Einstein.

Towards the middle of the 18th century, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis proposed the “principle of least action” as a fundamental law of physics and as a proof of the existence of God. Samuel König and other contemporary authors criticized Maupertuis’ work. There ensued a fierce discussion concerning this subject, in which Leonhard Euler, the king Frédéric II of Prussia and Voltaire took part. This paper discusses that debate, emphasizing its extrascientific features and analyzing the interests that motivated the actions of the people involved in that episode. RESUMO: Em meados do século XVIII, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis propôs o “princípio de ação mínima”, que seria uma lei fundamental da física, além de constituir uma prova da existência de Deus. O trabalho de Maupertuis foi criticado por Samuel König e outros autores da época. Ocorreu uma violenta discussão a respeito desse assunto, da qual participaram Leonhard Euler, o rei Frédéric II da Prússia e Voltaire. Este artigo estuda o debate ocorrido, enfatizando especialmente os aspectos extracientíficos e analisando os interesses que motivaram as ações das pessoas envolvidas nesse episódio.

Lamarck's evolutionary theory has been regarded as groundless speculation by both coeval naturalists and modern historians of science. Lamarck is usually regarded as belonging to the group of the " idéologues" – followers of Condillac, with a strong empiricist outlook. Indeed, Lamarck refers respectfully to Condillac, and in his methodological discourse presents himself as an empiricist. However, if one compares his evolutionary theory with the empiricist requirements, Lamarck's work should be dismissed as groundless – a mere metaphysical " système" – in the pejorative sense used by the followers of Condillac. There is, however, another way of looking at Lamarck's method. The analysis of his later works – specially Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres and Système analytique des connaissances positives de l'homme – shows that he did not follow an empiricist method. His point of departure is indeed metaphysical, but it is exactly the kind of metaphysics now accepted by the biological sciences: a strict physicalism, that requires that all natural phenomena be explained by natural laws. Following this requirement, Lamarck's method seems the best available solution of that time to the fundamental biological problems: the nature, origin and structure of living bodies. Lamarck's work was criticized as purely speculative and non-scientific because it was evaluated in the context of empiricism. He was not altogether clear about his method and maybe he did not realize that he was departing from the empiricist tradition. The reinterpretation of Lamarck's theory from the point of view of his non-empiricist physicalism allows a favorable evaluation of his work. RESUMO: A teoria evolucionista de Lamarck tem sido considerada como uma especulação sem fundamento, tanto por naturalistas de sua época quanto por historiadores atuais da ciência. Lamarck é usualmente considerado como pertencendo ao grupo do "idéologues" – seguidores de Condillac, com uma forte tendência empirista. De fato, Lamarck se refere com respeito a Condillac, e em seu discurso metodológico apresenta a si próprio como empirista. No entanto, se compararmos sua teoria evolucionista com as exigências empiristas, o trabalho de Lamarck deveria ser rejeitado como desprovido de fundamentos – um mero "système" metafísico – no sentido pejorativo utilizado pelos seguidores de Condillac. Há, no entanto, outro modo de considerar o método de Lamarck. A análise de seus últimos trabalhos – especialmente os livros Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres and Système analytique des connaissances positives de l'homme – mostra que ele não seguia um método empirista. Seu ponto de partida era na realidade metafísico, mas é exatamente o tipo de metafísica que é atualmente aceita pelas ciências biológicas: um fisicalismo estrito, que exige que todos os fenômenos naturais sejam explicados por leis naturais. Seguindo essa exigência, o método de Lamarck parece a melhor solução disponível naquela época para os fenômenos biológicos fundamentais: a natureza, a origem e a estrutura dos seres vivos. O trabalho de Lamarck foi criticado como puramente especulativo e não-científico porque foi avaliado no contexto do empirismo. Ele não foi totalmente claro sobre seu método, e talvez ele próprio não tivesse percebido que estava se afastando da tradição empirista. A reinterpretação da teoria de Lamarck sob o ponto de vista de seu fisicalismo não empirista permite uma avaliação positiva de seu trabalho.

This work compares the views of René Descartes and Isaac Newton on the nature of gravitation and the possibility of direct action at a distance. In his early writings, Newton tried to find mechanical explanations of gravitation, but could not find any acceptable model. For that reason he preferred to avoid any mechanical explanation. He admitted that the existence of gravitation could be justified by induction, and used it to explain and to predict several phenomena, although gravitation itself was not explained. Descartes, on the other side, tried to explain gravity and the motion of planets using a mechanical model that accepted the existence of vortices of invisible matter. He criticized authors of his time, such as Roberval, who tried to introduce action at a distance. Descartes argued that this would require that brute matter should be endowed with soul and intelligence. This article analyses the arguments of several authors (before and after Descartes) and concludes that Descartes' criticism of action at a distance is valid. RESUMO: Este trabalho discute as posições de René Descartes e Isaac Newton frente à natureza da gravitação e à possibilidade de ações diretas à distância. Newton procurou inicialmente explicações mecânicas da gravitação, porém, não encontrando nenhum modelo aceitável, preferiu não propor nenhuma explicação. Admitindo que a existência da gravitação era justificada pela indução, ele a utilizou para explicar e prever muitos fenômenos, sem que ela própria fosse, no entanto, explicada. Descartes, por sua vez, tentou explicar a gravidade e os movimentos dos planetas a partir de um modelo mecânico de um vórtice de matéria invisível, criticando duramente autores de sua época que, como Roberval, tentaram introduzir a idéia de ação à distância, pois isso exigiria atribuir-se alma e inteligência à matéria bruta. Estudando os argumentos de vários outros autores anteriores e posteriores a Descartes, o artigo defende a posição de Descartes.

This paper addresses the context of emergence, development, and current status of the use of history and philosophy of science in science education in Brazil. After a short overview of the three areas (history of science, philosophy of science, and science education) in Brazil, the paper focuses on the application of this approach to teaching physics, chemistry, and biology at the secondary school level. The first Brazilian researches along this line appeared more consistently in the decade of 1970. From 1980 onwards, the importance of this approach became widely accepted, and the subject became a common theme of dissertations and theses, appearing in conferences and educational journals. Since 1998, the use of history and philosophy of science was included among the government recommendations for secondary school science teaching in Brazil. Nowadays, this is an important line of research in graduate programs on science and mathematics education. However, the actual use of this approach in secondary education is still a desideratum.

In the first chapter of the Origin of species and in two chapters of the Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discusses the origin of domestic pigeons, claiming that all the known breeds were produced from a single species: Columba livia, the rock pigeon. The detailed defense of this point is of high relevance in Darwin’s argumentation strategy, since the differences between the several domestic breeds is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they could be classified as different species or genera. If man was able to produce such large differences, it becomes plausible that nature can produce even larger differences, and therefore the process of natural selection becomes acceptable. Darwin emphasizes the enormous differences between the several domestic breeds (that may have dissimilar cranial structures and a varying number of vertebrae), and at the same time he attempts to show that there are connections and transitions between the extreme types, arguing for their common origin. One of the several interesting parts of his argument is an experiment of crossing between widely different breeds, which led him to obtain pigeons similar to the wild species. The detailed analysis of Darwin’s study of pigeons shows the extreme care he took in his attempt to provide strong arguments for his theory. RESUMO: No primeiro capítulo do Origin of species, e em dois capítulos do Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discute a origem dos pombos domésticos, defendendo que todas as raças conhecidas provêm de uma única espécie: Columba livia, o pombo de rocha. A defesa detalhada desse ponto é de grande importância na estratégia argumentativa de Darwin, pois as diferenças entre as várias raças de pombos são tão grandes que, se fossem encontradas em estado selvagem, poderiam ser classificadas como espécies ou gêneros diferentes. Se o homem foi capaz de produzir mudanças tão grandes como essas, torna-se plausível que a natureza possa produzir diferenças ainda maiores, e assim o processo de seleção natural se torna aceitável. Darwin enfatiza as grandes diferenças entre as raças de pombos (que chegam a possuir, por exemplo, diferentes estruturas cranianas e diferentes números de vértebras), e ao mesmo tempo procura mostrar a existência de nuances e transições entre os tipos extremos, para defender a origem comum. Um dos aspectos interessantes de sua argumentação é um experimento de cruzamento entre raças bem diferentes, através da qual obtém pombos semelhantes à espécie selvagem. A análise detalhada desse estudo de Darwin mostra o extremo cuidado que ele tomava para tentar proporcionar fortes argumentos a favor de sua teoria.

The Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone is a non-profit academic association, founded on May 5th, 2000, in Quilmes, Argentina, at the closing ceremony of the 2nd Meeting of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone. The creation of this Association was the result of the interest to deepen and strengthen the exchange between the researchers in Philosophy and History of Science from the countries of the South Cone, from the two first meetings that took place in Porto Alegre and Quilmes onwards. Since then, there have been biennial meetings organized as its responsibility. The main aim of AFHIC is to contribute to a better understanding of science from a philosophical as well as a historical point of view in the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries, especially in those which belong to the American South Cone, promoting a space for reflection, exchange, discussion, communication, and dissemination of such an understanding. This volume is - with minor changes - the English version of Fisica: Estudos Filosofi cos e Historicos. It is composed of refereed and, in some cases, opportunely modifi ed contributions made by members of the Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone, some of them who are unfortunately no longer among us. Pablo Lorenzano Director of AFHIC's Book Series.

Apresentação / Pablo Lorenzano Introdução / Os editores Princípios em cosmologia / Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Aleatoriedad vs. arbitrariedad en la mecánica estadística clásica / Eduardo H. Flichman La teoría galileana de la materia: resolutio e infinitos indivisibles / Fernando Tula Molina Ciencia y música en la obra de Vincenzo Galilei (ca. 1520-1591) / Guillermo Boido & Eduardo Kastika T-invariancia, irreversibilidad, flecha del tiempo: similares pero diferentes / Olimpia Lombardi Mapa das interpretações da teoria quântica / Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. Aspectos epistemológicos y geométricos de la teoría del campo unificado de Schrödinger / Victor Rodríguez & Pedro W. Lamberti

Although historians and philosophers of science usually try to explain the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories by scientists, there are no well definite criteria to evaluate when a scientist accepts or rejects a theory/hypothesis. This work proposes a new method of analysis. The attitudes of scientists towards a theory or hypothesis are classified according to three dimensions (cognitive, instrumental and strategic). This method is exemplified by the study of the attitude of the British naturalist William Bateson (1861-1924) towards chromosome theory. The analysis shows that Bateson never rejected the chromosome theory – a conclusion opposite to most historical accounts. RESUMEN: Los historiadores y los filósofos de la ciencia intentan explicar la aceptación o lo rechazo de determinadas hipótesis ó teorías por los científicos, pero no hay criterios claros que nos permitan decir lo qué es aceptación o rechazo. Este trabajo propone un nuevo método de análisis. Las actitudes de los investigadores son analizadas en relación a tres dimensiones (cognitiva, instrumental y estratégica). El método es ejemplificado por el estudio de la postura del naturalista inglés William Bateson (1861-1924) frente a la teoria cromosómica. El análisis que se realizó permitió verificar que Bateson jamás rechazó la teoría cromosómica, en contrario de lo que la mayoría de los historiadores afirman.

Norwood Hanson's last paper (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) presented an analysis of the very concept of "discovery". Many recent historiographical works discuss episodes of scientific discovery, but there are few epistemological analyses of this concept. The present paper attempts to improve Hanson's work, proposing a hierarchical series of discovery levels. The analysis presented here establishes the conditions that should be satisfied in order to ascribe the scientific discovery of a new phenomenon to somebody. It also points out the partial aims that one should endeavour to attain in the investigation of a new phenomenon. RESUMEN: El último artículo escrito por Norwood Hanson (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) analizaba el concepto mismo de “descubrimiento”. Muchos trabajos historiográficos recientes discuten episodios de descubrimientos científicos, pero hay pocos análisis epistemológicos de este concepto. El presente artículo procura perfeccionar el trabajo de Hanson, proponiendo una serie jerárquica de niveles de descubrimiento. El análisis que se presenta acá establece las condiciones que deben ser satisfechas para que se atribuya a un individuo el descubrimiento científico de un novo fenómeno, e indica también las metas parciales que se deben buscar en la investigación de un fenómeno desconocido.

This paper studies the history of teleological thought in Antiquity, after Aristotle, analyzing three relevant episodes: the contribution of Theophrastus – a companion and successor of Aristotle; Stoicism, as described by Cicero in his work On the nature of gods; and Galen’s anatomical and physiological works, especially his book On the utility of the parts of the human body. This analysis exhibits the broad diversity of views concerning final causes in Antiquity, all of them widely different from Aristotle’s one, and the strong influence of theological concerns in some of those philosophers – such as the Stoics and Galen.

From Antiquity to the 19th century it was very common to explain natural phenomena (especially biological ones) through final causes. This paper analyses one of the periods of development of this concept, in Antiquity, with special emphasis upon the contributions of Socrates and Plato. They introduced the idea of an intelligent and beneficial god, who plans the structure of the universe and of all beings in the best possible way. This concept was strongly influential in later periods. RESUMO: Da Antiguidade até o século XIX foi muito comum procurar-se entender os fenômenos naturais (especialmente os biológicos) através de causas finais. Este artigo analisa um dos períodos de formação dessas concepções, na Antiguidade, dando especial atenção às contribuições de Sócrates e Platão. Estes introduzem a ideia de uma divindade inteligente e bondosa, que planeja a estrutura do universo e de todos os seres da melhor forma possível. Essa concepção teve grande influência, no período posterior.

Este trabajo analiza las diferencias entre las teorías de Lorentz y Poincaré (quienes aceptaban el éter) y de Einstein, cuestionando las explicaciones comunes de los motivos por los cuales la teoría de la relatividad es preferible a la anterior. La principal diferencia entre los puntos de vista de Einstein y de Lorentz y Poincaré era de naturaleza epistemológica y no teórica. Cada uno de los enfoques tenía aspectos epistémicos positivos, pero de la misma manera les hacía falta a los dos puntos de vista determinados aspectos que estaban presentes en la otra propuesta. Por lo tanto, una de ellas no era superior a la otra. De ese modo, no había argumentos conclusivos que permitieron elegir una de ellas y rechazar a la otra.

Isometry hypotheses are propositions that assert the constancy of a specific physical magnitude of a system under prescribed conditions. This paper addresses the controversy concerning the conventionality of this type of hypotheses. It discusses several instances of isometry hypotheses and it is shown that experimental facts can be invoked to criticise (or "refute") isometry hypotheses, just as other types of hypotheses. This proves that isometry hypotheses, and the choices of measurement standards that are grounded in such hypotheses, are not merely conventional.

Abstract   This paper describes the early history of magnetochemistry: the search for chemical effects of magnetism in the nineteenth century. Some early researchers, such as Johann Wilhelm Ritter, attempted to reproduce with magnets the effects that had been produced by electricity and Volta’s battery. For several decades, researchers successively reported positive results and denied claims concerning the effect of magnetism in oxidation, electrolysis, reduction of metals from saline solutions, crystallisation, change of colour of vegetable tinctures and other chemical reactions. In the two last decades of the nineteenth century some effects were accepted as real, and a thermodynamic theory of the influence of magnetic fields upon chemical reactions was developed. Finally, Dragomir Hurmuzescu was able to create reproducible experiments and measured the electromotive force between two electrodes, with or without the presence of magnetic fields, confirming the existence of the phenomenon and obtaining results compatible with the theoretical predictions. Afterwards, this magnetochemical effect was accepted as real, but the effect was weak and its practical importance was negligible. The subject was gradually forgotten. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-26 DOI 10.1007/s10698-011-9127-8 Authors Roberto de Andrade Martins, Department of Physics, State University of Paraiba, Campina Grande, PB, Brazil Journal Foundations of Chemistry Online ISSN 1572-8463 Print ISSN 1386-4238.