•  529
    Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of laws
    with Darrell Patrick Rowbottom
    Analysis 69 (4): 668-677. 2009.
    We argue that the inference from dispositional essentialism about a property (in the broadest sense) to the metaphysical necessity of laws involving it is invalid. Let strict dispositional essentialism be any view according to which any given property’s dispositional character is precisely the same across all possible worlds. Clearly, any version of strict dispositional essentialism rules out worlds with different laws involving that property. Permissive dispositional essentialism is committed t…Read more
  •  179
    Two conceptions of the chemical bond
    Philosophy of Science 75 (5): 909-920. 2008.
    In this article I sketch G. N. Lewis’s views on chemical bonding and Linus Pauling’s attempt to preserve Lewis’s insights within a quantum‐mechanical theory of the bond. I then set out two broad conceptions of the chemical bond, the structural and the energetic views, which differ on the extent in which they preserve anything like the classical chemical bond in the modern quantum‐mechanical understanding of molecular structure. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, D…Read more
  •  174
    Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2): 339-353. 2007.
    In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevin's recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called
  •  139
    Elements, Compounds, and Other Chemical Kinds
    Philosophy of Science 73 (5): 864-875. 2006.
    In this article I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so complex and heterogeneous at the molecular level that `water is H2O' seems …Read more
  •  139
    The physicists, the chemists, and the pragmatics of explanation
    Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 1048-1059. 2004.
    In this paper I investigate two views of theoretical explanation in quantum chemistry, advocated by John Clarke Slater and Charles Coulson. Slater argued for quantum‐mechanical rigor, and the primacy of fundamental principles in models of chemical bonding. Coulson emphasized systematic explanatory power within chemistry, and continuity with existing chemical explanations. I relate these views to the epistemic contexts of their disciplines.
  •  111
    Review. Realism rescued: How scientific progress is possible. Jerrold L Aronson, R harré, Eileen Cornell way
    with D. J. Mossley
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 175-179. 1999.
  •  104
    Elements, compounds and other chemical kinds
    Philosophy of Science 73 (5): 864--875. 2006.
    In this article I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so complex and heterogeneous at the molecular level that `water is H2O’ seems …Read more
  •  101
    Ontological reduction and molecular structure
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (2): 183-191. 2010.
  •  97
    Philosophy of chemistry
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
    Chemistry is the study of the structure and transformation of matter. When Aristotle founded the field in the 4th century BCE, his conceptual grasp of the nature of matter was tailored to accommodate a relatively simple range of observable phenomena. In the 21st century, chemistry has become the largest scientific discipline, producing over half a million publications a year ranging from direct empirical investigations to substantial theoretical work. However, the specialized interest in the con…Read more
  •  75
    Are realism and instrumentalism methodologically indifferent?
    Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3). 2001.
    Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist …Read more
  •  70
    Chemical substances and the limits of pluralism
    Foundations of Chemistry 14 (1): 55-68. 2011.
    In this paper I investigate the relationship between vernacular kind terms and specialist scientific vocabularies. Elsewhere I have developed a defence of realism about the chemical elements as natural kinds. This defence depends on identifying the epistemic interests and theoretical conception of the elements that have suffused chemistry since the mid-eighteenth century. Because of this dependence, it is a discipline-specific defence, and would seem to entail important concessions to pluralism …Read more
  •  70
    Lavoisier and mendeleev on the elements
    Foundations of Chemistry 7 (1): 31-48. 2004.
    Lavoisier defined an element as a chemicalsubstance that cannot be decomposed usingcurrent analytical methods. Mendeleev saw anelement as a substance composed of atoms of thesame atomic weight. These `definitions' doquite different things: Lavoisier'sdistinguishes the elements from the compounds,so that the elements may form the basis of acompositional nomenclature; Mendeleev's offersa criterion of sameness and difference forelemental substances, while Lavoisier's doesnot. In this paper I explor…Read more
  •  66
    In this paper I examine the relationship between historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, and indeed scientists themselves. I argue that they co-habit a shared intellectual territory ; and they should be able to do so peacefully, and with mutual respect, even if they disagree radically about how to describe the methods and results of science. I then go on to explore some of the challenges to mutually respectful cohabitation between history, philosophy and sociology of science. I con…Read more
  •  57
    Emergence is often described as the idea that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts: interactions among the components of a system lead to distinctive novel properties. It has been invoked to describe the flocking of birds, the phases of matter and human consciousness, along with many other phenomena. Since the nineteenth century, the notion of emergence has been widely applied in philosophy, particularly in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics. It has …Read more
  •  52
    Introduction: Historiography and the philosophy of the sciences
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55 1-2. 2016.
    The history of science and the philosophy of science have a long and tangled relationship. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on science can be guided, shaped, and challenged by historical scholarship—a process begun by Thomas Kuhn and continued by successive generations of ‘post-positivist’ historians and philosophers of science. On the other hand, the activity of writing the history of science raises methodological questions concerning, for instance, progress in science, realism and ant…Read more
  •  50
    Models and approximations in quantum chemistry
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 63 123-142. 1998.
  •  47
    Realism and Progress: Why Scientists should be Realists
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38 53-72. 1995.
    For as long as realists and instrumentalists have disagreed, partisans of both sides have pointed in argument to the actions and sayings of scientists. Realists in particular have often drawn comfort from the literal understanding given even to very theoretical propositions by many of those who are paid to deploy them. The scientists' realism, according to the realist, is not an idle commitment: a literal understanding of past and present theories and concepts underwrites their employment in the…Read more
  •  35
    Realism and Progress: Why Scientists should be Realists
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38 53-72. 1995.
    For as long as realists and instrumentalists have disagreed, partisans of both sides have pointed in argument to the actions and sayings of scientists. Realists in particular have often drawn comfort from theliteralunderstanding given even to very theoretical propositions by many of those who are paid to deploy them. The scientists' realism, according to the realist, is not an idle commitment: a literal understanding of past and present theories and concepts underwrites their employment in the c…Read more
  •  34
    Entropy and Chemical Substance
    Philosophy of Science 77 (5): 921-932. 2010.
    In this essay I critically examine the role of entropy of mixing in articulating a macroscopic criterion for the sameness and difference of chemical substances. Consider three cases of mixing in which entropy change occurs: isotopic variants, spin isomers, and populations of atoms in different orthogonal quantum states. Using these cases I argue that entropy of mixing tracks differences between physical states, differences that may or may not correspond to a difference of substance. It does not …Read more
  •  34
    Scientific Realism and the History of Chemistry
    Spontaneous Generations 9 (1): 108-117. 2018.
    -
  •  31
    Structure as Abstraction
    Philosophy of Science 83 (5): 1070-1081. 2016.
    In this article I argue that structure in chemistry is a creature of abstraction: attending selectively to structural similarities, we neglect differences. There are different ways to abstract, so abstraction is interest dependent. So is structure. First, there are two different and mutually irreducible notions of structure in chemistry: bond structure and geometrical structure. Second, structure is relative to scale : the same substance has different structures at different scales, and relation…Read more
  •  28
    Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?
    Philosophy of Science 68 (S3). 2001.
    Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist …Read more
  •  25
    Structure, scale and emergence
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85 44-53. 2021.
  •  24
    Substantial confusion
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2): 322-336. 2006.
    In this paper I defend, against Eric Scerri’s objections, the following theses: that Lavoisier and Mendeleev shared a ‘core conception’ of chemical element, and that this core conception underwrites referential continuity in the names of particular elements.Keywords: Antoine Lavoisier; Dmitri Mendeleev; Chemical elements; Substance; Natural kinds; Reference.
  •  20
    Structure, essence and existence in chemistry
    Ratio 36 (4): 274-288. 2023.
    Philosophers have often debated the truth of microstructural essentialism about chemical substances: whether or not the structure of a chemical substance at the molecular scale is what makes it the substance it is. Oddly they have tended to pursue this debate without identifying what a structure is, and with some confusion and about what a chemical substance is. In this paper I draw on chemistry to rectify those omissions, providing a pluralist account of structure, clarifying what (according to…Read more
  •  19
    Review (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 287-291. 1997.
  •  14
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 101 (401): 169-171. 1992.
  •  13
    By their own account, physicalists are committed to the claim that physics is causally complete, or closed. The claim is presented as an empirical one. However, detailed and explicit empirical arguments for the claim are rare. I argue that molecular models are a key source of evidence but that, on closer inspection, they do not support the completeness claim
  •  7
    Elements and (first) principles in chemistry
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 14): 3391-3411. 2019.
    The first principle of chemical composition is that elements are actually present in their compounds. It is a golden thread running through the history of compositional thinking in chemistry since before the chemical revolution. Opposed to this principle, which I call Actually Present Elements (APE), is the idea that elements are merely potentially present in their compounds: although not actually present, it is possible to recover them. In this paper I follow that golden thread, and then discus…Read more