Roblin Meeks

John Jay College Of Criminal Justice, CUNY
  • John Jay College Of Criminal Justice, CUNY
    Graduate Studies
    Associate Dean Of Graduate Studies
CUNY Graduate Center
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
New York City, New York, United States of America
  •  59
    Reviews (review)
    with Joshua Knobe, Dingmar Van Eck, Susan Blackmore, Henk Bij De Weg, John Barresi, Julian Kiverstein, and Drew Rendall
    Philosophical Psychology 18 (6). 2005.
    JOHANNES ROESSLER & NAOMI EILAN (Eds.)Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003ISBN 0199245622 (pbk, 415 pages, $39.95)In The Principles of Psychology, William James presents an interesting case of a ‘...
  •  1
    Identifying the First Person
    Dissertation, City University of New York. 2003.
    Wide agreement exists that self-ascriptions that one would express with the first-person pronoun differ in kind from those one would express with other self-designating expressions such as proper names and definite descriptions. At least some first-person self-ascriptions, many argue, are nonaccidental---that is, they involve no self-identification, and hence in making them one cannot accidentally misidentify the subject of the ascription. I examine the support for this claim throughout the lite…Read more
  •  8
    Book Review: Stanley Cavell: Philosophy's Recounting of the Ordinary (review)
    Philosophy and Literature 19 (2): 407-408. 1995.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the OrdinaryRoblin MeeksStanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary, by Stephen Mulhall; xxv & 351 pp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, $52.00.Despite what his book’s title might suggest, Stephen Mulhall’s thorough explication of Stanley Cavell’s philosophy is anything but ordinary. At the outset Mulhall makes it clear that he intends to address Cavell’s excep…Read more
  •  65
    Unintentionally biasing the data: Reply to Knobe
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2): 220-223. 2004.
    Knobe wants to help adjudicate the philosophical debate concerning whether and under what conditions we normally judge that some side effect was brought about intentionally. His proposal for doing so is perhaps an obvious one--simply elicit the intuitions of "The Folk" directly on the matter and record the results. Knobe concludes that people's judgment that a side effect was brought about intentionally apparently rests, at least in part, upon how blameworthy they find the agent responsible for …Read more