•  607
    Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary
    In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. 2019.
  •  579
    How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge
    Logos and Episteme 5 (2): 133-140. 2014.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier si…Read more
  •  436
    Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture
    In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, Oxford University Press. 2017.
    I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.
  •  365
    Unreasonable Selflessness
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (3): 492-502. 2016.
    According to Jennifer Lackey, one should assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to believe that p and if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p. As data for this norm of assertion Lackey appeals to the intuition that in cases of ‘selfless assertion’ agents assert with epistemic propriety something they don’t believe. If that norm of assertion was true, then it would explain why selfless assertions are epistemically…Read more
  •  296
    E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin
    Erkenntnis 82 (5): 1031-1041. 2017.
    A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is jus…Read more
  •  289
    Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4): 463-479. 2016.
    Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti-luck …Read more
  •  278
    A Failed Twist to an Old Problem
    Logos and Episteme 7 (1): 75-81. 2016.
    John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
  •  193
    The diachronic threshold problem
    Philosophical Studies. 2021.
    The paper introduces a new problem for fallibilist and infallibilist epistemologies – the diachronic threshold problem. As the name suggests, this is a problem similar to the well–known threshold problem for fallibilism. The new problem affects both fallibilism and infallibilism, however. The paper argues that anyone who worries about the well known problem for fallibilism should also worry about this new, diachronic version of the problem.
  •  186
    On synchronic dogmatism
    Synthese 192 (11): 3677-3693. 2015.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken
  •  132
    Knowledge from Knowledge
    American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3). 2020.
    This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status of one’s belief in th…Read more
  •  76
    This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
  •  70
    ABSTRACT This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics.
  •  49
    Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem (edited book)
    with Claudio de Almeida and Peter David Klein
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
  •  15
    This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology. There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is g…Read more
  •  15
    Altruísmo Irracional
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (3): 492-502. 2016.
    De acordo com Jennifer Lackey, deve-se asserir que p somente se é razoável acreditar que p e se alguém asseriu que p, afirmaria que p pelo menos em parte porque é razoável acreditar que p. Como dados para essa norma de asserção, Lackey apela à intuição de que, nos casos de afirmação altruísta, os agentes afirmam com propriedade epistêmica algo que não acreditam. Se essa norma de afirmação fosse verdadeira, então ela explicaria por que as afirmações altruístas são epistemicamente apropriadas. Nes…Read more
  •  13
    Apresentação
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3): 477-480. 2017.
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  •  8
    Editorial note
    Manuscrito 40 (4). 2017.
  •  5
    Correction to: The diachronic threshold problem
    Philosophical Studies 179 (6): 2079-2079. 2022.