•  171
    Making Sense of Thompson Clarke's "The Legacy of Skepticism"
    Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 23 (12): 70-102. 2021.
    Thompson Clarke’s seminal paper “The Legacy of Skepticism” (1972) is notoriously difficult in both substance and presentation. Despite the paper’s importance to skepticism studies in the nearly half-century since its publication, no attempt has been made in the secondary literature to provide an account, based on a close reading of the text, of just what Clarke’s argument is. Furthermore, much of the existing literature betrays (or so it seems to me) fundamental misunderstandings of Clarke’s tho…Read more
  •  107
    In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne’s thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel’s progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne’s thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hart…Read more
  •  100
    The Legacy of Thompson Clarke
    Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 23 (12): 148-167. 2020.
  •  52
    Sextus Empiricus on Isotheneia_ and _Epoche: A Developmental Model
    Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 21 (11): 188-209. 2020.
  •  29
    Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy: The Charronian Legacy 1601–1662 (review)
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1): 174-178. 2016.
  •  22
    How (Not) To Read Sextus Empiricus
    Ancient Philosophy 34 (1): 121-149. 2014.
    This paper pursues two tasks: first, to criticize a number of prominent contemporary interpretations of the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, especially Jonathan Barnes’s; and second, to outline an alternative interpretation of Sextus that (a) reconciles the opposing sides of the long-standing dispute over the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment, and (b) suggests a sympathetic alternative to some of the most influential accounts of the Pyrrhonian way of life.
  •  17
    Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumiéres, Aufklärung (review)
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2): 383-388. 2015.
  •  14
    The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
    Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 41 (2): 329-362. 2020.
    I argue in this paper that, like the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to negative–dogmatic skepticism in On Certainty turns on the attempt to free us from the demands of traditional philosophy and is therefore not a philosophical position, strictly speaking. Rather, it is a therapeutic metaphilosophy designed to bring into view (i.e., to illumine) the relationship between our everyday epistemic practices and those of philosophy such that we simultaneously come to recognize…Read more
  •  9
  •  2
    This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical skepticism. One goal is to forestall overhasty dismissals of his position based on failures to understand the logical relations among his various anti-skeptical claims and arguments. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical strategy consists solely in d…Read more