•  748
    The intelligibility objection against underdetermination
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1): 121-146. 2012.
    One of the objections against the thesis of underdetermination of theories by observations is that it is unintelligible. Any two empirically equivalent theories — so the argument goes—are in principle intertranslatable, hence cannot count as rivals in any non-trivial sense. Against that objection, this paper shows that empirically equivalent theories may contain theoretical sentences that are not intertranslatable. Examples are drawn from a related discussion about incommensurability that shows …Read more
  •  728
    Quine’s writings on indeterminacy of translation are mostly abstract and theoretical; his reasons for the thesis are not based on historical cases of translation but on general considerations about how language works. So it is no surprise that a common objection to the thesis asserts that it is not backed up by any positive empirical evidence. Ian Hacking (1981 and 2002) claims that whatever credibility the thesis does enjoy comes rather from alleged (fictitious) cases of radical mistranslation.…Read more
  •  145
    Relativismo e Absolutismo
    with Guilherme Gräf Schüler
    Cognitio-Estudos 17 (2): 293-296. 2020.
  •  118
    Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is…Read more
  •  113
    Kant’s treatments of incongruent counterparts have been criticized in the recent literature. His 1768 essay has been charged with an ambiguous use of the notion of ‘inner ground’, and his 1770 claim that those differences cannot be apprehended conceptually is thought to be false. The author argues that those two charges rest on an uncharitable reading. ‘Inner ground’ is equivocal only if misread as mapping onto Leibniz notion of quality. Concepts suffice to distinguish counterparts, but are i…Read more
  •  95
    A Note on Essential Indexicals of Direction
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1): 10-15. 2012.
    Some authors claim that ‘I’ and ‘now’ are essential indexicals, in the sense that they cannot be eliminated in favor of other indexicals or nonindexical expressions. This article argues that three indexicals of direction—one for each spatial dimension (e.g., ‘up’, ‘front’, and ‘left’)—must also be regarded essential, insofar as they are used as pure indexicals and not as demonstratives
  •  94
    A puzzle about incongruent counterparts and the critique of pure reason
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4). 2007.
    Kant uses incongruent counterparts in his work before and after 1781, but not in the first Critique. Given the relevance that incongruent counterparts had for his thought on space, and their persistence in his work during the 1780s, it is plausible to think that he had a reason for leaving them out of both editions of the Critique. Two implausible conjectures for their absence are here considered and rejected. A more plausible alternative is put forth, which explains that textual absence as a re…Read more
  •  50
    Quine – Peter Hylton (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 738-740. 2009.
    This is a review of Peter Hylton's Quine (Routledge, 2007). The review highlights three aspects of the book that make are somewhat novel in the literature: (1) Hylton points out that Quine does not reject the analytic-synthetic distinction altogether, but merely its epistemological use by Carnap and others; (2) that the thesis of indeterminacy of translation is not a central doctrine in Quine's philosophy; and (3) that besides a naturalized epistemology, Quine's philosophy contains also a "natur…Read more
  •  37
    Quine is frequently acknowledged as one of the main proponents of both confi rmation holism and underdetermination. In the recent literature, however, his views have been often criticized and misrepresented: the distinction between the two theses has been often blurred, the obviousness of holism has been rejected, and the plausibility of underdetermination has come under attack. This paper attempts to formulate both theses as clearly as possible and to defend Q…Read more
  •  33
    Quine's argument “from above”
    European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 601-607. 2021.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 601-607, June 2022.
  •  19
    Book review of Sander Verhaegh's Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism
  •  13
    Este artigo mostra que não há uma tese de subdeterminação de teorias científicas pelos indícios observacionais, mas várias. Identificamos quatro, com significados, plausibilidades e implicações distintos. Mostra-se que as mais fortes não passam de conjeturas, e que as mais fracas são mais plausíveis, mas não possuem implicações filosóficas robustas – em particular, não implicam o antirrealismo científico –, embora forneçam indícios de alternativas teóricas sistematicamente i…Read more
  •  9
    Tradução do artigo de Kant publicado orginalmente em 1768.
  •  7
    Are there emprical cases of indeterminacy or translation?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1): 135-152. 2014.
    Quine's writings on indeterminacy of translation are mostly abstract and theoretical; his reasons for the thesis are not based on historical cases of translation but on general considerations about how language works. So it is no surprise that a common objection to the thesis asserts that it is not backed up by any positive empirical evidence. Ian Hacking (1981 and 2002) claims that whatever credibility the thesis does enjoy comes rather from alleged (fictitious) cases of radical mistranslation.…Read more
  •  4
    O naturalismo sustenta que não há acesso mais elevado à verdade do que por meio de hipóteses empiricamente testáveis. No entanto, não repudia hipóteses intestáveis. Elas preenchem os interstícios de teorias e conduzem a novas hipóteses que são testáveis.Uma hipótese é testada deduzindo-se, dela e da base [background] de uma teoria aceita, algum categórico observacional que não se segue da base apenas. Esse categórico, um enunciado condicional generalizado composto de duas frases observacionais, …Read more
  • Kant, Kuhn e a racionalidade da ciência
    with Michael Friedman
    Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 14 (1): 175-209. 2009.
    Este artigo considera a evolução do problema da racionalidade científica desde Kant, passando por Carnap, até Kuhn. Argumento em favor de uma versão relativizada e historicizada da concepção original kantiana dos princípios científicos a priori, e examino o modo pelo qual esses princípios mudam e se desenvolvem através de mudanças revolucionárias de paradigmas. O empreendimento distintivamente filosófico de refletir sobre e contextualizar tais princípios é então visto como desempenhando um papel…Read more