•  2519
    The Kuhnian Paradigm
    Topoi 32 (1): 65-73. 2013.
    Kuhn wanted to install a new research agenda in philosophy of science. I argue that the tools are now available to better articulate his paradigm and let it guide philosophical research instead of itself remaining the object of philosophical debate.
  •  689
    A Unified Model of the Division of Cognitive Labor
    Philosophy of Science 81 (3): 444-459. 2014.
    Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the “context of justification,” assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balanci…Read more
  •  556
    Peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems
    Synthese 190 (13): 2547-2556. 2013.
    In a situation of peer disagreement, peers are usually assumed to share the same evidence. However they might not share the same evidence for the epistemic system used to process the evidence. This synchronic complication of the peer disagreement debate suggested by Goldman (In Feldman R, Warfield T (eds) (2010) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 187–215) is elaborated diachronically by use of a simulation. The Hegselmann–Krause model is extended to multiple epistemic systems and …Read more
  •  73
    Academic and corporate research departments alike face a crucial dilemma: to exploit known frameworks or to explore new ones; to specialize or to innovate? Here I show that these two conflicting epistemic desiderata are sufficient to explain pluralistic ignorance and its boom-and-bust-like dynamics, exemplified in the collapse of the efficient markets hypothesis as a modern risk management paradigm in 2007. The internalist nature of this result, together with its robustness, suggests that plural…Read more
  •  69
    Introduction: The Progress of Science
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 54-54. 2014.
  •  59
    The problem of Kuhnian rationality
    Philosophica 86 (3): 11-31. 2012.
    According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn's view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neo-positivist inte…Read more
  •  41
    Evaluating Philosophy as Exploratory Research
    Metaphilosophy 48 (3): 227-244. 2017.
    This article addresses the question how philosophy should be evaluated in a research-grant funding environment. It offers a new conception of philosophy that is inclusive and builds on familiar elements of professional, philosophical practice. Philosophy systematically questions the questions we ask, the concepts we use, and the values we hold. Its product is therefore rarely conclusive but can be embodied in everything we do. This is typical of explorative research and differentiates it from ex…Read more
  •  33
    A comparison of two models of scientific progress
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46 94-99. 2014.
    Does science progress toward some goal or merely away from primitive beginnings? Two agent-based models are built to explain how possibly both kinds of progressive scientific change can result from the interactions of individuals exploring an epistemic landscape. These models are shown to result in qualitatively different predictions about what the resulting system of science should be like
  •  15
    Satisficing as an Account of Kuhnian Rationality
    Philosophy Study 3 (5). 2013.
    The lack of an account of rationality in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was a lacuna which Thomas Kuhn acutely felt. In this paper, I argue that Herbert Simon’s notion of “satisficing” provides a formally well-developed and empirically well-established theory of rationality that fits well with Kuhn’s general characterization of science. I start by considering two rival interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality and introduce Simon’s notion of satisficing. In Section 3, I show…Read more
  •  3
    A guidebook through Kuhn scholarship
    Metascience 25 (3): 455-457. 2016.
  • Evidentie in wetenschap en wetenschapsfilosofie
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (1): 65-68. 2009.
  • CONGRESBESPREKING-Evidentie in wetenschap en wetenschapsfilosofie
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (1). 2009.
  • From Theory Choice to Theory Search: The Essential Tension Between Exploration and Exploitation in Science
    with Peter Rubbens
    In William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.), Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 311. Springer. 2015.