• Parmenides and the Problem of Inquiry
    Dissertation, City University of New York. 1996.
    In the fragments of Parmenides, a goddess tells a human of the "roads of inquiry there are for conceiving", and rehearses arguments to show why to eon must be said and taken to be a certain way, on or for an apparently viable road of inquiry. These arguments invoke ike, nanke, and oi ra--roughly, ustice, ecessity, and air Portion--as binding to eon. There is no evidence that the goddess speaks of how to eon might be independent of inquiry, or across all contexts. ;I show that in order for inquir…Read more
  •  19
    Colloquium 1 Parmenides, Liars, and Mortal Incompleteness
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 33 (1): 1-21. 2018.
    On the road of inquiry that Parmenides’ goddess recommends, one is to say and conceive that what-is is one, unmoving, continuous, ungenerated, undestroyed, complete, and undivided. Yet the goddess’s arguments in favor of this road use negations, distinctions, divisions, and references to generation and destruction. The requisites of inquiry that she outlines are both defined on and at odds with other features that inquiry appears to require. This essay argues that the goddess’s arguments manifes…Read more
  •  10
    Sex, Gender, and Class in the Poem of Parmenides: Difference without Dualism?
    American Journal of Philology 140 (1): 29-66. 2019.
  •  16
    Mortals Lay Down Trusting to be True
    Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2): 251-271. 2017.
    The goddess’s speech in Parmenides’s fragments is framed by the opinions of mortals in at least two ways. First, the journey of the proem starts in the world described by mortals’ opinions, and the second part of the goddess’s speech explores those opinions. Second, throughout her speech, the goddess invokes features of the world according to mortals’ opinions—negation, coming-to-be, destruction—even when she is arguing for a road of inquiry that excludes those features. Further, we study the fr…Read more
  •  11
    Inquiry and What Is: Eleatics and Monisms
    Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1): 1-26. 2003.
    While Melissus argues for a numerical monism, Parmenides and Zeno undermine claims to unconditional or transcendental knowledge. Yet the work of Parmenides and Zeno is not merely critical or eristic, and does not imply that philosophical inquiry is futile. Instead it shows the importance of reflection on the way the requisites of inquiry are represented in its results, and entrains an axiological investigation to every ontological one.
  •  26
    Why Matter? Aristotle, the Eleatics, and the Possibility of Explanation
    Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26 (2): 1-29. 2005.
    Aristotle introduced the notion of matter to Greek philosophy. His use of the term ὕλη was essentially original, and he was the first to explore this ὕλη thematically and theoretically. Why, though, did he introduce the notion of matter? It is important to note that Aristotle first invokes ὕλη, and first lays out what he means by it, in discussions about causes. In fact, Aristotle’s interest in matter is as a cause, as responsible for the way things are, not as a kind of independent entity.
  •  8
    Why Matter? Aristotle, the Eleatics, and the Possibility of Explanation
    Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26 (2): 1-29. 2005.
    Aristotle introduced the notion of matter to Greek philosophy. His use of the term ὕλη was essentially original, and he was the first to explore this ὕλη thematically and theoretically. Why, though, did he introduce the notion of matter? It is important to note that Aristotle first invokes ὕλη, and first lays out what he means by it, in discussions about causes. In fact, Aristotle’s interest in matter is as a cause, as responsible for the way things are, not as a kind of independent entity.
  •  9
    Parmenides’s Poetic Frame
    International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1): 7-38. 2004.
  •  34
    Parmenides’s Poetic Frame
    International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1): 7-38. 2004.
  •  6
    Commentary on Marmodoro
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 32 (1): 25-37. 2017.
    This paper comments on Anna Marmodoro’s “Stoic Blends.” That essay argues that the “Eleatic Principle” is central to Stoic conceptions of what is. It also investigates a key difference between Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions of the roles of form and matter in constituting what is: the Stoics’ insistence that form and matter are bodies, and their concomitant assertion that more than one independent body can occupy the exact same place. The present comment explores the relationships between the…Read more
  •  2
    Λέγειν, Νοεῖν and Τὸ Ἐόν in Parmenides
    Ancient Philosophy 21 (2): 277-304. 2001.
  •  8
    Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science, by Ian Bell (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 27 (2): 448-452. 2007.
  •  16
    Inquiry and What Is
    Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1): 1-26. 2003.
    While Melissus argues for a numerical monism, Parmenides and Zeno undermine claims to unconditional or transcendental knowledge. Yet the work of Parmenides and Zeno is not merely critical or eristic, and does not imply that philosophical inquiry is futile. Instead it shows the importance of reflection on the way the requisites of inquiry are represented in its results, and entrains an axiological investigation to every ontological one
  •  42
  •  39
    Λέγειν, Νοεῖν and Τὸ Ἐόν in Parmenides
    Ancient Philosophy 21 (2): 277-303. 2001.