•  13
    Vulnerability and Trust: An Introduction
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5): 575-582. 2020.
  •  17
    Bodily feelings and felt inclinations
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1-16. forthcoming.
    The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body. But it rejects the idea, familiar in the work of William James, that what one feels when one has a feeling is something biological about one’s body. Instead it argues that to have a bodily feeling is to feel an apparent bodily indication of something – a bodily appearance. Being aware of what one’s body is apparently indicating to one is being aware…Read more
  •  33
    Empathy, Vulnerability and Anxiety
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2): 347-357. 2019.
    ABSTRACTA concept of empathy as openness to the emotional perspective of another is developed in opposition to a concept of sympathy as agreement with the emotional perspective of another. Empathy involves knowledge of how things are emotionally for the other person, which is not the same thing as knowledge of the other person’s emotions. Being open to another perspective requires the capacity to hold two perspectives in mind simultaneously – one that is one’s own perspective and at the same tim…Read more
  •  65
    Practical reasoning and practical knowledge
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4): 564-579. 2019.
    The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that…Read more
  •  155
    Philosophy 72 (279): 19-27. 1997.
    A natural picture to have of events and processes is of entities which extend through time and which have temporal parts, just as physical objects extend through space and have spatial parts. While accepting this picture of events, in this paper I want to present an alternative conception of processes as entities which, like physical objects, do not extend in time and do not have temporal parts, but rather persist in time. Processes and events belong to metaphysically distinct categories. Moreov…Read more
  •  314
    What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2): 135-148. 2012.
    What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759
  •  196
    Seeing the anger in someone's face
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 29-43. 2010.
    Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product–process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product
  •  123
    Internalising practical reasons
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3). 2004.
    Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent’s state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this means that in a causal proc…Read more
  •  107
    Adopting roles: Generosity and Presumptuousness
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 141-161. 2015.
    Generosity is not the same thing as kindness or self-sacrifice. Presumptuousness is incompatible with generosity, but not with kindness or self-sacrifice. I consider a kind but interfering neighbour who inappropriately takes over the role of mother to my daughter; her behaviour is not generous. Presumptuousness is the improper exercise of a disposition to adopt a role that one does not have. With this in mind I explore the idea that generosity is the proper exercise of the disposition to ado…Read more
  •  57
    Process, Action, and Experience (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Process, Action, and Experience offers a radical new approach to the philosophy of mind and action, taking processes to be the central subject matter. An international team of contributors consider what kinds of things processes are, and explore the progressive nature of action and conscious experience.
  •  96
    Can There be Virtue in Violence?
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 265 (3): 323-336. 2013.
  •  162
    Routledge. 2005.
    The traditional focus of debate in philosophy of action has been the causal theory of action and metaphysical questions about the nature of actions as events. In this lucid and lively introduction to philosophy of action, Rowland Stout shows how these issues are subsidiary to more central ones that concern the freedom of the will, practical rationality and moral psychology. When seen in these terms, agency becomes one of the most exciting areas in philosophy and one of the most useful ways into …Read more
  •  318
    The Category of Occurrent Continuants
    Mind 125 (497): 41-62. 2016.
    Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. This has mistakenl…Read more
  •  135
    Despite being somewhat long in the tooth at the time, Aristotle, Hume and Kant were still dominating twentieth century moral philosophy. Much of the progress made in that century came from a detailed working through of each of their approaches by the expanding and increasingly professionalized corps of academic philosophers. And this progress can be measured not just by the quality and sophistication of moral philosophy at the end of that century, but also by the narrowing of some of the gaps be…Read more
  •  192
    An influential philosophical conception of our mind’s place in the world is as a site for the states and events that causally mediate the world we perceive and the world we affect. According to this conception, states and events in the world cause mental states and events in us through the process of perception. These mental states and events then go on to produce new states and events in the world through the process of action. Our role is as hosts for these states and events that causally medi…Read more
  •  63
    Descartes's hidden argument for the existence of God
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6 (2). 1998.
  •  37
    The book is an extended argument against neuralism (or against a sort of argument for neuralism), where neuralism is understood to be the identification of mental events with neurophysiological events. So an event of a trying is not supposed to be inner in the sense that a brain event is. And although Pietroski accepts Descartes metaphysical distinction between mental events and physical events, he does not need to extend this to the thought that mental events occupy a special mental realm. So t…Read more
  • What you know when you know how someone behaves
    Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7. 2002.
    [1] In chapter 2 of _The Concept of Mind_, “Knowing How and Knowing That”, and especially in the section on “Understanding and Misunderstanding”, Ryle rejects two approaches to the question of the interpretation of other minds that correspond quite closely with what are now called functionalism, or theory theory, and simulation theory. There is a painful irony here that the functionalist approach to the philosophy of mind, which developed in the late 60s and 70s, has widely been regarded as comp…Read more
  •  21
    The evolution of theoretically useful traits
    Biology and Philosophy 13 (4): 529-540. 1998.
    The purely theoretical notion of fitness or optimality that is employed for instance in optimization theory has come under attack from those who think that only a more historically based notion of fitness could have a central role in evolutionary explanation. They argue that the key notion is proven usefulness rather than theoretical usefulness. This paper articulates a notion of theoretical usefulness and defends its role in functional evolutionary explanations.
  •  201
    in O’Rourke, F. (ed.), Human Destinies (Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).
  •  208
    Think 2 (5): 37-44. 2003.
    The central claim of philosophical behaviourism is this: what it is to be in a certain state of mind is to be disposed to behave in a certain way. Most philosophers think that this claim is obviously false. They also think it is offensive. They think it is offensive because it appears to reduce or eliminate what is most valuable to us – our minds. It puts the notion of behaviour in the place of mind, and so removes what distinguishes us from automata. B. F. Skinner, one of the most famous (notor…Read more
  •  58
    Rowland Stout presents a new philosophical account of human action which is radically and controversially different from all rival theories. He argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen, and that they are to be explained in terms of objective facts rather than beliefs and intentions.
  •  35
    Ryle's behaviourism
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 37-49. 2003.
  •  6
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1): 1-2. 2014.
  •  61
    Anti-externalism – Joseph Mendola
    Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240): 656-658. 2010.
    No Abstract