Rudi Te Velde

This paper examines critically Kretzmann's reconstruction of the project of natural theology as exemplified by Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles. It is argued that the notion of natural theology, as understood and advocated by Kretzmann, is particularly indebted to the epistemologically biased natural theology of modernity with its focus on rational justification of theistic belief. As a consequence, Kretzmann's view of the arguments for the existence of God and their place within Aquinas's theological project is insufficiently sensitive to the ontological conception of truth and intelligibility which underlies the argumentation. From his epistemological point of view Kretzmann differs from Aquinas in two aspects. First, he contends that it is not necessary to establish the existence of God with absolute certainty at the outset; one may begin with the hypothesis that there is a God. Second, the arguments do not yet conclude to the existence of God in the specific theistic sense; they show at most the existence of a primary explanatory entity, which may be identified with God later on. Both claims are criticized in the light of a discussion of Aquinas's theological method.

This article discusses Thomas Aquinas's view on the ‘utility’ of prayer in the light of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. ‘Creatio ex nihilo’ means, among other things, that nothing can exist that is not caused by the universal power of God. The universal causality of creation implies that God cannot receive from the world or react to any activity on our part. This claim of divine immutability throws into question the intelligibility of prayer: does it make sense to pray to God when his providence is certain and immutable? I argue that the God Thomas conceives is not the God of the ancient régime, the sovereign deity of absolute power who is in charge of everything; on the contrary, it is a God who grants the secondary causes within the world their own power and operation. The human activity of prayer belongs to this sphere of ‘second causes’, through which God realizes his providential plan. God's providence provides good things to us, one of which is the fulfillment of our prayers

Contemporary theology commonly rejects the traditional 'Greek' reading of Exodus 3:14, according to which God reveals himself to Moses by the name of 'being' in favour of a more religious interpretation which sees in the name a confirmation of Gods enduring and liberating presence to his people. By means of an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas' reading of the Exodus-name in the Summa the author intends to show that Aquinas' account of the name is not guided by an exegetical and hermeneutical interest but by a propoer speculative way of questioning, which can be formulated as follows: given the fact that God reveals himself to Moses under the name of being, how can this name - in what it signifies and how it signifies - be understood as a suitable medium by which God reveals himself to man. In the Summa-text Thomas gives three arguments why the name 'being' is the most appropriate name of God. It is argued that each of these arguments relates to a different aspect of the complex structure of God-in-his-revelation-to-man. Aquinas' account of the name of being is in accord with his analysis of the divine names, in which the tension between the res significata, the reality which is signified by a name, and the modus significandi, the human way of signifying, stands central. This tension returns in his analysis of the name 'being', where it clarifies the structure of revelation as a concealing presence of God to man. The implications of Thomas' reading for the notion of revelation exhibit some interesting similarities with the modern reading of Exodus inspite of the fundamental difference in theological method

According to Thomas Aquinas, both logic and metaphysics are characterized by the same universal scope. The consideration of metaphysics extends to everthing which is, as its subject is being insofar as it is being. And the science of logic too considers everything which is, not as it exists in reality but insofar as the whole of being falls under the consideration of reason. Because of the equivalence between the logical sphere of reason and the real sphere of being metaphysics has an affinity with logic. This similarity is mentioned by Aquinas in order to explain the legitimate use of a logical mode of reasoning within metaphysics. Metaphysics is not identical with logic, but the modus logicus, the logical mode of reasoning, is to a certain extent useful for the philosopher in his inquiry into metaphysical matters. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Thomas refers frequently to this ‘modus logicus' by which Aristotle is said to proceed in his investigation into substance. However, it is not altogether clear what this method consists in and how the similarity between logic and metaphysics, on which the modus logicus is based, should be understood. In this article I want to clarify the meaning of the modus logicusin Aquinas and its revelance for metaphysics. This might help us to understand better how according to Thomas logic and metaphysics are related to one another and in what sense they are different

Grace is defined by Thomas as a participation of the divine nature. By the gift of grace man is said to become a „god by participation”. In this study an interpretation is proposed of the meaning of participation as applied to grace. Grace, according to Thomas, is the free gift of God himself to man by which man becomes united with God in knowledge and love. It is through the gift of grace that man achieves his ultimate perfection which consists in the vision of God. Why must grace be understood as a matter of participation, so it is asked? Does the notion of participation befit the Christian experience of grace as a personal encounter between man and God? It appears that the expression participation of the divine nature is intended as a solution to the following problem: how can man be understood to attain his ultimate perfection of seeing God's infinite essence, if this vision is only connatural to an infinite intellect? Because the act of seeing God is proper to the divine nature, it is not a desirable good for man precisely insofar as he is a man. This means that human nature as such cannot be understood as the subject of the act of faith by which the vision of God is anticipated within the context of human life on earth. The only way open to man to be subject of faith, thus to attain God in his divinity, is by becoming a god himself, while remaining a human being. Since the act of faith is properly a divine act, this act cannot perfect man in relation to his human nature, but only in relation to the divine nature as participated in him by grace. Only in this way, by receiving a participated likeness of God, is the human intellect capable of an act with respect to God himself, which is nevertheless a free and spontaneous act of man himself as it proceeds from an intrinsic principle. The conclusion is that participation provides an answer to the question of how man must be understood if a personal encounter between man and God, between creature and creator, should be possible.

Contemporary theology commonly rejects the traditional 'Greek' reading of Exodus 3:14, according to which God reveals himself to Moses by the name of 'being' in favour of a more religious interpretation which sees in the name a confirmation of Gods enduring and liberating presence to his people. By means of an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas' reading of the Exodus-name in the Summa the author intends to show that Aquinas' account of the name is not guided by an exegetical and hermeneutical interest but by a propoer speculative way of questioning, which can be formulated as follows: given the fact that God reveals himself to Moses under the name of being, how can this name - in what it signifies and how it signifies - be understood as a suitable medium by which God reveals himself to man. In the Summa-text Thomas gives three arguments why the name 'being' is the most appropriate name of God. It is argued that each of these arguments relates to a different aspect of the complex structure of God-in-his-revelation-to-man. Aquinas' account of the name of being is in accord with his analysis of the divine names, in which the tension between the res significata, the reality which is signified by a name, and the modus significandi, the human way of signifying, stands central. This tension returns in his analysis of the name 'being', where it clarifies the structure of revelation as a concealing presence of God to man. The implications of Thomas' reading for the notion of revelation exhibit some interesting similarities with the modern reading of Exodus inspite of the fundamental difference in theological method

Grace is defined by Thomas as a participation of the divine nature (with reference to II Petrus 1:4). By the gift of grace man is said to become a „god by participation”. In this study an interpretation is proposed of the meaning of participation as applied to grace. Grace, according to Thomas, is the free gift of God himself to man by which man becomes united with God in knowledge and love. It is through the gift of grace that man achieves his ultimate perfection which consists in the vision of God. Why must grace be understood as a matter of participation, so it is asked? Does the notion of participation befit the Christian experience of grace as a personal encounter between man and God? It appears that the expression participation of the divine nature is intended as a solution to the following problem: how can man (as a finite intellect) be understood to attain his ultimate perfection of seeing God's infinite essence, if this vision is only connatural to an infinite intellect? Because the act of seeing God is proper to the divine nature, it is not a desirable good for man precisely insofar as he is a man. This means that human nature as such cannot be understood as the subject of the act of faith by which the vision of God is anticipated within the context of human life on earth. The only way open to man to be subject of faith, thus to attain God in his divinity, is by becoming a god himself, while remaining a human being. Since the act of faith is properly a divine act, this act cannot perfect man in relation to his human nature, but only in relation to the divine nature as participated in him by grace. Only in this way, by receiving a participated likeness of God, is the human intellect (and will) capable of an act with respect to God himself, which is nevertheless a free and spontaneous act of man himself as it proceeds from an intrinsic principle. The conclusion is that participation provides an answer to the question of how man must be understood if a personal encounter between man and God, between creature and creator, should be possible

According to Thomas Aquinas, both logic and metaphysics are characterized by the same universal scope. The consideration of metaphysics extends to everthing which is, as its subject is being insofar as it is being. And the science of logic too considers everything which is, not as it exists in reality but insofar as the whole of being falls under the consideration of reason. Because of the equivalence between the logical sphere of reason and the real sphere of being metaphysics has an affinity with logic. This similarity is mentioned by Aquinas in order to explain the legitimate use of a logical mode of reasoning within metaphysics. Metaphysics is not identical with logic, but the modus logicus, the logical mode of reasoning, is to a certain extent useful for the philosopher in his inquiry into metaphysical matters. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Thomas refers frequently to this ‘modus logicus' by which Aristotle is said to proceed in his investigation into substance. However, it is not altogether clear what this method consists in and how the similarity between logic and metaphysics, on which the modus logicus is based, should be understood. In this article I want to clarify the meaning of the modus logicusin Aquinas and its revelance for metaphysics. This might help us to understand better how according to Thomas logic and metaphysics are related to one another and in what sense they are different.

This paper examines critically Kretzmann's reconstruction of the project of natural theology as exemplified by Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles. It is argued that the notion of natural theology, as understood and advocated by Kretzmann, is particularly indebted to the epistemologically biased natural theology of modernity with its focus on rational justification of theistic belief. As a consequence, Kretzmann's view of the arguments for the existence of God and their place within Aquinas's theological project is insufficiently sensitive to the ontological conception of truth and intelligibility which underlies the argumentation. From his epistemological point of view Kretzmann differs from Aquinas in two aspects. First, he contends that it is not necessary to establish the existence of God with absolute certainty at the outset; one may begin with the hypothesis that there is a God. Second, the arguments do not yet conclude to the existence of God in the specific theistic sense; they show at most the existence of a primary explanatory entity, which may be identified with God later on. Both claims are criticized in the light of a discussion of Aquinas's theological method.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius I:On God, Creation, and ProvidenceRudi A. Te VeldeIn this essay, I want to share my impressions of the first chapter of the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius of Vatican I. It begins its declaration of the basic truths of Christian faith in a language which is similar, and probably intended to be similar, to that of a solemn confession of faith: "The holy, catholic, apostolic, and Roman church believes and acknowledges that there is one true living God, creator and lord of heaven and earth."1 It reminds one, in some of its formulations, of the Nicene Creed, but with a remarkable difference: here, in the text of the constitution, the object of the confession is formulated as a proposition about God's existence.2 What is said is not, for example, "I believe in one God, the Father almighty"; but the Church believes and holds it to be true that there exists a God. One can notice a subtle shift from a confession of faith to the proclamation of a (rational) truth. The Pope, gathered with all the bishops of the Church, declares that there exists a God, the one and true living God, a doctrinal statement directed, by implication, against those who dare to deny the existence of God. The opening sentence of chapter 1 corresponds with its canon, which says that, "if anyone denies the one true God, creator and [End Page 823] lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema."3 Thus the constitution says that the "one, true living God" of the biblical faith exists, that this is a truth, and that, as consequence, the opposed thesis of atheism is false and must be rejected.Who is asserting this truth? Who is speaking and with which authority? The text leaves no doubt about the speaking subject. It is the Church, entitled to speak with authority about matters of faith, because it is the Roman Church, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The Church speaks, in the person of the pope, the legitimate successor of St. Peter, with authority granted to her by God himself through his Son Jesus Christ. In the preface preceding chapter 1 of the constitution, it is said that the Church is appointed by God to be "mother and mistress of nations." Hence:She can never cease from witnessing to the truth of God... and from declaring it, for she knows that these words were directed to her: "My spirit which is upon you, and my words I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth from this time forth and for evermore"(Is 59:21).4This gives the pope, sitting in the chair of Peter, the authority of "teaching and defending Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines."5 And the first thing to be declared, as part of the Church's task to proclaim the Catholic truth to all the nations, is to assert the existence of God against the error of atheism.It is important to understand the genre of a dogmatic constitution. It is a document in which the Church, by mouth of the pope together with the bishops, expounds the basic tenets of Christian teaching. The purpose of a dogmatic constitution is to reaffirm the basic truths of Christian doctrine, to clarify the fundamentals of faith in a message to the world. A constitution may be occasioned by actual developments in the world and society, but it speaks as it were from the standpoint of eternity. In case of the constitution Dei Filius, the addressee is the world of the mid-nineteenth century, a time of dominance of scientific reason, of materialism, naturalism, atheism, and not unimportantly, of current forms of idealistic pantheism (Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, the influence of German Idealism in general); what the constitution especially stands opposed to [End Page 824] is the view of supernatural religion as being irrational. For this purpose it wants to reclaim reason and to overcome the disastrous gap between faith and (modern) rationality.The double program underlying the constitution—teaching the Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines—reminds one of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] of Thomas Aquinas.6 The...

Aquinas on God presents an accessible exploration of Thomas Aquinas' conception of God. Focusing on the Summa theologiae - the work containing Aquinas' most systematic and complete exposition of the Christian doctrine of God - Rudi te Velde acquaints the reader with Aquinas' theological understanding of God and the metaphysical principles and propositions that underlie his project. Aquinas' conception of God is dealt with not as an isolated metaphysical doctrine, but from the perspective of his broad theological view which underlies the scheme of the Summa. Readers interested in Aquinas, historical theology, metaphysics and metaphysical discourse on God in the Christian tradition will find this new contribution to the studies of Aquinas invaluable.